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ABSTRACT
The German Communist Party's response to the rise of the 
Nazis was conditioned by its complicated political environment which 
included the influence of Soviet foreign policy requirements, the 
party's Marxist-Leninist outlook, its organizational structure and 
the democratic society of Weimar.
Relying on the Communist press and theoretical journals, 
documentary collections drawn from several German archives, as well 
as interview material, and Nazi, Communist opposition and Social 
Democratic sources, this study traces the development of the KPD's 
tactical orientation towards the Nazis for the period 1923-1933.
In so doing it complements the existing literature both by its 
extension of the chronological scope of enquiry and by its attention 
to the tactical requirements of the relationship as viewed from the 
perspective of the KPD.
It concludes that for the whole of the period, KPD tactics were 
ambiguous and reflected the tensions between the various competing 
factors which shaped the party's policies.
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7INTRODUCTION
This study examines the relationship which developed between 
the German Communist Party (KPD) and the German National Socialist 
Workers' Party (NSDAP). The focus is on the KPD and the strategic 
and tactical perspectives which were evolved between 1923 and 1933 
to govern the party's relations with the Nazis. The argument 
establishes that these relations were complicated; that they 
contained tensions as between the KPD's overall objectives and the 
exigencies of its life as a party under Weimar. The tension was 
expressed as tactical ambiguity and for the various reasons which 
are explored in the pages which follow, the KPD's response to the 
NSDAP contained elements of co-operation as well as competition. As 
it is developed below, this argument is sufficiently distinct in its 
emphasis, scope and conclusions to Justify the separate treatment.
However modest its aims, no enquiry into Weimar politics and 
history can entirely free itself from the profound general problems 
of interpretation which the subject raises. The need to assign a 
more certain place to the 1933 disaster in German and Western history 
is still compelling. If only by implication, therefore, general 
questions concerning the reasons for the collapse of Weimar are 
bound to impinge upon a study of the relationship between the two 
parties which were the most visible and active antagonists of 
constitutional government. Even if the scope of enquiry could be
8reduced to the barest account of tactical questions, the larger 
issues would remain. This would be so because, for the citizen of 
Weimar, the violent element in the relationship —  the frequent 
and bloody clashes in the streets —  expressed the central truth of 
the Republic's failure to provide a basis for order and security.
In another sense, too, the relationship touches on central 
problems. In a way the shared hostility to Weimar meant that 
Communists and Nazis could be seen as allies; yet it was an 
alliance which could never be complete and could never be fully 
acknowledged by either side. Despite themselves, the Communists 
were bound to the same rationalist tradition in politics which found 
its expression in the Weimar constitution. The KPD's oppositionist 
stance, therefore, proceeded from an entirely different conception 
than that of the Nazis. Nazi opposition was more fundamental; it 
expressed a dark, atavistic and complete rejection of rational 
discourse as the appropriate basis for political life. In 1933, the 
Communists found that more had been involved in Hitler's rise to 
power than the mere replacement of one form of "bourgeois" government 
by another. A whole universe of rational discourse had disappeared. 
Everyone, including the Communists, who had found a place in that 
universe shared in the general defeat. It was the special and ironic 
tragedy of the KPD that it more than most of Hitler's victims only 
dimly comprehended this simple truth. There was irony because, of 
all the Weimar parties, it was the KPD which was most firmly wedded
9to its rationalist outlook; that is, to an outlook which 
uncompromisingly stressed the preponderant importance of a rational 
calculation of interest as the determinate of political behaviour.
So unyielding were their categories, and so blindly applied, that 
the Communists were led to misunderstand the nature of the threats 
which faced them. There was madness in such stubbornness; the 
other side, so to speak, of Nazi madness and the intelligent, 
completely cynical, manipulation of an irrational political appeal.
If the general problems are tenacious, a direct approach to them 
must still be avoided in a study such as this. As far as is possible 
the questions which fall outside of a restricted range of considerations 
which bear directly on the relationship between the two parties are 
avoided. This means that important dimensions of Communist behaviour 
and tactics are, by necessity, not considered. Although in practice 
it was sometimes difficult to establish boundaries, it is obvious 
that not everything which needs to be said about the KPD can be 
contained within an examination of its response to the Nazis. In 
this connection, a special difficulty was raised by the Social 
Democrats. In order to make the KPD's priorities clear, 
considerable attention had always to be directed at questions 
which arose out of the KPD's relations with the SPD. Nevertheless, 
despite the unavoidable attention given to such important 
contextual considerations, this is not a comprehensive treatment 
of the KPD under Weimar; still less is it an account of Weimar's 
failure. If a little more light is thrown on one of the
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more shadowy corners of Weimar's political history and something new 
is revealed of the KPD's attitudes and behaviour, then the argument 
will have met its purposes.
The very real problem of restricting the scale of the enterprise 
could have been met in other ways. The most efficient of these 
would have involved confining the research to some more narrowly 
defined period. The case for doing so seems strong. The Nazis, 
after all, only made their appearance as a serious factor in Weimar 
politics after their electoral breakthrough in September 1930 and so 
they could only have been a serious problem for the KPD during the 
last years. While this is largely true, much of the Communist 
approach to the Nazis was worked out much earlier. In fact, it is 
a central contention of this study that over the years there was 
much that was consistent in the Communist response to the Nazis. In 
the decisive period between 1930 and the end of 1932 it was the 
earlier experience with the Nazis which formed the foundation of the 
KPD's tactics. Unless the need to examine the whole record of the 
KPD's tactics is squarely faced, the important element of consistency 
will be lost.
Other economies would have been possible if some different 
perspective had been adopted than the one chosen here. During most 
of the period, for example, the KPD's connections with the Soviet 
Union and the Comintern meant that it was not free to decide its 
own policies. Thus, at least the main outlines of the KPD's response
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to the Nazis should be traceable to Soviet attitudes towards Hitler. 
For this reason it might seem appropriate to ignore all intermediary 
considerations of the KPD's behaviour and concentrate instead on the 
development of Soviet policy. Although this enquiry, in part, has 
yielded to the logic of such an approach, it also rests on the 
assumption that too rigid an insistence on the central importance 
of the KPD's links with the Soviet Union as the central determining 
influence on tactics can distort the record. No matter how thorough 
Soviet control was, it should still be impossible to avoid 
consideration of the KPD's own needs under Weimar. This must be so 
if only because the question of the KPD's needs had an obvious 
bearing on its effectiveness as an instrument of Soviet policy. 
Whatever the source of its objectives, it was the KPD as a party 
which was constrained by the realities of Weimar which had to find 
ways to pursue those objectives. In the pages which follow, much 
is said about Soviet policy and about the connections between Soviet 
policy and the KPD's tactics; nevertheless, objectives are measured 
against behaviour and the problems which confronted the KPD as a 
Weimar political party.
The NSDAP offers another possible perspective and the development 
of Nazi tactics could have provided the focus for the research.
There is at least one obvious advantage in such a strategy. Nazi 
goals were more straightforward than those of the KPD. No outside 
power intervened to influence the NSDAP's behaviour and so it could
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reasonably be expected that the KPD would enter the Nazi calculations 
only as a more or less important rival for influence and power. 
Whatever advantages might be gained from the simpler frame of 
reference would, however, more than likely be offset by other and 
formidable problems of interpretation. Although objectives on the 
Nazi side were in a general sense easier to interpret than those of 
the KPD, it was still true that there was much less internal 
consistency. Unlike the KPD, the NSDAP never developed one clear 
line on any problem. There was no one Nazi programme and no one 
tactical orientation. Moreover, none of the problems raised by 
Soviet influence on the KPD's behaviour are avoided if the relation­
ship is examined from the Nazi side. It therefore seems better to 
meet this problem directly by placing the emphasis on the KPD.
As a final justification for the research strategy adopted here, 
there is the question of sources. When it is exploited with care, 
there is one structural feature of Communist parties which can be of 
great assistance for an enquiry such as this. However it is 
interpreted, the Communist claim for an intimate connection between 
their political practice and their general political theory establishes 
a special status for the Communist press and the public statements of 
Communist leaders. In the Communist commentary on tactical questions 
it is possible to assume a closer connection between what is said and 
what is done and a more disciplined and complete consensus than would 
be true in the case of similar Nazi commentary. Even though there
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could never be a perfect consensus, this feature of the KPD remained 
useful. When consensus broke down or when one tactical line gave 
way to another those facts were immediately obvious from the 
Communist commentary.
For these reasons the Communist press and theoretical journals 
were a rich source for this study. It was, nevertheless, a source 
with its own pitfalls and limitations. The language of the 
Communists., for example, always emphasized the revolutionary goals 
of the KPD; this was so even at times when there were few other 
indications that the party remained seriously committed to revolution. 
It is, however, easy to exaggerate this problem. Other immediate 
and less clearly "revolutionary" goals are seldom entirely obscured 
by the revolutionary language. Moreover, the press commentary could 
be checked against other Communist sources where there was less need 
to emphasize revolutionary themes. The KPD's internal circulars and 
directives provided one such corrective to the press and a large 
number of these were assembled from the scattered collections of 
Communist materials in the West German archives. In addition, police 
reports as well as Communist opposition, Social Democratic and Nazi 
materials were used to gain a more balanced impression of Communist 
tactics. On particular points concerning Soviet intentions in Germany 
published and unpublished documents drawn from the German Foreign 
Ministry Archives were consulted. There was also much that was 
helpful in the large memoir and secondary literature which in one
14
way or another had a bearing on the discussion. Beyond these sources, 
access to the internal KPD documentation would have been of obvious 
help. This is particularly true of one or two special problems. It 
must be assumed, for example, that somewhere in the SED's archives 
more information can be found on the so-called "Neumann Opposition". 
Without access to this material, some mystery must always surround 
Heinz Neumann's role during 1931 and 1932 and especially the part 
which he played in the KPD's response to the Nazis. Since there is 
no SED study of Neumann, perhaps even East German scholars have been 
deprived of tne advantages of these documents.
Although the subject of this study has not been entirely ignored 
in English language scholarship, the few existing full length 
treatments are in German.^- This work extends the existing scholarship 
in two ways. It represents the first attempt to treat the subject 
for the whole of the Weimar period. It also has more to say about 
the tactical dimensions of the relationship than any of the existing 
literature. Weingartner's book, which in its scope and conclusions, 
comes the closest to this study, has much to say about the genesis 
of the KPD's attitudes and policies but much less attention is given 
to the problems which the KPD experienced in reconciling its overall 
objectives with the attempt to protect its organization against the 
Nazis. Weingartner's line of investigation is the one which dominates
7in all the existing work. The different emphasis is also reflected 
in the sources which have been used. This study makes greater use
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of KPD materials which relate to tactical questions (notably party 
circulars) than has hitherto been the case.
On the question of the development of Nazi tactics, Schuddekopf
3comes the closest to a full discussion. He offers a history of 
affinities between a variety of groups on the right —  including some 
among the Nazis —  and Marxist and Marxist-Leninist groups on the 
left. Although a systematic treatment of KPD-NSDAP relations falls 
outside the scope of his work, there is nonetheless much that is 
useful for this study. This is especially true of his examination of 
the attitudes of the various Nazi splinter groups towards the Soviet 
Union and the KPD.
In the more general literature on the KPD emphasis has been
placed on the problem of locating the party within the context of the
German left. The problems of the relationship between the SPD and
the KPD, the nature and strength of the Communist following, the
history of factional struggle and the links between the KPD and the
4Comintern have been at the centre of the research. When the subject 
of the NSDAP is raised it is within the context of questions 
concerning the effectiveness of the KPD as part of the left 
opposition to the rise of Hitler. On the question of the KPD's 
attitudes towards the Nazis before 1930, these sources are virtually 
silent. Thus Hermann Weber in his monumental study of the KPD 
between 1924 and 1928 scarcely mentions the Nazis. In view of the 
weakness of the NSDAP during the years which Weber considers, the
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omission is understandable. Nevertheless, the Communists did 
possess a position on the Nazis during these years, which it is 
important to examine, if only for the reason that such an 
examination reveals consistencies in the KPD's tactical orientation 
over the whole of the Weimar period.
Beyond these difficulties of perspective and sources there is 
another kind of difficulty inherent in a study such as this. There 
is the problem that built-in assumptions in the vocabulary of 
political discourse, the very language one must unavoidably use in 
discussing Communism and National Socialism, will to a certain extent 
prejudge the issues one wishes to examine. The KPD was obviously a 
party of the "left" or "extreme left" and the NSDAP was just as 
obviously a party of the "right" or "extreme right". To label them 
as such is harmless enough except when it is remembered that 
important expectations are entailed in the labels themselves. They 
suggest tnat the parties were mutually exclusive with respect to 
their followings and their objectives. They also suggest a strong 
mutual antagonism. There is a danger, therefore, that evidence which 
does not easily fit these preconceptions will not be given the 
attention it merits.
Typologies which stress factors other than ideological 
orientation and class composition are useful antidotes to the 
limitations of the standard left-right dichotomy of our political 
language. From one perspective the functions which parties perform
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provide a basis for analysis and comparison. Parties in democratic 
societies can be seen as vehicles for the integration, articulation 
and representation of competing interests. They are also channels 
of political communication between governments and private citizens 
and they provide a means for the organization and management of 
conflict. They can be classified according to the extent to which, 
or the manner in which, they perform these functions.
One such classification which is particularly useful here, 
since it grew out of a study of political parties under Weimar, is 
that provided by Sigmund Neumann."* Neumann regards political parties 
as indispensible intermediate organizations in a democratic society. 
They are communities of private interests with the primary democratic 
function of reconciling those interests with the larger interests of 
the whole community. Beyond that, they are instruments of political 
modernization, since they make possible an ever wider participation 
In political life. Parties can be classified according to their 
ability to perform these functions of democratic integration and 
modernization. A broad two-fold classification is possible between 
parties of "democratic integration" and parties of "total integration". 
By "total integration", Neumann meant to distinguish parties like 
the KPD and the NSDAP which he claimed functioned not to relate the 
private citizen to existing political environments but rather to 
remove him from those environments altogether. Such parties aim at 
nothing less than the total integration (or reintegration) of
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individual personalities. They directly relate their adherents to 
new purposes and a new style of life.
This characterization draws attention to the possibilities for 
more complicated interractions between the KPD and the NSDAP than is 
allowed by the left-right dichotomy. It emphasizes a shared 
opposition to democratic parties. It also suggests a common objective 
of capturing the support of those people in society who are without 
"interests". One would then expect to find parallels in the 
recruitment efforts of the Communists and Nazis and in the political 
preoccupations of their members. There is one immediately apparent 
problem raised by Neumann's typology. It is difficult to view the 
KPD as a perfectly satisfactory example of a party of "total 
integration". "Total integration" as a concept rests on the implicit 
assumption that a party is committed to a revolutionary new order.
For most of the Weimar years the KPD did not pursue revolutionary 
objectives in the usual sense. It attempted to pattern Itself on the 
CPSU. During these years, however, the CPSU was itself in a process 
of redefining its revolutionary objectives. New objectives emerged 
which had to do with modernization, not to be sure in Neumann's sense, 
but in the more primitive sense of modernizing a relatively 
backward economy. These were clear goals and clearly relevant 
not only for the Soviet Union but for other societies at the 
beginning of the process of economic reconstruction and modernization. 
They were less obviously relevant for advanced industrialized
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countries such as Germany.
To the extent that the KPD and other Communist parties of 
Western Europe were not able to find independent goals, they might 
well be characterized as misplaced parties of "primitive 
modernization". They were misplaced because without objectives 
which were rooted in their own societies they could only play marginal 
political roles. At most they could be the sponsors of an 
Irrelevant revolutionary idea but they were more likely to be, as a 
consequence of their irrelevance, the mere agents of an outside 
interest.
There is one further consideration. As parties of "total 
integration" both the KPD and the NSDAP aspired to organizational 
structures which differed radically from those of their democratic 
rivals. Both saw themselves as parties of the "new type". The 
structural emphasis was on unity of purpose, central leadership 
and the establishment of a "transmission belt" relationship with 
mass organizations which they controlled or within which they had 
decisive influence. As a matter of fact, neither party came very 
close to this model in the years before 1933. Both parties had to 
work within a democratic society. A democratic society offers 
certain kinds of choices which are not readily compatible with the 
total integration characterization; not the least of these in that 
people in a democratic society can come and go as they please. This 
simple fact undermined the organizational pretentions of both parties.
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Both had to pay much more attention to the problems of gaining and 
holding their members than they did in reintegrating their 
personalities. They had to take into account the host of private 
reasons which led people to join their parties.
The concept of a party of "total integration" is not, of 
course, so different from that of "totalitarian" party. Totalitarian 
theory might serve just as well to draw attention to the 
similarities between the KPD and the NSDAP.' Yet neither 
characterization is so obviously applicable to parties which are 
out of power'.' A "totalitarian" party whose behaviour, structure and 
aspirations are constrained by a democratic environment must remain 
totalitarian only in aspiration. In other words, within Neumann's 
scheme the KPD and the NSDAP, just because they operated within a 
democratic society, had to some extent to behave as parties of 
democratic integration and modernization. Both parties provided 
access to political life for people who otherwise found themselves 
excluded and provided some "democratic" counterweight to the 
established interests which would otherwise have dominated the 
politics of the Republic. It was precisely as "democratic" parties 
representing the interests of the dispossessed that the two parties 
challenged and threatened one another.
Whatever qualifications it may seem necessary to introduce with 
respect to Neumann's categories, the categories themselves together 
with the interesting questions which they raise were helpful in
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guiding the research for this study. At the outset Neumann helped 
to draw attention to possible complexities in what might have 
otherwise seemed a straightforward relationship.
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CHAPTER I
THE CONSTRAINTS ON CONFLICT
There would seem to have been little room for complications in 
the relationship between the Communists and the National Socialists 
during the Weimar years. One of the protagonists was outward looking 
and stressed its links with an international fraternity of like 
winded revolutionaries. The other was inward looking and dedicated 
to national renewal and nationalist self assertion. One championed 
the cause of the dispossessed against the established capitalist 
order. The other promised a new order where class purposes were 
overcome in a common allegiance to national and racial unity. The 
one operated with a rationalist tradition which perceived that men 
act according to a rational calculation of their interest. The other 
Promised salvation through blind obedience and the denial of 
rationality.
It would be reasonable to infer from such opposite outlooks that 
the relationship between the two parties would have been one 
dimensional, that there would be room for nothing else than antagonism 
and unrelenting conflict. This, however, was not the case. The 
inherent element of conflict in the relationship was constrained by 
structural features of both parties which qualified the antagonism 
between them by placing it in a wider and more subtle context of 
interests and objectives which were not so clearly relevant to the
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clash between their contending ideologies.
The structure of the KPD clearly illustrated this. At no time 
during the Weimar years was the party free, or entirely free, to 
decide its own policies. Its close ties with the Comintern and the 
Soviet Union were of crucial importance in determining its 
orientation in Weimar politics. As it turned out, the outside 
connection was the most important influence which operated to 
qualify the party's self image as a revolutionary party of the 
working class which was incidently, therefore, an important and 
active enemy of Fascism and National Socialism.
Given the internationalist pretentions of both the Soviet and 
the German parties and given also the authority and resources which 
the Bolshevik seizure of power gave the Soviets, it is not surprising 
that they should have been involved in the planning of the KPD's 
strategy and tactics. The KPD became "bolshevized in the direct 
sense that for many purposes it could be regarded as an extension of 
the Soviet party, accurately reflecting the concerns and objectives 
of that party.^ In other words, to understand what the KPD's 
purposes were, it is always necessary to understand at the same time 
the direction of Soviet policy towards Germany. It is essential to 
he aware of this elementary fact of life of the KPD, yet it would be 
misleading to state the matter so plainly and leave all the emphasis 
on a command submission relationship, for it was not such a simple 
case of dominant party and a helpmate subordinate. In a way the KPD 
needed its relationship with the Soviet Union, for its own reasons.
It is one of the observations of this study that the Soviet and
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Comintern leaders came early to the conclusion that their interests
would not, at least for an indefinite future, be served by a
revolutionary effort in Germany. The KPD consequently postponed
whatever independent revolutionary ambitions it may have had. It
does not, however, follow that they would not have had to do so in
any case. It can easily be argued that the helpmate role was the
only one available to the KPD. Certainly by 1923 few in the party
2hierarchy could hold out much hope for the German revolution.
In a situation where the prospects for revolution were remote, 
it is difficult to see what further relevance the KPD would have had 
in Weimar politics without the second hand purposes it derived from 
the Soviet connection. It faced the problem always faced by 
Communist parties in non-revolutionary situations. If it sought a 
more relevant and independent role as part of a left opposition, it 
would have run the real risk of losing its identity and following in 
a process of becoming indistinguishable from its Social Democratic 
and trade union rivals. This would have been so even had the party 
enjoyed a larger share of working class support than it in fact did. 
For the revolutionary, the bitter truth was that the overwhelming 
majority, at least among the employed workers, was not interested in 
revolution. They proved that by their steadfast support for the SPD 
throughout the Weimar years. The same workers could conceivably have 
made their point by giving their allegiance to a Communist party 
which had surrendered to the "trade union consciousness" of its
following.
For the KPD all such problems were avoided by accepting Soviet
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leadership and the role which went with it of seeking to promote 
Soviet objectives in any and all ways which the Soviet leaders saw 
as appropriate and possible. The KPD's problems, however, did not 
and there. Having accepted the dominance of Soviet interests and 
especially of Soviet foreign policy interests, it remained to be seen 
to that extent the KPD could be a useful agency in the overall design 
of Soviet policy.
The Soviet Union had means other than its connections with the 
KPD for pursuing its foreign policy objectives in Germany. The most 
obvious of these were the usual diplomatic channels. It was a central 
objective of Soviet diplomacy to establish good relations with 
Germany. The KPD’s problem, in part, became one of supporting and 
supplementing these efforts, and it was not immediately clear how the 
party could best do this. German governments could be forgiven for 
seeing a contradiction between Soviet protestations of friendship, 
on the one hand, and, on the other, Soviet backing for a party which 
had as its avowed purpose the overthrow of the German constitution. 
Indeed, this was a problem for Soviet diplomacy and it could never 
be adequately resolved by claiming that the Comintern and its member
3sections were separate from and independent of the Soviet government.
To the extent that this argument failed to carry conviction, the 
KPD was an embarrassment for Soviet diplomacy. At the same time, 
however, the contradictions in Communist behaviour appear much less 
stark when the activities of the KPD are measured against the 
background of the Soviet approach to Germany and of Soviet assessments 
of the bearing of Weimar’s domestic politics on Soviet interests.
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Much falls Into place as this is attempted. What appears most
clearly is a continuing Soviet commitment to the preservation of the
Germany which emerged in lyi8. The Germany of 1918-1923 offered
unique opportunities for the new revolutionary government in the
Soviet Union. Weimar was weak and divided. It was also alienated
from the Western Democracies by the humiliations of defeat and the
terms of an unfavourable peace. While itself presenting few
strategic and economic threats to the Soviet Union, it stood at the
same time as an obstacle to the formation of anti-Soviet coalitions
and in particular could be seen as a factor which worked against
4French and British preponderance on the continent. On the positive 
side, it was also true that if Germany’s isolation from the West could 
be maintained then fruitful possibilities were open for economic, 
diplomatic and military collaboration between Weimar and Soviet 
governments. The various accords and treaties signed between Germany 
and the Soviet Union and the economic and military collaboration 
which was established were consistently viewed by the Soviets as 
crowning achievements of their foreign policy. The efforts to 
maintain and expand these relations were just as consistently central 
Preoccupations of Soviet foreign policy strategy.
In light of these central concerns of the Soviet Union's foreign 
Policy, it followed that Soviet governments would seek by any means 
open to them to restrict the influence of those forces within Germany 
which could upset the 1918-1923 status quo. It was the KPD which 
Provided the Soviets with their principal means for influencing 
the balance of political forces in Germany. The KPD could be used
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to combat the influence of the most dangerous enemy of the post war 
status quo —  Social Democracy. The SPD with its mass working class 
following, its entrenched position within the trade unions and its 
large electoral following, represented the most likely foundation 
for a strong German republic. The democratic-republican and 
pro-Western orientation of the SPD ensured that the strengthened 
^public would almost certainly wreck the advantages which the Soviet 
Union hoped to gain from its German policy.
This foreign policy consideration provided the main reason for 
Soviet opposition to the SPD but it was not the only one. Social 
Democracy and especially German Social Democracy was an important 
critic of internal developments in the Soviet Union. Vorwarts, the 
chief organ of the SPD, brought its readers almost daily accounts of 
economic and civil rights conditions in the Soviet Union. It was 
Vorwarts which was most often singled out for attack in the Soviet, 
Comintern and KPD press for spreading "lies" about the Soviet Union 
and for lending moral support to the internal critics of Soviet 
policies.^ In view of the near hysteria of some of these attacks, 
it is easy to believe that the Soviet authorities saw a dangerous 
enemy in the SPD press.^
More than any other single factor, opposition to Social 
Democracy tied together all the strands of Communist strategy and 
tactics. The KPD was assigned the role of undermining the SPD's 
hold on the industrial workers and beyond that of applying pressure, 
in any way open to it, against a Western orientation in German 
foreign policy. That role never changed between 1923 and 1933.
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This fact was of the utmost importance for the development of the 
KPD's position towards National Socialism. It was always present 
to exert strong pressure against assigning first importance to the 
National Socialist issue.
Not that any one interpretation should be expected to make 
perfect sense. There were doubts among the Communists, unforeseen 
difficulties and mistakes which in practice made the apparently 
straightforward role less than straightforward in its execution.
Then, too, there were other Soviet interests which needed to be 
served. As long as there was uncertainty and oppositional struggle 
within the Russian party then the KPD leadership had to choose sides, 
and opposing factions in Soviet debates were free to solicit the 
support of the foreign Communist leaderships. Thus factional strife 
was reflected in the Comintern member parties and all parties were 
required to join in attacks on the positions of defeated 
oppositionists. This factor could not, however, be of central 
importance in establishing the roles of Communist parties. For one 
thing, there is no evidence that support from outside was so 
important in Stalin’s consolidation of power. Other factors, notably
Stalin’s growing control of the Russian party apparatus were 
8decisive.
In the case of the KPD, the most important of the outside 
parties, there were no significant delays in following the line set 
down by the dominant majority in the Russian party. Even had there 
been, it is difficult to see that it would have made much difference 
for the policies of the KPD. There was wide agreement among the
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Soviet leaders on a range of issues confronting the KPD. These 
included the basic ones of the primacy of the Russian party within 
the Comintern and the importance of the SPD as an enemy of Soviet 
interests. One need not overtax one's resources of cynicism to 
note that oppositionists both in the Russian and the German parties 
found it easier to find their independence of mind on these matters 
after they were safely out of the main line party. Anyway, it is 
not necessary to discount a role for the KPD in the factional 
struggles of the Russian party before it is possible to make the 
case for the primacy of foreign policy considerations. It is a fact 
that the campaign against the SPD survived all the shifts of emphasis 
between the left and right lines of the Comintern. At all times in 
these ten years the SPD was identified in the statements of 
Communist leaders and in the pages of the Communist press as a 
dangerous enemy of the Soviet Union.
Besides the link with Soviet purposes in Germany, there were 
other aspects of the KPD's structure which served to obscure and 
complicate its policies both for the party itself and for the 
outside observer trying to make sense of it. The revolutionary 
language of the party was one source of such difficulties. Any goal 
for the Communists had to find its revolutionary rationale. No 
ultimate objective except revolution could be accommodated within 
the party's Marxist-Leninist categories of self justification. At 
every stage of the party's history, therefore, official statements 
and the Communist press depicted a movement on the march to 
revolution. Such self accountings obscured the immediate,
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non-revolutionary purposes of the party.
The obscurity was unavoidable. Not only the niceties of
Marxist-Leninist language were at stake. Any admission that the
efforts of the Communists were not related to revolutionary
objectives would undoubtedly have destroyed the party's morale along
with its usefulness for any purposes at all. This consideration was
relevant not just for the naive rank and file. Even the more
sophisticated in the upper reaches of the Communist hierarchy had
probably to convince themselves that there was ho contradiction
between Soviet interests and the revolutionary aspirations of the
movement as a whole. Indeed, there was something almost disarming
about the protestations of Soviet leaders when they were confronted
with such suggestions. In 1926, for example, in reply to accusations
from the "left" opposition that the Comintern was becoming an
instrument of Soviet foreign policy and that revolution was no longer
its goal, both Bukharin and Stalin answered, not by denying that
there was a link between Soviet foreign policy and the "revolutionary"
activities of the Comintern, but rather by insisting that Soviet
9foreign policy was itself revolutionary. Stalin could,
"...not think that the interests of the Soviet 
Union require even for one second a betrayal 
of the working class on the part of our 
brother parties."1°
There is no necessary cynicism in Stalin's statement. Since the 
prospects for revolution were at the moment dim in Europe, and since 
the one tangible result of the world revolution so far achieved 
was the establishment of Bolshevik power in Russia, then it could be 
seen to follow that loyal Communists everywhere could best discharge
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their revolutionary responsibilities in defense of the Soviet Union 
and Soviet interests as defined by the Soviet leaders.
For the KPD, as it suffered setback after setback in its pursuit 
of revolutionary goals between 1918 and 1923, it became ever easier 
to accept such a "revolutionary" explanation of its purposes. At the 
same time, the Russian revolution commanded its own loyalties among 
the German Communists. This influenced not just the bureaucratic 
elements in the party. The Th'álmanns, Ulbrichts and Neumanns, who 
modeled themselves on Stalin, were perhaps best suited to the 
uncritical centrally directed pursuit of Soviet interests. Others 
such as Clara Zetkin, with closer connections with the earlier 
humanist and Social Democratic roots of the German working class 
movement, also found it easy to accept Soviet dominance. These 
People, although they were critical of aspects of Communist policies, 
fomained in the party and restrained their criticisms because of 
their loyalty to the Soviet Union as the first revolutionary workers' 
state. ^
It was not, however, just willing acceptance of Soviet interests 
which made the tasks assigned the KPD acceptable as a revolutionary 
tole. The SPD was the strongest Social Democratic party in the world 
it held in its grip the bulk of the industrial workers - workers 
without whom the revolutionaries in the KPD could not realize their 
hopes, it made sense, then, to assign the highest priority to the 
campaign against the SPD. On both counts, from.the point of view of 
the revolution and from the point of view of Soviet foreign policy 
interests, the SPD made a particularly congenial enemy for the
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Communists.
There was one other structural feature of the KPD which complicated
its policies. The party always found it difficult to find an effective
means for translating its priorities into "concrete" action. An attack
on the SPD, if it were to have any impact, had to be directed at the
SPD's strongholds in the trade union structure. Yet, after 1923, the
KPD could never manage this, for the simple reason that it never
succeeded in building its own base in the factories which was
sufficiently strong to challenge the free trade unions. For most of
the Weimar years the KPD was primarily a party of the unemployed.
Despite the continuing emphasis on the need to win influence in the
12unions and to expand the party’s network of factory cells, the 
organizational weight of the party continually shifted outside the 
factories. The KPD's "street" cells, as distinct from its factory 
cells, became central to its organization and to its continued 
survival. Certainly the Communists could compete with the SPD for 
the support of the unemployed and they tried that. This form of 
competition, though, could never seriously damage the SPD, which 
remained overwhelmingly a party of the employed workers. This basic 
structural limitation of the KPD seriously limited its usefulness as 
an instrument of Soviet foreign policy. The KPD could not be 
decisive. It could exert some pressure on the SPD and on other 
Parties through its propaganda and agitational work. It could exert 
some influence in the Reich, Land and communal parliaments and 
assemblies and it could exert some influence more generally on public 
opinion through its electoral and other campaigns.
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Besides limiting its effectiveness as an enemy of the SPD, there 
was another important consequence of this weakness. Especially after 
1930, the party's organization made it vulnerable to the challenge of 
the National Socialists. Since such an important part of the KPD 
was on the streets, it was largely deprived of the protection of the 
factory and thus its ability to counter the terror attacks of the SA 
and the SS was seriously impaired. Moreover, from a recruitment 
standpoint it was the NSDAP or more particularly the SA which was 
aore of a challenge to the KPD's efforts to win the support of the 
unemployed than was the SPD. For these reasons the Communists had, 
in the end, to pay more attention to the NSDAP than could easily be 
accommodated within its overall stretegy. It is tempting to see a 
tragic appropriateness in the party's own "dialectical" approach to 
Political problems for the characterization of these difficulties. 
There was a kind of dialectical tension between the KPD's strategy 
and the day to day requirements of its survival which defied the 
party's attempts to make sense of its own activities. Tactical 
necessities finally made a nonsense of the KPD's objectives in Weimar 
and wrecked its programmatical and organizational coherence.
What was needed, if there was to be any chance of resolving 
such a contradiction, was a hew conception of Soviet interests in 
Germany and a corresponding new revolutionary rationale for the KPD 
which would have assigned first importance to the struggle against 
Hitler. There were those in the party and especially in the 
Communist opposition groups who argued for just such a change. Given 
the strength of the Nazis after 1930, the new policy would have had
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to be along the lines of a broad alliance between the SPD, KPD and 
other parties willing to join against the National Socialists. There 
was, of course, the second possibility of some kind of revolutionary 
gesture on the eve of Hitler's takeover. Some determined independent 
revolutionary action might well have seemed preferable to the 
passive acceptance of a Nazi government no matter how foredoomed 
such an action might have been. Anyway, the Communist leadership 
did not accept either of these alternatives. Their priorities in 
Germany did not change until it was too late. There were sporadic 
attempts in 1932 to reevaluate the party's tactics towards National 
Socialism but the real changes came only after Hitler's seizure of 
power and were not, in fact, completely in place until the Seventh 
Comintern World Congress in 1935.
History has dealt harshly with these decisions. It might be 
conceded that as long as the NSDAP remained weak (and it was, after 
all, only a minor party for most of the decade) the Communist 
approach made a certain amount of sense. Before 1930 it was natural 
enough to regard the NSDAP as a party which posed few if any threats 
to the Communists. In fact it could be seen as a political factor 
which to some extent complemented the efforts of the Communists. In 
so far as it mattered at all, the NSDAP in its own way worked for the 
preservation of the Weimar status quo. It complicated the life of 
the Republic and it opposed good relations with the Western 
Democracies. Since the KPD and the NSDAP shared a common opposition 
to the democratic and pro-Western parties of Weimar, it was even 
possible to seek tactical accommodations. As will be shown in the
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chapters which follow this indeed was a feature of their relationship 
both before and after 1930. There was, in other words, scope for 
ambivalence in the Communist response to National Socialism. From 
the moment of first contact between the parties this was apparent.
The recognition of danger was there but so was the recognition of 
opportunity.
In the years after 1930 there should have been less ambivalence. 
The NSDAP was no longer weak. It had, in fact, emerged as a dominant 
force in German politics. It had upset the Weimar status quo 
decisively and in ways which threatened the continued existence of 
the KPD and just as clearly threatened Soviet interests in Germany. 
Nevertheless, together with the decision to insist on the secondary 
importance of the KPD's relations with the Nazis, the ambivalent 
uncertainties in KPD tactics were to remain too.
As incomprehensible as the consistency in the Communist approach 
to National Socialism at first sight appears to be, the various 
factors which worked against any re-evaluation are readily enough 
identified. One important influence was the party's experience with 
the National Socialists in 1923. Hitler's party enjoyed mass support 
in that year and as a mass party it was a factor in German politics 
which could not be ignored by the Communists. When the crisis passed, 
that is when the Republic seemed on the way out of its immediate 
economic and political difficulties, the Nazi following melted away. 
Thereafter, this simple fact remained to exert its influence on 
Communist expectations. Any evidence of internal difficulty, any 
setback for the NSDAP, no matter how minor, was seized upon as
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signaling the beginning of the end for Nazism as a mass movement. At 
the same time, it was only too easy in retrospect for the Communists 
to exaggerate their own anti-"Fascist" campaign in 1923 as an 
important contributory factor in the decline of the Nazis and so they 
succeeded in persuading themselves that their anti-Fascist efforts 
after 1930 would lead to a similar result.
Had the exercise in self persuasion failed, it would still have 
been difficult for the KPD to redesign their strategy. There was, 
in the first place, an important time constraint. Just over two 
years separated the first major Nazi electoral breakthrough from 
Hitler's seizure of power. This was little enough time for 
Communists to rethink their basic policies. Communists have always 
claimed tactical flexibility as one of the principal organizational 
virtues of Democratic Centralism, but in practice they must always 
Pay a high price for flexibility. In this case rival interpretations 
of the German situation, which placed more importance on opposition 
to Hitler, were already occupied by the enemies of the line. To admit 
error, to make in fact an about face, meant vindicating important 
critics and sacrificing important friends. This would have been 
especially embarrassing since the Fascist question was one of those 
which united both the left and right opposition to the KPD and to 
Stalin.13
The admission of error would have necessarily also involved 
redesigning Communist theoretical interpretations of National 
Socialism. The opposition and the party alike based their arguments 
and their defense of policy on the Marxist assumption of an intimate
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"dialectical" relationship between theory and "praxis". The opposition 
critics took it for granted that the problems which the party 
encountered with the Nazis were traceable to its flawed general 
theoretical understanding of Weimar, Fascism and National Socialism.
It was the false theory which mediated a flase "praxis". They 
assumed also that the central problem to which Communist theory and 
"praxis" were directed was that of revolution.^
For the non-Marxist observer a problem is raised here which is 
always present in the study of Communist parties. At the simplest 
level, there is the question of whether theoretical formulations 
ought to be understood primarily as ex-post-facto rationalizations 
for decisions shaped by a variety of factors, only some of which have 
anything to do with a Marxist analysis of policy alternatives, or 
whether theoretical formulations are in themselves influential in 
determining the choices made. The difference between these two 
understandings of the role of theory may not actually be all that 
wide. Even theory as "rationalization" exerts some pressure on 
actions. Marxist-Leninist categories are plastic enough to allow 
most actions but perhaps not all. It would, for example, be difficult 
for Communists to make open electoral appeals to the capital owning 
classes. In other words, the theoretical formulations of Communists 
must always contain something of their actual perceptions and 
expectations.
For the case in question, it was no doubt true that important 
elements in the KPD and Comintern theories of Fascism were 
rationalizations for policies adopted with little concern for any
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Marxist analysis. At the same time, the theoretical formulations 
probably influenced policy at least to the extent of obscuring 
important realities of the National Socialist phenomenon and so 
impeded any reconsideration of it.
The problem of determining an influence for theory is well 
illustrated in one of the central theoretical preoccupations of the 
opposition. The aspect of the KPD's understanding of Fascism, which 
was most strongly attacked by Marxist critics was the "Social 
Fascist" argument. The Communists developed the position that Social 
Democracy had become a species of Fascism - "Social Fascism". Indeed, 
for a time it was Social Fascism which was presented in Communist 
pronouncements as the most virulently dangerous kind of Fascism, 
or even as Fascism itself with no distinction allowed for species.^ 
One must be allowed to ask, however, whether this formulation can 
even be addressed in theoretical terms. "Social Fascism" is surely 
one of the most barren of the theses to be found in the lexicon of 
discarded Marxist-Leninist arguments. It scarcely repays the few 
moments of "theoretical" effort necessary to explode it. So barren 
is it, that it transcends the limits of just plain bad theory, which 
informed and reflected an equally bad "praxis". It suggests the 
presence of an entirely different kind of dialectic than the one most 
commonly considered by the Marxist critics of the KPD. "Social 
Fascism" is one of the clearest examples of a "theory" improvised 
after the fact of "praxis"-theory concocted to make palatable a 
praxis which Communist leaders found convenient for a variety of 
reasons, few of which had much to do with their commitment to
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socialism and to revolution. It is theory which trades at par with 
the theories of conspiracy which were used to justify the purge 
trials. The "Social Fascism" conception was so transparent, its roots 
in Marxist categories so unfirm, that, for many Communists, it 
failed even as a device for rationalizing the Communist antipathy to 
Social Democracy.
Yet Social Fascism, in a sense, found its importance as theory, 
that is, in so far as it provided the best evidence that the 
Communist understanding of Fascism contained cpnclusions which worked 
against a clearer understanding of the threat posed by the NSDAP. It 
was as if the Communists felt secure in using "Fascism" as a mere 
polemical label which they could apply indiscriminately and with 
impunity to any and all political movements and governments which 
they perceived as opposed to their objectives.
With respect to National Socialism as a variety of Fascism, it 
was not that the analysis was in itself so inadequate or unusual. In 
the details of its findings, it is remarkably in accord with the 
conclusions of both other Marxist and non-Marxist analyses. Communist 
discussions of National Socialism noted its impressive strengths as 
a mass movement. They understood the power of its propaganda, its 
appeal to youth, the threat posed by its paramilitary organizations 
and the strength of its organizational methods."^ Some of the 
Communist studies, notably those which deal with the sources of Nazi 
electoral support, are among the best in the contemporary 
literature.^ It must be concluded, therefore, that it was not so 
much the analysis itself which was at fault but rather the choices
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which were made within it. It was the influence of some of the
"optimistic" elements of the theory which were dangerously misleading
and which were nearly always present alongside the clearer insights.
It is possible to recognize an enemy and still be misled into
thinking that he is, after all, not such a serious enemy, or that
the threat which he poses is not nearly so serious as the threats
posed by other enemies. In these respects it is possible to see once
more the influence of the 1923 experience.
From 1923 onwards, the Communists frequently pointed out, in
their discussions of Fascism and National Socialism, that "Germany
was not Italy". That is to say that there were, according to the
Communist view, "objective" factors present in German society which
18made a Fascist style government unlikely to emerge. The 1923
experience had demonstrated that German capitalism was much more
strongly developed than its Italism counterpart and had shown itself
able to ensure its dominance, even in a crisis, without recourse to
the Fascist style movements of the radicalized lower middle classes.
It was also true that in Germany the working class was better
organized than in Italy and possessed a more substantial and long
standing revolutionary tradition. It was thus better able to oppose
19the rise of the Fascists.
The power of these optimistic conclusions to mislead was 
reinforced by some of the general features of the Fascism theory.
The authoritative general treatments of Fascism which were developed 
by the Communists during the inter-war period were all agreed that 
Fascism and National Socialism were entirely derivative phenomena.
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They allowed Fascism no purposes of its own. It was seen as linked
entirely to the capital owning classes or to sections of those 
20classes. In an era where capitalism found itself faced with
crisis and especially with the crisis caused by the increasing
radicalism of its working classes, it looked to Fascism as a desperate
last attempt to preserve bourgeois class rule which could no longer
be adequately defended behind a mask of parliamentary and democratic
institutions. One of the serious problems with this conception from
the Communist point of view was that it was not discriminating enough.
By stressing the "objective" role of Fascist movements and governments
the Communists could find a Fascist government everywhere where non-
parliamentary methods were resorted to. Similarly they found Fascism
in every political movement which opposed itself to the working class
organizations which they controlled. The Stresemann government, the
Bruning government, the Braun-Severing government in Prussia, the
Papen and the Schleicher governments were all in their turn labelled
"Fascist". Since it was the "objective" role of Fascism which
needed to be stressed then it followed that not only organizations
which manifestly shared important characteristics with National
Socialism, such as the Stahlhelm and the various "vBlklsch" rivals
of the NSDAP, could be regarded as "Fascist" but also the
keichsbanner organizations, the Zentrum and the SPD. Hence, the
21"theoretical" underpinning for "Social Fascism".
It was at this point that Fascism as a concept lost whatever 
analytical utility it may have possessed and became worse than 
useless as a guide to action. For the KPD, perhaps the most serious
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consequence of this was that its theoretical hostility to Fascism 
was never allowed to focus exclusively on the NSDAP. The campaign 
against Hitler had always to be only part of a struggle which included 
attacks on assorted "Fascist" governments, "Fascist" legislation, such 
as the emergency decrees of the Briining and Papen governments and, 
of course, Social Fascism. Nor was the NSDAP's status as a Fascist 
party ever all that clear. For some of the time, even after 1930, it 
was not regarded as the most serious of the Fascist forces in Germany. 
In 1932, after a decade of struggling to establish the theoretical 
links between Fascism and National Socialism there was still no 
concensus in the Communist journals on this question.
In January 1932 the readers of Die Internationale were told that,
"...National Socialism and Fascism are not one 
and the same thing. Social Democracy is in 
Germany without doubt the most active factor of 
fascisization. This is so regardless of the 
fact that the National Socialist party, with 
its explosive expansion as a Fascist mass party and 
with its consequent status as the numerically 
strongest party, remains a serious enemy for us."^
Later in the year, another article, this time in Die Kommunistische
Internationale criticized this view for being "confused", ("every
word...demonstrates the greatest confusion") and went on to observe
that National Socialism was,
"...naturally not the only embodiment of Fascism 
in Germany but certainly the National 
Socialists are outspoken Fascists."23
As might be expected, some confusion remained even after this effort
of clarification.
These conceptual difficulties took their toll in the 
uncertainties and impaired morale of the Communist rank and file.
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Yet in another sense the confusion was reassuring. What more could
be feared from a National Socialist government than had already been
experienced under the Fascist regimes of Brilning and Papen? How could
it matter to the KPD or to the Soviet Union if the German bourgeoisie
came to rely more on one variety of Fascism - National Socialism, and
less on another variety - Social Fascism? As the debates on the
nature of the National Socialist threat revealed, such ideas played
their part in inhibiting any re-evaluation after 1930.
Other aspects of the Fascism theory were equally reassuring.
The Communists were generally agreed that Fascism represented the
interests of only sections of the capital owning classes but there
was less agreement on exactly which sections were implicated. In the
early years Fascism was understood as, "the Orgesch organization of
big industry, the big banks and the big landowners"; as, "supported,
led and nourished by industrial and agricultural capital"; as, "the
fighting organization of finance and industrial capital"; and as,
24"the fighting organization of... industrial capital." Between 1923
and 1933 the formulations were frequently even more general. Fascism
was now the tool of "the most developed industries"; "the...political
activization of the great masses of the petite bourgeoisie and of the
proletariat for the protection of bourgeois class rule against the
proletariat"; "the terroristic dictatorship of big capital...bankers,
25the big industrialists and the agrarians." Finally, at the Seventh 
Comintern World Congress, one authoritative interpretation was agreed 
upon. Fascism had become, "the open and terroristic dictatorship of 
the most reactionary, most chauvinistic and the most imperialistic
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elements of finance capital.
The fact that in all such formulations Fascism was understood as 
representing the interests of some capitalists but not of others was 
important because it allowed the view that Fascism was evidence for 
weakness in capitalist class rule. It meant that the capital owning 
classes were at cross purposes with themselves. Such "contradictions" 
moreover, were rooted in the same crisis which was leading to the 
decisive moment of revolutionary confrontation. In a sense, then, 
the revolutionary could believe that what was good for Fascism was 
good also for him. This was a self flattering idea. It placed the 
Communist parties at the centre stage of history. It presented the 
world with the choice of either Fascism or the proletarian revolution. 
It was also a distracting idea at important moments in the struggle 
against Hitler. It was doubly distracting because in the confrontation 
with Fascism the Communists believed themselves to be at an advantage. 
It was not just that Fascism reflected fatal weaknesses in capitalism. 
It also embodied a weakness, a contradiction, within itself.
What was special about Fascism was that it was much more 
efficient in mobilizing mass support than was true for its bourgeois 
rivals. It found its support mainly among the various sections of 
the radicalized lower middle classes - the small business men, small 
farmers, professional people, civil servants and white collar workers. 
It was clear to the Communists that Fascism did not in fact represent 
the "objective" interests of these classes. It could hold them only 
through pretence, through "demogogic manoeuvres"» through paying lip 
service to their class aspirations. A movement which pretended to
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transcend class differences and which tried to unite opposing interests 
must in time disintegrate under the assault of its own contradictions. 
This was a consistent theme in the Communist literature and it is 
present in the earliest consideration of Fascism. Miinzenberg’s 
observations on the decline of the National Socialists after 1923 
are characteristic both of the view and of some of the pitfalls in 
Marxist-Leninist dialectics.
"...Already from the first moment of its 
existence Fascism carried within itself the 
seed of its destruction. And that for the simple 
reason that it sought to combine within itself 
contradictory tendencies; it sought to combine 
half proletarian, petit bourgeois and junker 
elements in one and the same front. It was self 
evident that that wouldn’t work. The most 
elementary laws of the dialectic contradicted the 
tendency to form a combination from all these 
sections of the population, fundamentally 
opposed to one another in purpose, principle, 
history and tradition."27
This conclusion survived the Nazi revival and was frequently repeated
both in the theoretical literature and in the party's resolutions
28and official statements.
The Communists could also intervene to deepen the contradiction 
and to turn it to their decisive advantage. This was the "subjective"' 
factor in the situation. With correct tactics, resolutely pursued, 
it was open to the Communists to win away, or at least to neutralize 
these classes. Such considerations are important for understanding 
the tactics of the KPD. Far more emphasis was most of the time placed 
on agitational and propaganda work among the supporters and potential 
supporters of the Nazis than was placed on the tactics of direct 
confrontation. Here was a form of democratic competition. Whatever
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the conclusions of the Communist analysis, this form of competition 
might have been dominant in any case. The constraints of a democratic 
environment required that both the KPD and the NSDAP had to take 
account of the fact that their constituencies overlapped. Just 
because of the overlap the way was open for each side to influence 
the propaganda efforts of the other. So it was that there was much 
that both parties shared in language and emphasis on a range of 
political issues.
It would, however, be wrong to see all such coincidences as a 
consequence solely of recruitment and electoral competition between 
the parties. For the KPD, there was always the factor of Soviet 
interests to be taken into account. KPD propaganda, especially with 
respect to foreign policy issues, must be interpreted in this light.
On some issues, therefore, parallels between KPD and NSDAP propaganda 
can be interpreted as reflecting the fact that the NSDAP's and the 
Soviet Union's foreign policy objectives were in some degree 
complementary. Both the KPD and the NSDAP could be seen as exerting 
pressure on Weimar governments against a Western oriented foreign 
policy. After 1930 it could be expected that the increasing threat 
to the KPD posed by the Nazis would be weighed against this 
consideration. As long as the NSDAP did not actually assume power 
in Berlin, it was tempting to downplay both the threat to the KPD 
and the anti-Soviet aspects of the Nazi foreign policy position. For 
the reasons outlined above the Communists underestimated the ability 
of Hitler to form a government. In the meantime the low level, 
second priority campaign against the NSDAP allowed the Communists to
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combine attempts to resist the further advance of the Nazis with the 
established effort to influence Weimar's foreign policy.
Even if Soviet calculations were upset by a Nazi seizure of 
power, the attitude of the Communists to a Hitler government could 
not have been anticipated in advance. What would matter much more 
than the Fascist character of such a government was the specific 
content of National Socialist foreign policy. The Soviet Union had 
had a long experience with Fascism. Mussolini's Fascism had not 
prevented the Soviet Union from regarding Italy as a useful counter­
weight to France. The Soviets urged the Brlining government to seek
closer relations with Italy as part of the diplomatic effort against 
29France. They had shown sympathy for the Italian side in French- 
30Italian disputes and they had sought good diplomatic and economic
31relations with Mussolini. The Soviets had also supported "Fascist"
32Lithuania in its disputes with Poland. These precedents suggested 
that the advent of a Hitler government would not end Soviet hopes 
for good relations with Germany.
The anti-Nazi dimension of KPD propaganda never had much chance 
of being effective. Outside of a broadly based anti-Nazi alliance 
the Communists could not hope to make much headway, whatever balance 
they managed to strike between the tactics of confrontation and 
those of persuasion. They were no better placed for competition with 
the NSDAP than they proved themselves to be with respect to the SPD 
and the trade unions. They managed to pose some threat to the Nazi 
following among the workers and the unemployed but this could not be 
so important. They largely failed to gain access to the Nazi
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supporters among the lower middle classes and, as the Communists
themselves recognized, the NSDAP had become a mass party with roots
in all the classes of Weimar. The heterogeneous following and the
flexible, eclectic, nature of the Nazi appeal made them all but
invulnerable to the efforts of the Communists.
This was a main reason why relations between the two parties
posed fewer problems for the NSDAP than they did for the KPD. The
principal tactical problems facing the Nazis had to do with defining
and consolidating their position on the right. In the early years
that meant that much of their energy was absorbed in competition with
the radical and volklsch parties. Later it meant competition with
the established middle class parties. The phenomenal successes of
33the Nazis were largely at the expense of these parties.
If the Communists were not the central obstacle to Nazi ambitions,
it was still true that they could not be ignored entirely. Throughout
the Weimar years the Nazis aspired to the status of a mass party.
They promised a political order that transcended classes, that is,
a party for all Germans including the workers and the unemployed.
Consequently a considerable part of Nazi agitational and propaganda
34effort was always directed at the workers. This could not help 
but bring them into competition with the KPD.
The Communists understood this aspect of National Socialism very 
well. They always allowed that part of the working class was 
susceptible to Nazi appeals and occasionally they went further and 
identified the NSDAP as a serious working class rival. They pointed 
to the Nazi working class vote (.which if anything they over estimated)
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and to the importance of working class elements in the NSDAP
35organization, especially in the SA. They also interpreted the 
decline of the middle class parties as partly attributable to the
ability of the NSDAP to attract the specifically proletarian
36supporters away from those parties. In fact, it must be concluded 
that the Communist literature of the nineteen twenties and thirties 
placed more emphasis on the working class dimension of National 
Socialism than has been the case with most of the more recent 
research. ^
The perception of the NSDAP as, in part, a working class party
was for the Communists the greatest of all the contradictions which
the NSDAP represented. It was also a contradiction which they never
managed to explain. They allowed that the explanation might lie in
the susceptibility of part of the working class, its most "backward"
38and "wavering" elements, to the nationalist appeals of the Nazis.
But for the most part working class support for the NSDAP made sense 
for them only as a function of National Socialism's false "social 
demogogy". They could never accept that National Socialism could 
appear at one and the same time as the last bulwark against "Marxism" 
and as the revolutionary saviour of the working class and the ruined 
petite bourgeoisie, that, in other words, It could to some extent be
39true to its own self image as a movement which stood above classes.
The Communists, of course, were not alone in finding a problem 
here. The coexistence of greatly diverse Interests within the NSDAPf 
together with its lack of a coherent programme and ideology, have 
created difficulties of interpretation for everyone. Yet part of the
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explanation surely lay in the very different structure which
distinguished the NSDAP from its Communist rival. To be sure, there
were structural similarities and these were recognized by the
Communists. They were right to notice that the Nazis deliberately
copied some of their organizational ideas, the cell organization,
the transmission belt relationship between the party and other mass
organizations, the activism, the emphasis on agitation and propaganda
40and the importance of centralism and discipline.
There were, however, also some important differences. One of 
these was the absence of a legitimating role for doctrine. In 
Communist terms there was no one National Socialism, no party line.
For the KPD, rival approaches, even to tactical problems, to the 
extent that they were significant enough to demand doctrinal 
rationalization, could not coexist for long. They became tests of 
legitimate authority and consequently led to endless faction building 
and splits. The history of the KPD is a history of faction building —  
a history of struggle against the "Right", the "Ultra Left", the 
"Reconcilers" (Versohnlern). These were doctrinal labels and a 
would-be Communist functionary needed considerable resources of 
doctrinal adroitness to survive. Where, however, were the Nazis 
factions and splinter groups? There were defections, but no one ever 
left the NSDAP and carried with him anything like a significant part 
of the Nazi membership. It is only necessary to compare the rag tag 
following of Otto Strasser, after he left the party in 193U, with 
the KPO, to see this.
One convincing explanation for these structural differences has
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been provided by Joseph Nyomarkay. Nyomark^ finds in the person 
of Adolf Hitler the functional equivalent of a coherent doctrine.
It was Hitler's leadership which legitimated the NSDAP. Personal 
allegiance to Hitler was what mattered and not particular inter­
pretations of Nazi principles. The doctrine was open ended, 
variously interpretable. What could not be questioned was the 
status of Per Führer. Per Führer pronounced on questions of doctrine 
only when he perceived a threat to his status as leader. Beyond 
this, tactical considerations were much more.important to Hitler than 
questions of National Socialist principle. Poctrine and programme 
were important mainly for the part they played in attracting and 
holding the following. Yet even in these respects the activism, 
symbolism and hero worship of the movement were probably much more 
important for recruitment purposes.^
Especially after 1930, Hitler's own tactical and doctrinal
preferences were clear enough. He stood on the right of the party
and was inclined where necessary to sacrifice inconvenient "socialist"
parts of the Nazi appeal in the interests of securing the support
of the middle classes. He was nevertheless still able to tolerate
and at times even favour those in the party who thought differently.
Before 1933 there were always those who took the socialist
pretentions of National Socialism seriously and who concentrated
43their efforts on winning the workers for the Nazi cause.
The Communists missed the central importance of Hitler's 
leadership. They were Inclined to see at the top of the Nazi 
hierarchy a delicately balanced, contradiction laden group of
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leaders of approximately equal status with Hitler. It was one of the 
favourite exercises among some of the Communist writers to identify 
the various factions and potential splits in the NSDAP on the basis 
of the contending views of the participants. Hitler was never seen 
as standing above such disputes, as indeed he mostly did. The 
difficulties into which this approach could lead the Communists is 
well illustrated by their analysis of Otto Strasser's defection in 
1930. It was Otto Strasser and his following which was at first 
identified as the most important and dangerous of the Nazi "factions".
The programmatical and doctrinal flexibility of the NSDAP was 
only limited by the importance of anti-Semitism. Anti-Semitism was 
the nearest thing to a programmatical common denominator for the Nazis 
and as such it was a kind of programme in itself. Its very 
irrationality lent itself well to the purposes of Nazi propaganda.
It allowed them to appeal simultaneously to lower and to middle class 
constituencies. Behind a sinister plot to expropriate the middle 
classes stood the power of "Jewish Marxism". Behind a capitalist 
order which was ruining the petite bourgeoisie and the workers stood 
the Jewish managers of international finance capital.
This feature of National Socialism, too, was only imperfectly 
understood by the Communists. They insisted for most of the time 
that Nazi anti-Semitism was a corrupt form of anti-capitalism. Thus 
in Nazi propaganda it represented one facet of the "social demogogy" 
which the Communists hoped to discredit. They only rarely approached 
the subject as one which was of importance for an understanding of the 
flexibility of the Nazi appeal and which was central also for an
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understanding of the political outlook of most Nazis.
Far from representing weakness and evidence for internal 
contradiction, the organizational and programmatical flexibility 
which these factors gave National Socialism were important sources of 
strength in its struggle to achieve the status of a mass party. In 
comparison with the KPD, the NSDAP enjoyed the additional advantage 
of being able to decide its own priorities free from the consideration 
of outside interests.
The organizational strengths of the NSDAP meant that it was 
comparatively easy always to keep the question of the Communists 
as a secondary tactical priority. It perceived threats and obstacles 
in its attempt to gain working class support but it was the SPD as 
the stronger of the two major working class parties which was more 
important in this respect. It was also the SPD as the main bulwark 
of the Republic which was more generally an obstacle to Nazi ambitions.
Nazi propaganda did not clearly distinguish between the SPD and 
the KPD. Both were thoroughly corrupt parties of Jewish Marxism 
which divided and weakened the German nation. Tactical distinctions 
could nevertheless still be made. The SPD was most often the specific 
target of anti-Marxist attacks. Nothing redeemed the party of 
"November traitors" in Nazi eyes. At least the Communists shared 
the Nazi contempt for the Republic and its parliamentary institutions 
and they shared also an opposition to the Entente powers. The Nazis 
in fact, frequently noticed these similarities. Recognition of the 
virtues of the Communists, as militant opponents of Weimar can be 
found in the NSDAP press and in the statements of some of the Nazi
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leaders. Even Hitler recognized Communists as particularly valuable
46recruits for the NSDAP. On the Nazi side, too, there was ambivalence 
and this was sometimes reflected in Nazi tactics.
When anti-Communism, as distinct from anti-Marxism, made its 
appearance in Nazi propaganda, it was frequently in response to more 
important concerns. For example, Hitler's decision to step up the 
campaign against the Communists after the November, 1932 Reichstag 
elections did not reflect any sudden discovery of a growing Communist 
threat to the Nazis. During the election campaign the Nazis had 
stressed economic issues and an anti-government line. They had 
virtually ignored the anti-Marxist elements of their appeal. They 
had also been involved in many strikes during the year, and on the 
eve of the election they had collaborated with the KPD in a strike of 
transport workers in Berlin. Hitler interpreted the losses suffered 
by the NSDAP at the polls as evidence for the need to shift emphasis 
in order to reassure the party's middle class supporters. One 
convenient way to do this was to pay attention to anti-Communist 
propaganda. The KPD entered the equation, in other words, largely in 
a symbolic sense. ^
The "symbolic" dimension of Nazi anti-Communism found its 
parallel in KPD tactics. The KPD's anti-Fascist campaign was not 
only a reaction to the threat posed by the NSDAP to their organization 
and membership. They used their anti-Fascism as a weapon in their 
united-front struggles with the Social Democrats. They hoped to 
assert their leadership in the anti-Fascist struggle and to win 
support from among the trade union and SPD membership for their version
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of the anti-Fascist campaign. This aspect of the KPD's anti-Fascism 
remained the dominant one long after the NSDAP had become the most 
serious threat to the party.
For many in the party, probably for the majority, the situation 
was considerably simpler than this. Most of the Communist rank and 
file knew perfectly well who the Fascists were and how serious was 
the threat which they posed. Judging from all the evidence for low 
morale (the high turn-over rate, the passivity, the breaches of party 
discipline), many were mystified by the priorities of their leaders.
The tragedy of the ordinary member was that he, as much as anyone, 
had to pay a full price for the mistakes of the party, and yet such 
were the structure and purposes of the KPD, that his concerns never 
received much consideration in the complex of factors which governed 
KPD behaviour.
In 1923 when the issues of the relationship between the KPD and 
the NSDAP first asserted themselves as serious problems for the KPD, 
few could have predicted the tragic outcome for the party. Yet, in 
1923 the outlines of the relationship were already in place. All 
the complicating factors were established or on their way to being 
established —  the subordinate relationship to the Soviet Union, the 
dilution of revolutionary purpose, the primacy of the SPD in the 
party's calculations, the structural weaknesses and finally the 
uncertainties in the analysis of National Socialism and the ambivalence 
with which the party viewed the development of a powerful German 
Fascism. In an important sense their catastrophe was fashioned then 
in the experience of that year.
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CHAPTER II
1923: THE FORMATIVE YEAR
For both parties 1923 was a year of dramatic contrast, a time of 
unique opportunity and great disappointment. For the KPD the year 
began with excellent prospects. The French and Belgian occupation of 
the Ruhr and the accompanying economic dislocation, inflation and 
industrial unrest, strengthened its position relative to its Social 
Democratic rival.'*' By late summer strikes in Berlin, which were 
launched by the Communists, led to the fall of the Cuno government.
In October the KPD entered coalition governments with the SPD in 
Saxony and Thuringia. By this time the steady increase in the 
influence of the KPD and continuing industrial unrest pointed to the 
revival of revolutionary prospects in Germany. Yet the year ended 
in defeat.
Revolutionary activity culminated in the debacle of the Hamburg
2 •uprising at the end of October. This was followed by the forced 
dissolution of the coalition governments. The KPD found itself 
officially outlawed and more isolated than ever before. What was to 
prove an unbridgable rift had opened between it and the other working 
class organizations. Its following began to melt away and its 
influence within the trade unions began to decline. Its dependence 
on the Comintern and the Russian party increased as its self 
confidence as a revolutionary party collapsed.
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For the National Socialists, and the radical right generally, 
1923 was also a promising year. The Nazis grew throughout the year 
and emerged as the strongest of the various völkisch movements.^ 
Hitler had succeeded in asserting his leadership and was on the way 
to becoming an important figure on the national scene. Important 
links were established with the Wehrmacht, with the police and with 
the Bavarian government. But again, opportunity was followed by 
disastrous setbacks. There was the abortive Munich putsch attempt, 
then the banning of the NSDAP and Hitler's trial and imprisonment 
in Landberg.
In this atmosphere of crisis and rapidly changing political 
fortunes, the Communists first formulated the tactical perspectives 
which were to govern their relationship with the Nazis for the 
remainder of the decade. In the first place, they were quick to see 
the Nazis as a serious threat. Mussolini's success, and especially 
the failure of the Italian working class parties to offer effective 
resistance to the Fascists, had made the Communists alert to the 
dangers of Fascist style political movements. From the first, the 
Italian example became a kind of weather guage for danger. This was 
evident in the Communist analysis of the German völkisch and National 
Socialist parties. For it was not so much their actual political 
strength which most drew the attention of the Communists as it was 
their similarity to Italian Fascism. As Fascist parties it was their 
modernity and their potential relevance for the future which was 
worrying. Brandler recognized this early in 1923. In an address to 
the Seventh Reichskongress of the KJD, he noted that all the Weimar
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parties,
"With the exception of the Communist party and 
recently the National Socialists and the 
deutsch-volkisch groups, stem from the pre-war 
„social structure and are therefore in 
dissolution and disarray."4
What most distinguished National Socialism from the bourgeois 
parties and indeed even from other of the volkisch groups, was its 
aggressive activism and its ability to attract a mass following.
These qualities raised new and difficult problems for the Communists. 
Not only did they have to contend with the strong arm tactics of the 
Nazis,but they also recognized them as competitors for the support 
of sections of the population which the Communists expected to win 
for themselves.
By 1923 the Communist analysis of German society, although it 
retained the bi-polar model of working class and bourgeoisie, 
contained a more subtle dimension. The Communists saw the importance 
of the post war economic crisis as a factor which was altering 
Germany's class structure. The social and economic barriers between 
the working class and the lower orders of the middle class were 
breaking down. Their language of analysis reflected the new situation. 
They attempted to broaden their understanding of class as an econom­
ically determined category, so as to distinguish clearly between the 
"Mittelstand" and the bourgeoisie; that is, between the ruined small 
shopkeepers, independent Handwerker and the self employed, on the 
one hand, and on the other, the capital owning classes. They 
attempted also to distinguish between the "old" and the "new" 
Mittelstand. The so-called new Mittelstand was made up of the near
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proletarian Angestellten, (the white collar workers from both the 
private and the public sectors).^ Long before the sociologists of 
Weimar, such as Theodor Geiger, made this kind of analysis a standard 
for German sociology, the Communists had already modified their 
own analysis to take into account the recent changes in the German 
social structure.^ As early as 1919, Paul Frölich noted the
Odisintegration and "proletarianization" of the Mittelstand groups.
He argued that classes which before the war identified with the
bourgeoisie, were now radicalized and forced to use the same methods
as the workers in defending themselves against management. The
"contradictions" between mental and physical labour, between the
"Kopf- und Handarbeitern" were breaking down and the sense of special
status which separated these groups from the working class was being
lost in an awareness of a common interest. It was important for the
Communists to win the support of the Mittelstand or at least to
"neutralize" it. According to their analysis it made up almost half
of the population. It could either be an important ally under
Communist leadership or a decisive weapon in the hands of the 
9bourgeoisie.
The National Socialists and the other völkisch groups were 
recognized as important obstacles for the Communists in gaining access 
to the Mittelstand. According to the Communist argument, the Fascist 
parties had been cast in this role as a result of the mistakes and 
the betrayals of the Social Democrats. Social Democracy had lost 
the support both of the revolutionary workers and the radicalized 
Mittelstand groups. Through its compromise with capitalism it had
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sold out the Interests of these classes. The Mittelstand as a 
consequence was abandoning Social Democracy for the Fascist parties.
This was a well established theme both in the Communist literature on 
Italian Fascism and in the discussions of the German situation. Thus, 
as early as 1921, Brandler accused the Social Democrats of the 
"greatest historical treason", both the SPD and the USPD had,
"brutally disillusioned and mocked all those 
uprooted, wavering petit bourgeois thinking 
worker, civil service and white collar groups 
as well as those middle class people who live 
in the deepest misery, in that they have made a 
caricature of socialism and thereby have driven 
these wavering groups into the camp of the 
counter revolution."10
Because of their influence on the Hittelstand, it was not
sufficient simply to confront the Fascist parties with force. From
the beginning, the Communists insisted on the necessity of combating
Fascism politically by means of a broad propaganda and agitational
campaign designed to convince the Mittelstand supporters of Fascism
11that their objective interests could only be served by the KPD.
What was involved here was an application of the Communist 
"united front" approach to tactical problems and it is important to 
notice that the united front idea applied as much to the KPD's relations 
with the Nazis as it did to its relations with the Social Democrats.
What is involved, at any given time, in the application of the united 
front concept is the identification of the principal political forces 
ranged against Communist objectives (whatever these might happen to be) 
and the definition of the limits and of the form of co-operation and 
competition with those groups which are seen in some senses to share
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the interests of the Communists. It may be that the leadership of 
a group in question accepts Communist purposes either fully or partly. 
Where this is the case, a degree of direct collaboration, or "united 
front from above", may be appropriate. "United front from above", 
however, may not be, and usually is not in itself, an accurate guide 
to Communist priorities. Direct collaboration aimed at a limited 
objective such as a combined electoral or other assault on a shared 
enemy may have, from the point of view of the Communists, the primary 
objective of establishing their leadership over the enterprise and so 
undermining the collaborating party. In other words, "united front 
from above" is to be understood as a weapon to be used as much 
against the "ally" as the common enemy.
This is clearer in the second case of the application of the 
united front idea. It may be true that the shared sense of purpose 
necessary for the united front is not perceived either by the 
leadership or the supporters of the target group, but is nevertheless 
still present "objectively". Thus the industrial workers and the 
impoverished Mittelstand may be misled into an acceptance of the 
bourgeois political order and its values. They may even actively 
support these and just as actively oppose the Communists. It 
nevertheless remains true that their "objective" interests can only 
be served by the Communists. Where this is the case the appropriate 
tactic is "united front from below". What is specifically demanded 
with this tactic is capitulation. Individual members of the target 
groups are to be captured from the rival organization by convincing 
them to accept Communist leadership in pursuit of ends defined
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exclusively by the Communists.
Despite the absence here of any suggestion of allied or
co-operative effort between two parties, some selectivity remains in
the choice of target groups. It was not a tactic which could be
used indiscriminately. The SPD qualified for its attentions because
it was supported by the industrial workers, the single most important
group on whose behalf the Communists claimed to act. The Nazis and
other Fascist groups did, because of the support they obtained from
classes who also properly belonged to the Communists. On the other
hand, the major middle class parties, just because of their following
and membership, could not be recognized as suitable targets, except
in so far as they had some substantial working or lower class support,
as was the case with the Zentrum party. This is an interesting
limitation of tactics which was dictated by the legitimating role
of Communist ideology. It may well have been that the Communists
saw the advantage, for certain purposes, of co-operation even with the
most middle class and conservative groups in Germany. That awareness
of shared purposes, however, necessarily fell outside of the scope of
12united front tactics. Collaboration with such groups took on the 
character of "diplomatic" negotiation or even of conspiracy; but 
"conspiracy" only because of the Communist adherence to their 
revolutionary, Marxist-Leninist doctrine. Certain kinds of contacts 
were simply illegitimate in Marxist-Leninist terms. Hence, any 
revelation of KPD or Soviet contacts with such groups had to be 
acutely embarrassing.
In the case of the National Socialists there were few such
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inhibitions. The radicalized, nationalistic, lower middle class
supporters of National Socialism were seen as being directly open to
Communist united front from below efforts. In the first place, the
KPD's revolutionary (anti-üntente) foreign policy position was
recognized as "a strong weapon in the ideological struggle against
National Socialism", and throughout 1923 anti-Entente propaganda
formed the main content of these tactics. According to Brandler, the
effect of the Fascist nationalist appeal was the main reason for a
new emphasis on the "national question" not only in the German party
but also in the Comintern as a whole. He claimed that Fascist
propaganda had "forced" the party to reconsider its propaganda methods
14and to reform its hitherto "intransigent internationalism".
The Nazis also entered the united front calculations in another
way. From the beginning the Communists were impressed with their
potential as a working class rival. The ability of the Nazis to
attract support from labour was seen as something which distinguished
them both from other German völkisch groups and from the Italian
15Fascists. In 1922 and 1923 the first warnings were sounded. The
Nazis were seen as "far more 'friendly* towards the workers than thé
Italian Fascists". Those parts of the National Socialist programme
which were concerned with labour were interpreted as "posing the16demands of the KPD". The Communists noticed particularly the Nazi 
success among the unemployed and this was to be of even greater 
concern later when the Communists came to rely heavily on the 
unemployed. ^
It was not simply the ability of the Nazis to bring workers into
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their ranks which was worrying. There was, potentially at least, an
even more serious problem. Beginning late in 1922, the Communists
issued warnings which had to do with the Nazi and völkisch penetration
18of the factories and trade unions. Among other things they noted a 
large influx of völkisch minded young workers who were entering the 
factories in order to spread nationalist propaganda. Nazi and 
völkisch workers also brought forward their lists in elections to the 
factory councils which, according to the Communists, represented an 
attempt to disrupt the organizations of the workers. Beyond this they 
acted, more generally, as "agents" of the bourgeoisie within the 
factories performing the functions of "Pinkertons" and strike breakers 
for management.
19These concerns found expression in the resolutions of the RGI.
Communists everywhere were called upon to resist what was seen as
a growing threat to the working class organizations. They were to
fight against the building of Fascist trade unions, resist the
penetration of factory councils by the Fascists, conduct an anti-
Fascist propaganda campaign among workers and the unemployed, and
construct united front proletarian self defense units to counter
Fascist strong arm methods. A different emphasis was clearly present
here from that which characterized the campaign of propaganda and
persuasion directed at the Mittelstand. That is still there both in20the resolutions and in Communist activities at the local level. 
Nevertheless, what was underscored was the necessity for self defense 
and confrontation.
The two pronged tactical approach was reflected in the KPD’s
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first well elaborated statement of principle governing its relations 
with the Nazis. In response to the growing strength of the Nazis in 
southern and western Germany, the Zentrale held a special conference 
of district leaders from Southern Germany. The congress convened in 
Stuttgart on the 27th December 1922 and included as participants, 
representatives of the Zentrale (Maslow and Hollein) and members of 
the KPD Reichstag and Landtag delegations. The conference produced 
a document entitled "Guidelines for Combating National Socialism and 
Fascism".^
The emphasis of the "Guidelines" was divided approximately 
equally between reliance on confrontation and on the more subtle 
techniques of propaganda and agitation. The district leaders were 
required to deny the streets to the "Fascist bands" and to prevent 
and disrupt their meetings. At the same time,
"The National Socialist and Fascists 
were to be combated with the party's 
own ideals ...by means of political 
influence and organizational connections 
with those groups closest to them, especially 
the petite bourgeoisie and the middle and low 
ranking civil servants..."22
This tactical design was restated at a second conference held in Berlin 
in January 1923, and again at the Leipzig Parteitag on the 28th 
January 1923.^
At Leipzig, however, the fairly even balance between the two 
approaches to National Socialism began to break down. During the 
early months of 1923, the KPD made energetic efforts to exploit the 
Fascist issue as a key plank in its united front appeals to the trade 
unions and the Social Democrats. This was done on the basis of offers
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to lead a campaign of confrontation against the National Socialists
and other völkisch groups. The militant anti-Fascist line found
expression in the resolutions of the Leipzig Parteitag and again in
March at the Frankfurt Party Conference. At Frankfurt there was a
call for the establishment of mass united front organizations based
on all organizations of the working class to conduct the struggle
against Fascism. These were the so-called Hundertschaften and
Arbeiterkontrollausschlisse. They were to be based on the factories
and were meant both to defend the organizations of the working class,
and more aggressively, to disarm the Fascists, to disrupt their
movements, to prevent the transport of their weapons, and to deny
24the streets to them. At the same time an international committee
was established, the Internationale Kommittee für die Bekämpfung der
Kriegsgefahr und des Faschismus (Kampfbund). This had as its
declared purpose the co-ordination of the struggle against Fascism
internationally by supplying funds (and unofficially also arms) to
"all proletarian organizations and revolutionary groups which are
25actively engaged in the struggle against Fascism". The Kampfbund
was organized as a structure of "action committees" in each of the
countries where there was judged to be a serious Fascist threat.
Political and financial direction was centred in Berlin. In Germany
the active members were Hugo Eberlein, Ernst Meyer, Clara Zetkin and
Hermann Remmele. It was to be Zetkin and Remmele who would take the
26leading roles in the anti-Fascist campaign in Germany. The tactics 
of direct confrontation culminated with plans for a series of 
Communist led anti-Fascist demonstrations for Berlin and other major
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centres to be held in July.
As a united front tactic these efforts largely failed and they
failed also as a means of countering the activities of the various
radical right organizations. For one thing, the Hundertschaften
appear to have been badly organized. There were complaints from
Communist functionaries of lack of support and direction from the 
28centre. They were also badly understood. The Communists were
concerned that many of their members failed to understand the "united
front" nature of the Hundertschaften and saw them instead as
revolutionary combat organizations. Such comrades were warned that
until the united front functions of these organizations were fulfilled
there could be no question of an armed confrontation with the Fascists
or with the institutions of the Republic. Such an interpretation of
the role of the Hundertschaften, in the meantime, prevented them from
29attracting the support of non-party workers. This was the main
limitation of the Hundertschaften. There was little active support
from the trade unions and the SPD. Sometimes in order to suggest more
support from the workers the KPD functionaries in the factories were
reduced to forging the signatures of non-party trade unionists on the
30petitions demanding the building of Hundertschaften.
The SPD was suspicious of the KPD's united front policy for a 
number of reasons. They saw in the Hundertschaften an attempt to 
involve them in revolutionary adventures. Like many in the KPD they 
did not believe that the tasks of these organizations were confined 
to the problem of defending the factories against Fascist attacks.
They also suspected an attempt to subvert their following. The
27
79
Communists specifically avoided basing their organizational efforts
on the Betriebsräte. Since these already had a "united front"
character they might have been an acceptable base from which to
organize any genuine co-operative defensive effort. They were,
however, dominated by the Social Democrats. For this reason the
Communists insisted on new organizations over which they had control.
The Hundertschaften were also an important cause of friction within
the SPD. In March the KPD had made the construction of united front
Hundertschaften a condition for supporting "left" Social Democratic
governments in Saxony and Thuringia. Communist united front tactics
were therefore more successful in these Lander than elsewhere. In
Prussia, on the other hand, the Social Democratic Minister of the
Interior, Severing, banned the Hundertschaften and arrested some of
their members. Thus the issue of the Communist united front campaign
32was a source of difficulties within the SPD. As a result of these
concerns the SPD relied on its own anti-Fascist defense groups, the
Republikanische Notwehr, the Republikanischer Selbstschutz and
similar organizations. They specifically forbade their members to
participate in the Communist led campaign. Even worse, it sometimes
33came to blows between the competing anti-Fascist groups.
What most got in the way of a closer understanding between the 
Communists and the Social Democrats on the anti-Fascist issue was the 
other dimension of KPD united front policy. The SPD leaders resented 
the Communist argument that it was Social Democracy which was 
responsible for the rise of Fascism in Germany. ^ They resented even 
more the overtures which the Communists were making to the Fascists
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themselves. Even as the KPD was promoting the Hundertschaften it 
was at the same time intensifying its united front efforts with the 
Fascists. This transcended what could reasonably be understood as 
the united front from below approach. The Communists seemed to be 
seeking direct collaboration with the Fascists and, moreover, at the 
expense of the Social Democrats.
From the moment of first contact with the Nazis and the v'dlkisch 
groups, there was present in Communist tactics what was to become a 
characteristic note of uncertainty and ambivalence. To be sure, the 
Fascists represented a threat but they also represented an opportunity. 
It was not just that the supporters of these groups might be won for 
the Communist cause. The Fascist organizations themselves might be 
exploited for Communist purposes. Such a possibility was present 
because there were elements in the stated policy positions of the 
Fascists, or at least of some of the Fascists, which clearly 
complemented Communist purposes and suggested their potential as 
possible allies. To some extent, the Nazis could be seen in this light. 
This was indicated in a confidential report of a special Russian 
Communist party commission, which had been set up in July to report 
on the implications of various European nationalist parties for Soviet 
and Comintern interests. The part of the report concerned with 
nationalist forces in Germany singled out the National Socialists for 
favourable comment,
"the healthy urge for a final break with the 
old regime...finds expression in that part 
of the National Socialist programme which 
speaks of the requisition of the banks and 
the large enterprises."35
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It was, however, not so much the economic policies of the Fascists 
which interested the Communists. They were more interested in 
foreign policy attitudes. Some on the radical right argued for 
collaboration with the Soviet Union against the Entente. This was 
true of some of the smaller groups such as the Bund Oberland and it 
was true also of some of the Nazis. In 1923 the Communists tried to 
exploit these "National Bolshevik" tendencies. This aspect of 
Communist tactics is especially linked with one event of the summer of 
1923. This was the occasion of Karl Radek's "Schlageter" speech, 
which he delivered before the Comintern Executive on the 20th June.
No special significance attaches to the name Schlageter. Albert 
Leo Schlageter had been an obscure nationalist terrorist until he was 
executed by the French occupation authorities in the Ruhr for his 
part in an attempt to sabotage a railway line. He was a member of 
the paramilitary nationalist organization Freikorps Rossbach. He 
had fought against the Red Army in the Baltic and against the Poles 
in East Prussia. His execution made him an instant martyr for all the 
vBlkisch groups, including the National Socialists. He became, in 
fact, a central figure in Nazi propaganda for the remainder of the 
Weimar years.
Radek used the death of Schlageter as the theme of a speech which 
was meant as a direct appeal for an accommodation between the 
Communists and the German Fascists. He argued that the interests of 
the Fascists lay in an alliance with the Communists and the Russian 
people against "Entente capital",
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"Against whom do the Deutschvölkische want 
to fight? Against Entente capital or the 
Russian people? With whom do they wish to 
ally themselves? With the Russian workers 
and peasants so together to shake off the 
yoke of Entente capital, or with Entente capital 
to enslave the German and Russian peoples?...
We believe that the great majority of the 
nationalist minded masses belong not in the 
camp of Capital but in the camp of the workers.
We want to find, and we shall find the path to 
those masses."37
The Schlageter speech had a strong impact on KPD tactics. To
emphasize the united front approach to the Fascists some local
organizations carried placards in the streets with the Swastika and
38the Red Star painted side by side. In the Communist press, overtures
were made to the Fascists to make common cause with the KPD in
opposition to France. Heinz Neumann, for example, appealed in Die
_Rote Fahne to the National Socialists to oppose French efforts to
39establish contacts with Bavarian separatists. The Communists also
began to seek contacts with the various völkisch and National
Socialist organizations. They sent speakers to the meetings of these
40groups and they organized meetings of their own. Again, the basis 
of the approach was the appeal for common action in resisting the 
French. An idea of the tone of these meetings can be gained from an 
address given by Ruth Fischer on the 23th July to an audience of 
Nazi students,
"The German Reich, the German Kulturgemeinschaft, 
the unity of the nation can only be saved if 
you gentlemen on the deutschvölkisch side realize 
that you must fight together with the masses 
which are organized in the Communist party. You 
cry out against Jewish capital gentlemen? Who 
cries out against Jewish capital is already a 
class fighter even if he doesn't know it. You
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are against Jewish capital and want to beat down 
the stock exchange jobbers. Right. Trample 
the Jewish capitalists under, hang them from the 
lamp posts,...However, gentlemen what is your 
stand on the big capitalists, on Stinnes...
National liberation...gentlemen we will show you 
the positive way to the liberation struggle 
against French imperialism. This French 
imperialism is now the greatest danger in the 
world. France is the land of reaction. Only 
in alliance with Russia, gentlemen on the 
v'olkisch side can the German people throw out 
French capitalism from the Ruhr.41
Hermann Remmele was a frequent speaker at such meetings. In 
August, in Stuttgart and Goppingen, before audiences which were 
dominated by Communists and National Socialists, he explored the themes 
of resistance to France, anti-capitalism and anti-Semitism. With 
respect to anti-Semitism, Remmele, like Ruth Fischer, equated it with 
revolutionary anti-capitalism,
"It is easy to understand the reasons for anti- 
Semitism. One needs only visit the Stuttgart 
meat market to notice that the great majority 
of buyers are Jews who pay any price while the 
Stuttgart butcher goes away empty handed because 
he doesn’t have enough money...You Fascists claim 
to be fighting Jewish high finance. Good. Do 
that. We are agreed. (Stormy applause from the 
Fascists)...But...if you really want to fight 
against the exploitation of the German people... 
then you must fight side by side with the workers 
against the capitalist system."42
In discussing the "national question" and the French occupation of the 
Ruhr, Remmele sought to link the struggle against France with the 
themes of social revolution and an alliance with the Soviet Union. He 
compared Germany to a colony of the Western powers and invited the 
National Socialists in the audience to take up arms against the
occupation,
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"...this struggle is no war of words, it will 
not be decided in Parliament, it can only be 
victoriously concluded with weapons in hand."43
On this point he drew a sharp distinction between the Communist and
Soviet attitude towards French imperialism and that of the Social
Democrats. Borrowing a term from the National Socialist vocabulary,
he referred to the SPD as the "November Traitors". At one point,
when some Social Democrats in the audience left in protest, Remmele
observed,
"...in this meeting after the Social Democrats 
have withdrawn, there are not so many 
differences of opinion."44
When faced with this sort of thing, it is small wonder that the
SPD reacted with suspicion to the united front suggestions of the
Communists. The Social Democratic press was very critical of the
Communist contacts with the Fascists and they specifically noticed
45the anti-Social Democratic content of speeches such as Remmele's.
The Social Democrats suspected that it was they, rather than the 
Fascists, who were the main targets of Communist hostility. This was 
a well justified suspicion. Co-operation with the Communists, for 
any purposes at all, always came up against the stumbling block of 
the KPD's hostility to Social Democracy. For the SPD, defense of 
the working class meant primarily the defense of the democratic 
institutions of the Republic. The KPD had a very different conception. 
As a revolutionary party, it did not see itself as a defender of 
Weimar. It was not Fascism, but the SPD, as the strongest working 
class party, which was the main barrier to the KPD’s revolutionary
ambitions.
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What was changing was the content of those revolutionary ambitions. 
More and more the promotion of revolution was coming to be understood 
by the KPD leadership as the promotion of Soviet interests. This need 
not, of course, have meant any weakening in revolutionary resolve.
The Soviets, too, were doctrinally committed to revolution in Germany. 
Moreover, the new Soviet power was faced with serious problems of 
economic and political instability. It felt itself isolated and 
threatened. Its influence with the member sections of the Comintern 
might have been seen as its one political asset in an otherwise hostile 
world and revolution, especially revolution in Germany, as its most 
likely means of ending its isolation. Yet, just because of Soviet 
weaknesses, involvement in revolutionary adventures was bound to 
involve important risks. Besides, there were other options open to 
the Soviet Union in its attempt to reduce its sense of threat and 
there were other ways, too, of exploiting its leadership within the 
Comintern. The longer the revolution took to materialize the more 
the balance tipped in favour of the other options.
Perhaps without fully realizing all the implications of the shift 
in intention and commitment, the Soviet leaders began to explore these 
alternatives. At the Tenth Party Congress Lenin opted for policies 
which postponed some of the Bolshevik revolutionary objectives in 
favour of a programme which stressed a prudent concern for political 
and economic security. In foreign affairs, too, non-revolutionary 
approaches to the world were increasingly emphasized. Trade 
negotiations were opened with the Baltic Republics, with Great Britain 
and with Germany. In 1922 the non-revolutionary aspects of Soviet
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foreign policy were underscored with the Rapallo treaty.
The conservative approach to Germany which the Rapallo treaty
represented competed strongly with the KPD's revolutionary efforts.
What was indicated was that the Soviet Union's backing for the
German revolution was uncertain and this had to exert an influence on
KPD tactics. Without the moral and material support of the Soviet
Union the prospects for successful revolutionary action were very
much reduced. Rapallo was evidence that even a non-Soviet Germany
provided the Soviet Union with opportunities for ending its isolation
in Europe. Indeed, long before Rapallo there was ample evidence for
the presence of this idea in Soviet calculations. The Soviets had
consistently expressed sympathy for the German side concerning the
A 6terms of the Versailles Treaty. They had attempted also to find a 
basis of co-operation with conservative, anti-Entente circles in the 
Wehrmacht and German industry. These efforts laid the foundation 
both for Rapallo and extensive economic and military collaboration 
between the two countries.
The pursuit of working relations with German conservatives, with
those very classes which were identified by the KPD as the principal
antagonists in their revolutionary struggles, provided the best
evidence for the uncertain and half-hearted nature of the Soviet
commitment to the German revolution. These contacts were established
early through the efforts of Soviet representatives and agents, notably
Karl Radek and Victor Kopp. Much is known about the negotiations
47wnich were undertaken at that time. They took place, however, in 
an atmosphere of intrigue and conspiracy and therefore many of the
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details concerning any agreements reached remain obscure. One source 
which provides some additional detail is contained in secret British 
government intelligence reports on the activities of "foreign 
revolutionary movements" for 1919-1922.^ These reports conform well 
to other accounts and they express an unusual degree of confidence in 
the sources of their information. They emphasize the importance of 
the contacts as evidence for the growing Soviet preoccupation with its 
own security and economic problems.
Negotiations were first begun in Berlin in 1919 between Karl
Radek and leading representatives of the conservative right, including49fcugene Freiherr von Reibnitz, Rathenau and Harden. A year later, 
these initial talks resulted in the formulation of concrete proposals 
for mutual support between the Soviet government and representatives 
of the German conservatives, including General Ludendorff.
On his return from Berlin to Moscow late in January 1919, Radek 
presented a report to the Soviet government on the possibility of 
co-operation with the Wehrmacht and German industry. An account of 
this report, "a full and precise account which has been received 
from a most reliable source", was communicated to British intelligence 
early in 1920. According to this, Radek recommended that the Soviet 
government work through established contacts in Germany to obtain the 
services of German scientists and technicians, to obtain German help 
for the reorganization of the Soviet transport system and to establish 
normal economic and diplomatic ties between the two countries. In 
return the Soviets would supply German industry with specified raw 
materials. This proposal was accepted by the Soviet government.
88
There were also serious suggestions of direct military collaboration.
The British documents contain several reports of negotiations between
Karl Radek and Victor Kopp and a group of army officers who claimed to
represent a "secret military league".Although nothing came of these
plans, the negotiations were reported as far reaching and they involved
the participation of the highest levels in the Soviet government,
52including Lenin. What was apparently discussed were plans for joint
military operations against Poland and the provision of military
equipment and munitions for the Red Army. According to British
intelligence, these plans were shelved mainly as a result of difficulties
53raised by the German "reactionaries". Despite this, the policy of
seeking accommodations with the "reactionaries" continued and it
continued also to cast in doubt Soviet support for the German revolution.
The KPD was reported to be in desperate financial difficulties due to
54lack of financial help from the Russians. At the same time, reports
reaching Moscow were pessimistic about the prospects for successful
revolutionary action. Kopp, for example, argued that the best policy
for Moscow to adopt towards Germany was to continue to seek an
understanding with the German nationalists along the lines of the
55accommodation already reached with the Turkish nationalists.
Whatever enthusiasm for the revolution there may still have been 
at the beginning of 1921 was further eroded by the setbacks suffered 
by the KPD during that year. Revolution as an approach to the world 
was being eclipsed by the more conservative approach to the problems 
of advancing Soviet security and economic interests. In Germany and 
elsewhere —  in Turkey and China —  this continued to mean seeking
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close relations with the anti-Western and anti-imperialist nationalists. 
From the Soviet point of view, there was far less risk in this course 
of action than would have been the case had the decision been taken to 
base Soviet policy entirely on support for the revolutionary activities 
of the weak and isolated Communist parties.
In the KPD the central importance of Soviet interests was 
recognized as a consideration which was separable from the KPD's 
revolutionary objectives. This was apparent in KPD policy statements,
"The overthrow of Soviet power is only possible 
at present through outside intervention and 
here is where there is a close connection 
between Soviet Russia's policies and the 
policies of foreign Communist parties. Their 
task is to prevent any kind of capitalist 
assault against Russia and to create a world 
situation which favours socialist construction 
of Soviet Russia."56
During 1923 the non-revolutionary orientation was still stronger. In 
Jamaary the German ambassador, Rantzau, in a telegram to the German 
Foreign Office, noted that the French operations in the Ruhr had 
made a "strong impression among the Soviet leaders" and that the Soviet 
government were sympathetic to Germany. ^  Rantzau's opinion was
confirmed in the statements of Soviet leaders. In an open letter to 
the member sections of the Comintern, Bukharin justified support for
the German government against France,
"Social revolution in Europe and throughout the 
world will take years, and only be completed 
in the course of decades. During this time, 
for some proletarian states it can be necessary 
to reach temporary understandings with oppressed 
bourgeois states —  with weak and threatened 
states —  against the stronger and 
threatening."58
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At the same time Bukharin offered support for the German revolution
by promising Russian intervention should Poland attack Germany after
a successful German revolutionary effort. The competing trends in
the Soviet assessment found expression in the stated objectives of the
KPD. The German Communists were to conduct a war on "two fronts",
against the French and against the internal enemy, "Stinnes, Thysen 
59and Company".
The argument that the KPD could simultaneously support the German 
opposition to the occupation while pursuing their own revolutionary 
struggle against the German bourgeoisie did not really carry much 
conviction. It was clear that the campaign against France had 
priority, regardless of the effect of such a priority on the KPD's 
revolutionary hopes. The elaborations on the war on two fronts theme 
made the priorities clear. In justifying the KPD's tactics, Radek, 
for example, argued,
"If we had said at the time of the French 
invasion of the Ruhr, that we wanted first to 
fight Cuno and then throw out the French, we 
would then, whether we wanted to or not, have 
become the allies of Poincare."60
This emphasis was also present in the assessments of the KPD. Frolich, 
in an explanation of the party's tactics, gave first place to the 
struggle against France.^
At the same time, the fact that this priority reflected Soviet 
strategic calculations, at least as much as revolutionary considerations, 
was strongly suggested in some of the statements of the Russian 
leaders. Bukharin, in a speech before the All Russian Congress of 
Press Workers, argued that the invasion of the Ruhr aided the
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revolutionary struggles of the European working classes. This was so
because the invasion delayed the process of stabilization and
reconstruction of European capitalism. His arguments, however, also
stressed the possible effects of the invasion on Soviet strategic
interests. If the French succeeded in dividing and subjugating
Germany, there would be an increased threat of aggression against the
Soviet Union from France, Poland and France’s "other vassal states".
He argued that it would be "frivolous" for the Russians to "throw
themselves into any adventure", and he concluded by noting the primacy
of the need "to place the necessity of economic reconstruction and
62the desire for peace in the foreground".
The Communists found a revolutionary justification for this
emphasis. They argued that during the occupation the German
bourgeoisie had played an "objectively" revolutionary role. Their
opposition to French imperialism complemented the struggles of the
German proletariat, since it distracted and weakened an important
enemy of the revolution. Yet, at the same time, the strategic
argument was also present. One of the most important ways in which
the objectively revolutionary role of the German bourgeoisie had been
demonstrated was through the strengthened "Ostorientierung" of
63German foreign policy. The foreign policy aspects of the KPD's 
tactics at the time of the occupation were also underscored in 
subsequent commentary. Writing in 1927, Heinz Neumann observed that 
during the whole of the period between 1918 and 1923 Germany had 
acted as a factor which limited the effects of the anti-Soviet 
policies of the Entente governments. German foreign policy had
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furthered Soviet interests and this situation had arisen as a result 
of the opposition of the German bourgeoisie to the Versailles Treaty,
"The boundless stupidity of the Versailles 
peace gave the state of the proletarian 
dictatorship the possibility to secure its 
power, to bring the civil war to a victorious 
end and to exploit the breathing space after 
the collapse of the first war of intervention 
for the peaceful construction of the 
socialist economy."64
Together with the foreign policy concern, another influence 
exerted pressure on the KPD's revolutionary orientation. There was 
evidence that the Russian leaders had little faith in the KPD's ability 
to conduct any kind of mass action. In August, Radek was reported to 
have sent Chicherin a secret assessment of the KPD. Radek cast doubt 
both on the ability of the party's leadership and on the quality of 
its organization. In his view the party was "completely unprepared 
for serious and decisive action".^ Stalin, too, apparently shared 
these doubts. At the beginning of August, that is shortly before 
Radek's report, he expressed his misgivings,
"If power, so to speak, falls in Germany today 
and the Communists try to sieze it they will 
fail...That is the best case. In the worst, 
however, they will be ripped to pieces and 
thrown back...It is my opinion that the 
Germans must be held back and not encouraged."66
Later, at the time of the October uprising in Hamburg, the German
government noticed the same attitude among the Soviet leaders. On
the 23rd October, the German Ambassador had a conversation with
Litvinov during which he stated,
"...it was a dangerous game, if at a moment 
when the German people were engaged in a 
most difficult struggle for their existence,
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Communist propaganda...should intensify 
inner conflicts and thereby weaken Germany's 
ability to resist France. In this way the 
sympathy of those circles who want to work 
loyally with the Soviet government will be
forfeit."67
According to Rantzau, Litvinov was sympathetic to these protests. On
the 3rd November Chicherin met with the Ambassador to assure him
that the Russian government had taken "energetic measures" to ensure
68a more sympathetic treatment of Germany in the Soviet press.
The conservative nature of the Soviet approach to Germany and the 
acceptance of the German status quo which it implied did not appear 
to be reflected in KPD policies. At the end of 1923 the party's line 
had become more militant and more than ever dedicated to revolutionary 
goals. Its attitude, especially to the SPD and the trade unions had 
hardened and it showed no willingness to co-operate or participate 
at any level in the institutions of Weimar. This swing to the "left" 
was first announced at a conference of party workers on the 3rd 
November. Henceforth united front from below was to be the approach 
to the SPD and the unions. At the same time the Stresemann 
administration was characterized as representing the "Fascist triumph 
over the bankrupt November Republic". It was a government which 
could only be overcome through the creation of the "dictatorship of 
the proletariat".^
Early in 1924, at the Frankfurt Parteitag and again at the Fifth 
Comintern World Congress in June, the left positions were confirmed.
By the time of the Fifth Congress the SPD had become nothing more 
than a "branch of Fascism" in a "life and death alliance with white
. The possibility of co-operation with the Social Democraticreaction"
94
leaders whether "left" or "right" was decisively rejected.^ The
tactical implications of these resolutions were spelled out for KPD
functionaries in an internal party circular in December 1923.^  In
this document the party was informed that their central task had
become the "complete liquidation" of the SPD. To this end united
front from below tactics were to be employed. The SPD was to be
disrupted and the influence of the trade union leaders destroyed by
"actively supporting the demands of the proletariat and the
impoverished petit bourgeois masses", over the heads of their leaders.
As this circular indicated, the left militancy meant nothing
much more than an intensification of the existing attempt to weaken
the SPD. That was not in itself a good indication of a firmer
revolutionary resolve. Another interpretation was possible and it
was one which was more in harmony with the Soviet Union's search for
a basis of understanding with Germany.
The Communist commentary on the SPD had already established the
idea that Social Democracy was an important enemy of Soviet foreign 
72policy interests. At the Fifth Congress this argument was given a
new emphasis. Social Democracy was attacked for its betrayal of the
working class and the revolution but it was also attacked, and in
stronger terms, as an enemy of the Soviet Union. According to the
resolutions of the Congress, Social Democracy harboured a "boundless
hate against the Soviet Union". It was working for the "international
Isolation of the Soviet Union". The participation of Social Democratic
parties in democratic governments was seen as "increasing the risks of
73a war of intervention". On this last point, it is, of course,
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highly unlikely that many in the Soviet leadership took seriously the 
risks of a "war of intervention" —  anyway, certainly not in 1924. 
Stalin, for one, admitted this on several occasions.^ The 
endlessly repeated war danger argument should be understood mainly 
as a device for dramatizing the importance of Soviet interest for 
the work of the Communist parties. It provided a sense of crisis 
and of revolutionary urgency for policies which might otherwise have 
been less acceptable from the point of view of a revolutionary party. 
For some in the Russian party, such as Stalin, it perhaps served as 
a justification for the emphasis on the inward looking themes of 
national defense and economic construction. In the atmosphere of 
defeat and disappointment which followed the Hamburg uprising it 
gave the KPD a sense of purpose which protected its "revolutionary" 
morale and .served to distinguish it from its working class rivals.
The competing tendencies in Communist policies towards the 
Social Democrats were also present in the approach which was adopted 
in the case of the various radical nationalist and Fascist groups. 
There too it was possible to infer both revolutionary and non­
revolutionary objectives for Communist policies. It has already been 
argued that the early attempts to find an accommodation with the 
German nationalist groups was related to Soviet strategic 
calculations. Yet there were those among the Communists in Germany 
who saw in German nationalism an important revolutionary ally. At 
the same time that the Soviets were seeking an understanding with 
the Wehrmacht and German industry, there was an important independent
attempt to forge a revolutionary alliance with the more militant of
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the radical nationalist groups in northern Germany. This attempt 
was associated with the Hamburg party organization and especially 
with two of the Hamburg leaders, Heinrich Laufenberg and Fritz 
Wolfheim.
The argument which Laufenberg and Wolfheim developed between 
1919 and 1920 rested on two assumptions. The first of these was that 
there must be a clear and immediate resolve to proceed with the 
revolution. This meant, for them, a "left" policy of no compromise 
with, or involvement in, the institutions of the Republic. There 
could be no participation in elections and no question of tactical 
co-operation with the Social Democrats and the trade unions. The 
second assumption was that in the situation after the war nationalism 
had become a revolutionary force. They called for resistance to the 
Entente powers on the basis of a "Volkskrieg". They argued that such 
a Volkskrieg would quickly lead to the collapse of the Republic. The 
revolutionaries would then assume the task of national defense and 
create at the same time the foundations of a Soviet Germany.^
Success depended on the widest possible alliance of classes. Internal 
class struggle was, under the circumstances, counterrevolutionary, 
since it weakened the ability of Germany to resist the external enemy 
and thus ¿he possibility of a successful Volkskrieg. The class 
alliance was possible since the war had largely destroyed the old 
class order. Little of class antagonism remained. Except for a few 
in Germany, who were in a position to exploit defeat for their own 
selfish gain, the war had transformed the German people into one vast 
proletariat who suffered equally under the exploitation of foreign
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capital.7  ^ The Volkskrieg, the war of national liberation, and the 
revolution were identical.
The practical consequence of Laufenberg's and Wolfheim's 
arguments was the formulation of proposals for an alliance, a 
"revolutionary truce" between the Communists and the most militant of 
the nationalist groups, the Freikorps. Since the most powerful 
political forces in Germany were the Communists and the Freikorps. 
and since both were enemies of the foreign exploiters, did that not 
suggest, "seeking to avoid the fight between them and letting them 
fight together as allies against a common enemy?"77
The ideas and intrigues of the Hamburg Communists were quickly 
denounced by Lenin and other leading Bolsheviks. In his Left Wing 
Communism,an Infantile Disorder, Lenin lashed out at the,
"crying absurdities of 'National Bolshevism'
(Laufenberg et al.) which has gone to the 
length of advocating a bloc with the German 
bourgeoisie for a war against the Entente... 
to tie one's hands beforehand to tell the 
enemy, who is now better armed than we are, 
whether and when we shall fight him is being
stupid not revolutionary."78
Despite the elaborate revolutionary rationale with which Lenin
couched his arguments, a prudent concern for the survival of the new
Soviet power, and caution, are the dominant themes. This was true
also of Eadek's anti-National Bolshevik article, "The Foreign Policy
79of German Communism and the Hamburg National Bolshevism". The 
problem with the ideas of the Hamburg Communists was that they 
smacked too much of revolutionary adventurism. It was one thing to 
exploit the National Bolshevik tendencies of some right wing groups 
but quite another to surrender to them. It would, therefore, be
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inappropriate to see in Radek's Schlageter speech a rebirth of
National Bolshevism. It is significant that it was Radek who, in
1919 and 1920, was a principal critic of the Hamburg opposition. He
and others repeatedly asserted that the tactics of 1923 had nothing
80to do with the defunct National Bolshevism. There was to be no
suggestion of a "revolutionary truce" and there were certainly no
plans for genuine combat with the French. To be sure Radek's
position required its revolutionary justifications and these did
borrow something from the National Bolshevik ideas. Radek argued
that the radicalized petit bourgeois masses, who were the raw
material of Fascism, formed a natural "rear guard" for the German
revolution. They complemented the "advance guard" role of the
Communists by dividing and distracting the bourgeoisie with demands
for national and social justice. The Communists had to win the
support of these masses and turn their fury against the appropriate
targets of Entente imperialsim and German capitalism. The
revolutionary significance of the petite bourgeoisie was revealed
in its rejection of the Weimar system, Social Democracy and the
imperialist Versailles order. Fascism was the expression of this
deep rejection, or in Radek's words, "Fascism is the socialism of
81the impoverished petit bourgeois masses."
One need not cast doubt on Radek's revolutionary sincerity to 
notice that, despite this argument, the Schlageter initiative is open 
to a very different interpretation. It conformed well to the main 
outlines of Soviet foreign policy concerns with respect to Germany,
It could be seen to serve the limited objective of seeking to exploit
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forces which were clearly anti-French in their orientation. Their 
very presence provided an additional pressure on the German government 
to stiffen its opposition to the French. This operated in a double 
sense, since the activities of radical nationalist groups aroused 
the suspicions of the French and from their perspective better 
relations with Germany were made more difficult. Radical nationalist, 
anti-French pressure was even more desirable, from the Communist point 
of view, after the collapse of the Cuno government. One of the main 
concerns of Stresemann as Chancellor and as Foreign Minister was to 
end the government backed campaign of passive resistance in the Ruhr 
and break the diplomatic impasse with France. This would seriously 
undermine the basis of collaboration between Germany and the Soviet 
Union.
In thè discussions of Communist policies during 1923 and before,
there was consistently present a linkage between revolutionary themes
and the simpler ideas of resisting French influence in Europe and of
forging links between the Soviet Union and Germany. This was true
of Radek's statements before June 1923 and it was true of his
82subsequent elaborations on the Schlageter theme. The Schlageter 
initiative, then, could be interpreted (and should be interpreted) as 
an attempt to preserve the Soviet advantage in Germany while at the 
same time providing the KPD with a means of defending itself against 
the predations of the Fascists. In both senses, there was nothing 
really new in the so-called "Schlageter Course". It did, to be sure, 
have a united front from above implication, but the dividing line 
between the search for direct collaboration and tactics designed to
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influence only the following of another party was always, in any 
case, a fine one. This was only too apparent in the case of the KPD's 
relations with the SPD and it had been apparent all along in their 
relations with the National Socialists. Not so much separates the 
Schlageter speech from the earlier emphasis on the need for ideological 
work among the Mittelstand supporters of Fascism. Indeed, a year 
before the Schlageter speech, Radek published an article which 
anticipated some of its arguments. In the article he pointed out 
that the Communists had always to pay attention to the nationalist 
aspirations of the petitebourgeoisie. For according to Radek, "it83was laughable to see in these masses only a support for reaction".
This part of Radek's argument found wide acceptance even among
the critics. Zetkin had been one of the first to point out the
presence of a genuinely revolutionary aspiration in the Fascist ranks
and she had stressed the need for united front from below work among 
84them. Brandler, although he distrusted its similarities with the
older National Bolshevik positions of the Hamburg Communists
85nonetheless defended the effectiveness of Radek's approach. Speaking 
before the Executive Committee of the Profintern in September he 
observed that the KPD's tactics had been designed,
"...to make the Fascist elements harmless so 
it will not be possible for the middle classes 
to exploit them for the counter revolution...
We have sought to open a discussion with them 
in language they will understand...We have been 
able to penetrate their meetings and even discuss 
various questions with them...This has resulted 
in accelerating the process of disintegration 
in the Fascist organizations. In south Germany 
in Wurttemburg and even in Bavaria, the bastion 
of Fascism, this process of disintegration has
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intensified. The Fascist leaders...are now 
saying to their followers that there is no 
possibility of marching on Berlin...'If the 
Communists succeed in crushing the present 
government, then we are well rid of it.' The 
former self confidence has vanished."86
Brandler and others exaggerated the effectiveness of these tactics.
The truth was that the direct united front approach to German Fascism
in 1923 had very little positive impact. The limiting factor was the
attitude of the Fascists. The National Socialists and Völkische
responded with even less enthusiasm to Communist offers of
co-operation than did the Social Democrats. In July, the Völkischer
Beobachter reprinted Radek's speech and rejected the suggestions of
87co-operation which it contained. In August the Nazi membership was
88instructed not to visit Communist meetings.
Radek was particularly disappointed by the response of the Nazis
but in part he saw it as a reaction of fear and thus as evidence for
the success of the tactic in winning influence among the 
89Fascists. There may well have been some truth in such an 
interpretation. Some Nazis had responded to the Communist initiatives, 
at least to the point of tolerating their presence in public meetings 
and responding to Communist invitations to supply speakers. This may 
well have alarmed Hitler, who could have seen the evidence for
90"National Bolshevik" tendencies within the Nazi ranks as a threat.
It was also true that the Nazis had their own version of Schlageter.
They were interested in recruiting Communists for the NSDAP and the
Nazi press occasionally carried recruitment appeals meant for the KPD
membership. In exploiting the language and symbols of the Communists
91these efforts borrowed something from Radek's approach.
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The topics of the discussions In joint meetings provide some
measure of the effect of the Schlageter tactic. Once more, what
was obvious was that it was the Fascist side which imposed the limits
on the degree of co-operation and understanding which was possible at
this time. At one meeting sponsored by the Deutschvolkische
Freiheitspartei twenty leading Communist functionaries were present
by invitation. The speaker observed that there was little scope for
co-operation with the Communists. This was so because of the
dependence of the KPD on Moscow and Moscow meant the "rule of a
crowd of Jews". The Volkischesaw the Jews, "as the greatest enemy".
The speaker, however, did go on to point out that despite the question
of the Jews there was still some common ground. The Communists and
the Volkischewere ready to fight for the German people against France
and they shared a common antipathy for capitalism. The time to
exploit this common ground had not yet arrived since Germany was not
92ready to fight France.
Both the limited sense of shared purposes and the obstacles in 
the way of co-operation also found expression in the National 
Socialist and right wing press. The same article in the Volkischer 
Beobachter, which had rejected the possibility of co-operation with 
the Communists, had noted that, "whoever reads Radek's speech has 
here and there the sensation that the Jew strikes notes which for 
years have been the chief demands of the National Socialist workers' 
movement". But it was the Jewish and international character of
93Communism which made it impossible for Nazis to see it as an ally.
With hindsight it is easy to see the tragic dimension of the
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failure of the Communists to comprehend fully the nature of the 
differences which separated them from the National Socialists and 
Völkische. Above all, they insisted that anti-Semitism could be 
understood as anti-capitalism and therefore as a factor which made the 
Fascists a suitable target for the united front appeal. They were, 
of course, mistaken. Anti-Semitism was perhaps the most serious 
obstacle to such tactics. It could not be made so easily to yield to 
the Communist class analysis. The Communists tried hard to convince 
their Nazi audience that the racial question was irrelevant to their 
real (class) concerns. What went unnoticed, but was apparent in 
speeches such as Fischer's and Remmele's, was that too much was conceded 
(perhaps everything). Brandler was right on this point. As Fischer 
and Remmele borrowed some of the worst images from the anti-Semitic 
vocabulary, one had to wonder just who was influencing whom.
Doctrinal reservations also coloured the more positive responses 
to the Communist initiative. These came from the leading nationalist 
intellectual Moeller van den Bruck and from Graf Ernst zu Reventlow, 
a völkisch leader who was later to join the NSDAP. Reventlow replied 
to Radek in his own völkisch and anti-Semitic weekly, Der Reichswart 
and the article was later reprinted in Die Rote Fahne. Reventlow
< itaddressed himself to both Radek and Paul Frolich. The latter had 
promised in Die Rote Fahne that the Communists were prepared to 
co-operate with the völkisch organizations,
"Whoever is sincere in his intention of 
marching with us a part of the way (ein 
Stück Wegs) will find us willing."94
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Taking up Frölich's "ein Stück Wegs" theme, Reventlow replied,
"Should Herr Radek and the Communist International 
for which he spoke, be ready for such 
co-operation let them follow words by deeds. We 
Völkische are not prejudiced and are willing to 
accept support from anyone. But we will not 
consider sacrificing the substance of our 
völkisch ideas or having them infringed upon."95
Moeller van den Bruck, too, saw the main limiting factor on co-operation
in the doctrinal differences which separated the two sides. Two years
earlier he had made a case for an anti-parliamentary, anti-liberal
96"axis" of Communists and radical nationalists. Now when faced with 
the Communist overtures, he equivocated. He pointed to doctrinal 
differences and he also expressed doubts concerning the permanence 
of the Soviet Union's opposition to France,
"Germany must always be prepared for the 
restoration of a special political relationship 
between France and Russia...The French Republic 
will no more shy away from a tie with the Soviet 
state than it shied away from contact with 
Czarism."97
Despite the equivocations, there was enough that was encouraging
for the Communists to react favourably and to use Reventlow and
Moeller van den Bruck as central figures in their united front tactics.
Articles by Moeller van den Bruck, Reventlow, Frölich and Radek
appeared together in the Communist press and in a Communist published
98pamphlet, Schlageter eine Auseinandersetzung. Radek referred
99favourably to Moeller van den Bruck's Gewissen and Reventlow's 
article was reviewed sympathetically in Inprekorr.^^ On the 
radical right there continued to be some recognition of common 
ground with the Communists. Even the Nazi press went as far as to
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acknowledge that the two sides shared the same enemies. In September 
the völkischer Beobachter, while reacting to rumoured plans of 
emergency measures to deal with the extremists of left and right, 
asked the question,
"Cui bono if Seeckt and Stresemann proceed 
against the Völkische and Communists? One 
is permitted to conclude that such measures 
come about on the order of Jews and Social 
Democrats."101
Besides the limited contacts in the press and the fraternization
which took place in public meetings, there are hints of a more serious
kind of co-operation involving the Communists and various nationalist
and völkisch groups. In the memoir literature there are claims that
collaboration took place in the Ruhr against the French and in Selesia
against the Poles. Heinz Neumann, for example, supposedly reached
some kind of understanding with nationalist Wehrmacht officers in the 
102Ruhr. In Hamburg the Communists were supposedly in direct contact 
it 103with the völkisch, Schlageter Kreise. There were also contacts
104and offers of collaboration with Oberland. There was further 
evidence, this time for armed collaboration, in Communist agitational 
literature meant for the Völkische, the Wehrmacht and the police. This 
material reminded its audience of collaboration against the French 
and asked that such activities be borne in mind when considering what 
attitude to adopt towards the KPD and the Soviet Union. One such 
document noted that it would be far too dangerous to review the full 
history of the co-operation in a document that might fall into the 
wrong hands."''®5
There was also a suggestion of financial dealings between the
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Communists, the Nazis and the Bund Oberland. One internal Bavarian
government report of November 1923 noted that Scheubner-Richter had
"enormous sums" at his disposal and had been using them in
preparation for Hitler's putsch attempt. The source of these funds
was a mystery but the report suggested the possibility of some of
them originating in Moscow. It went on to argue that this was likely
in view of the large number of former Communists and Russian emigres
106in the radical right circles. It was, moreover, widely rumoured
that Scheubner-Richter was in direct contact with Moscow. Freikorps
commander Captain Ehrhardt claimed to have been able to contact the
Soviet government via Scheubner-Richter.Intrigues between the
Bavarian radical nationalists and Russian agents were also mentioned
108in the British intelligence documents.
There is good evidence for financial dealings between Communists
and Oberland. This has to do with the case of the SPD member of the
Bavarian Landtag, Graf. Graf had been editor of the KPD organ, Neue
Zeit, before defecting to the SPD. While in this position he was
reported to have accepted 350,000 Marks from Oberland with the
knowledge and approval of the KPD Zentrale. The subsequent SPD
Landtag delegation investigation into this matter upheld the charge
and claimed "further connections between the KPD Zentrale and leading
109members of Oberland'1. The Rote Fahne denied KPD complicity in the 
affair but its position was feeble since it attempted only to exploit 
the issue from the point of view that the SPD did not see fit to 
withdraw Graf's party membership when it became known that he had had 
dealings with Oberland. This case is interesting both in itself and
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for the questions it raises. Oberland reportedly had also supplied 
funds to the National Socialists.Moreover, Beppo Romer, who was 
named in both these cases and was the leader of Freikorps Oberland. 
went over to the Communists in 1932. At that time the Bavarian 
police claimed that, "Romer had long been a member of the KPD".^^
Despite the conspiratorial flavour of some of its details, it is 
possible to conclude too much from the evidence for direct 
collaboration. Certainly it is not enough to sustain an argument 
for a far reaching conspiracy between the extreme right and the 
extreme left. Such conspiracy as there was must be put in perspective. 
As has been shown, there were good reasons to discount the 
seriousness of the Communist revolutionary intention in 1923. If this 
can be said, at least of most in Moscow and of most in the central 
leadership of the KPD, then what remains of a "conspiracy"? It is not 
so unusual for one government to offer support, even undercover support, 
for groups in another country which share its immediate and limited 
objectives. There could not have been much concern that men such as 
Hitler could actually form a government. What they, or at least their 
following, might, however, be expected to do was to increase pressure 
on the Cuno and Stresemann governments against better relations with 
France.
There are other objections to a conspiracy interpretation. 
Conspiracy requires two parties and when all is said, there was not 
much willingness on the right to co-operate with the Communists.
This was especially true of the Nazis, who were only marginally 
responsive to the Communist overtures. This especially, had to be
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Important for the Communists. Although they included all the more 
militant right wing groups within their understanding of Fascism, 
they recognized the NSDAP and to a lesser extent the DVFP as the most 
important. United front efforts which could not penetrate to these 
parties had to be counted a failure. Given the status of Hitler and 
his clear rejection of co-operation, there was no chance of seriously 
influencing the NSDAP. The best that might be said was that Soviet 
and Nazi purposes, anyway on foreign policy issues, tended to push 
in the same direction.
It is also important to remember what an exceedingly complicated
time this was in Germany. There was no coherence on the right and
only a little more in the KPD. The growing acceptance of limited
non-revolutionary objectives makes most sense as an explanation for
much of the Communist tactical perspective. It ran like a red thread
through the KPD's activities but it was a tangled thread. In 1923,
the party was still far from realizing its Bolshevik organizational
ideals. As Brandler pointed out at the end of 1923, the party was
112at a "turning point". Thereafter, the Bolshevization process 
proceeded apace. For the time, however, the KPD lacked the coherence 
to be a really effective helpmate for the Soviet Union and it would 
certainly be unfair to see it as such. For one thing there was a 
great deal of undisciplined revolutionary enthusiasm among the rank 
and file. This was apparent with many of the Hundertschaften and it 
was true also in the Ruhr. There were cases of activities which took 
place completely outside of the control of the leadership. Instances 
were reported, for example, of Communist co-operation with the French
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occupation authorities and with the police against the Fascist groups.
These activities were designed to gain access to weapons. They
also attracted the vigorous disapproval of the party but the fact that
they took place at all showed how disorganized and uncertain the party 
113was.
There was a final limitation on the relationship. The Fascism 
issue never dominated Communist tactical calculations. The party was 
most concerned about its relations with the Social Democrats as a 
threat to the revolution and Soviet interests, as a partner in the 
left SPD governments in Thuringia and Saxony, and as a target for 
its united front recruitment efforts. Indeed, Fascism was at least 
as important as an issue which bore on the KPD's relations with the 
SPD as it was in any other sense. In a way, Fascism was a distraction. 
To the extent that it could not somehow be controlled or "neutralized" 
as an independent consideration, in Communist tactics, it threatened 
the party's priorities. It would do so again after 1930.
In view of the secondary status and the limited results of the 
tactics of the so-called Schlageter Course, it is perhaps tempting to 
dismiss them entirely as a failed experiment or as a temporary 
aberration. That would be a mistake. The Schlageter Course 
contained too many of the established Communist perspectives both on 
Fascism and on the KPD's role in German politics. It therefore held 
important clues for the Communist tactics of the future. To a really 
quite remarkable degree the Schlageter Course reappeared in the last 
years of the Republic. Once more there would be a strong Fascist 
movement and once more the united front approaches would be tried.
n o
More surprisingly, the tactics of 1923 can be detected below the 
surface of Communist activities between 1923 and the Nazi revival. 
What changed after the Munich putsch was not so much the Communist 
approach to German Fascism as it was the seriousness of the problems
which Fascism raised.
Ill
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CHAPTER III
VARIATIONS ON THE SCHLAGETER THEME:
THE CONTINUITIES IN COMMUNIST POLICY 1924-1928
For both parties 1924 introduced what was to be a long period 
of reconsolidation and of struggle to regain the influence in Weimar 
politics which had been badly eroded by the end of 1923. For the 
Nazis, the years between 1924 and 1928 were the bleakest of their 
so-called "Kampfzeit". The immediate problem was to find a way to 
build a coherent, separate organization amidst the splinters of the 
various völkisch and radical nationalist groups and to find a point 
of view which defined them as a unified party. These priorities 
led the Nazis into competition with the other radical right wing 
parties. The Communists impinged upon this central preoccupation 
in two ways. As had been the case earlier, the Nazis exploited 
their appeals to labour and the radical "socialist" aspects of their 
programme as part of their attempt to distinguish themselves from 
their völkisch rivals.^- This stance could not help but raise 
questions concerning their relations with the Communists. The 
socialist dimension of the Nazi appeal suggested rivalry with the 
Communists in the area of recruitment and, at the same time, it 
helped to keep alive the idea that some among the Nazis were 
susceptible to the united front efforts of the Communists.
On the other hand, the Nazis wished to stress their activism
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and the fact that they alone among the volkisch and nationalist
groups were willing and able to confront the system. One way of
demonstrating Nazi militancy was through the organization of
provocative public demonstrations, especially in the working class
strongholds of the SPD and the KPD. These activities sometimes led
to clashes with the working class parties and their affiliated
2defence organizations. The tactical questions which the Communists
raised for the Nazis were thus secondary and related to other
concerns which were more crucial at this stage of National Socialism'
development. On the Nazi side there was never any question, during
these years, of assigning a higher priority to their relations with
the Communists. The Nazis were, in any case, far too weak to
challenge seriously the KPD or indeed any of the major Weimar parties
The central preoccupations of the Communists were in a way
similar. They too entered their Kampfzeit. At the Frankfurt
Parteitag and at the Fifth Comintern World Congress, it was
acknowledged that the German revolution had suffered a temporary
setback. Less than a year later the Communists publicly postponed
their revolution for an indefinite period. German Communism was
3between "two waves of revolution" and it was acknowledged that,
"in some countries, as for example, Germany, 
no directly revolutionary situation for the 
moment exists".^
The revolutionary working class was on the defensive. For the Soviet 
Union and its KPD allies, this meant retrenchment, a time for the 
consolidation of the gains so far achieved, in the anticipation of 
happier days, when the inevitable sharpening of the contradictions
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of bourgeois society would once more provide an opportunity for 
revolution.
The situation had been objectively favourable for revolution, 
but the opportunity had been missed. The party in 1923 had 
succumbed to "opportunism". It had not sufficiently distinguished 
itself, either programmatically or structurally, from the Social 
Democrats. It had conspicuously failed to break the SPD's hold on 
the trade unions. Errors and shortcomings would now be corrected. 
The struggle to wrest the workers from the SPD was to commence in 
earnest. All other issues were at best secondary and the question 
of the party's approach to National Socialism, which had been so 
important in 1923, now received much less attention.
That this should be so was not surprising in view of the 
precipitous decline of the NSDAP and the other völkisch parties. 
Early in 1924, the illegal NSDAP organizations joined with the DVFP 
to form an alliance to contest the May Reichstag elections. The 
resulting völkisch Sozialer Block managed to win what was, under 
the shadow of the November setbacks, an impressive 6.6 percent of 
the vote and thirty-two Reichstag deputies. This electoral strength 
was, however, rapidly eroded. In the December elections, amidst 
growing tensions and rivalries, the völkische lost over half their 
vote and returned only fourteen deputies."*
The Communist evaluations reflected these weaknesses. In 1924 
their analysis of National Socialism took on something of the 
quality of an obituary. At first, in a curious turn of dialectical 
logic, one kind of Fascism, National Socialism, was seen as the
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victim of another, the "Fascism" of the Stresemann government and the 
emergency military administration at the end of 1923.^ It was now 
argued that Fascism had developed differently than had been 
anticipated. The party had been distracted by the mass character of 
the NSDAP and its similarities with Italian Fascism. What had been 
forgotten was the strength of German capitalism and its self 
confidence. Germany was not Italy. German capitalism could dispense 
with the services of the radical "drummers" of petit bourgeois 
Fascism. The assault on the working class could be led instead by 
the Generals of the Wehrmacht and the captains of German industry and 
with, of course, the loyal support of Social Democracy.^ As this 
argument suggested, "Fascism", as a descriptive category in the 
Communist vocabulary, was losing whatever precision it may have 
possessed.
For the Communists the centre of gravity of German Fascism 
shifted decisively after 1923. They interpreted the ban on the NSDAP 
as the beginning of the end for Fascism as a mass movement. As one 
Communist observer, Munzenberg, pointed out,
"It is not true that one cannot destroy parties 
by outlawing them. A lot can be accomplished 
with bayonets. We believe that you can suppress 
even the old truths in that way, of course not 
for ever. But a thousand years is also enough."8
In Hunzenberg’s opinion the bayonets were not so much needed in the
case of the NSDAP. To outlaw a party was to put it to a test of its
"necessity". If it represented an unavoidable historical tendency,
it would survive. The NSDAP could not meet such a test. General 
Seeckt had been able to "liquidate" a party which was already in the
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process of liquidating itself. National Socialism had fallen prey 
to its own contradictions. It was proof of the dialectical 
impossibility of combining the radical demands of the petite bourgeoisie
Uand the interests of the capitalist establishment in one movement.
Between 1924 and 1928 such commentary as was reserved for the 
National Socialists and Völkische continued to stress their weaknesses. 
The failure to find an organizational and doctrinal basis for unity 
was identified as one principal reason for the decline of a mass 
based German Fascism,
"All these parties and organizations fight 
most vehemently with one another and there 
is the keenest competition in the area of 
recruitment. This is one of the subjective 
reasons why in Germany Fascism was bankrupted 
so quickly.
The "bankruptcy" of the National Socialists and the Völkische 
exerted pressure for change on the general theory of Fascism. The 
Italian example began to seem less menacing, less significant as a 
guide to Communist tactics elsewhere in Europe. The perceived 
international character of Fascism had deeply influenced Communist 
tactics. In Germany, the assumed similarities between National 
Socialism and Italian Fascism largely accounted for the attention 
which the Communists paid to the Nazis in the years before 1923.
Italy had been portrayed as occupying a position which was roughly 
equivalent to that of the Soviet Union. Although the parallel was 
weakened by the absence of a formal international organization and 
by numerous differences among the Fascist parties, Italy was seen 
as possessing an influence in the Fascist world which was similar 
to the Soviet Union's relationship with the Communist movement
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To some extent the international conception had already been
compromised by the Schlageter initiative. German Fascism had been
singled out and treated separately, and as a force which could be
made to serve Communist purposes. After 1924 the tendency to treat
German Fascism as a separate phenomenon continued. By 1927 the
weaknesses and the disorganization of the vBlkisch movement had led
some Communist observers to the conclusion that the Italian example
had lost all relevance for an understanding of German Fascism.
Thalheimer, for example, argued that the disorganization of the
German radical right suggested not Italy but rather the United States,
12"with its various patriotic, half-military organizations." In
Germany the demands of the radical petite bourgeoisie were no longer
relevant. German Fascism was "firmly in the hands of a newly
13entrenched bourgeoisie". At the same time, the SPD and the SPD
dominated Reichsbanner were the closest approximations to the earlier
Fascist mass movement and they served the same "objective" purpose
14of securing the bourgeois order. The new situation on the right 
in Weimar politics meant that organizations such as the Stahlhelm, 
because of their closer connections with established middle class 
interests, were more important expressions of Fascism than was the 
NSDAP. By 1926 it was even possible for a review of dangerous right 
wing groups to ignore the Nazis altogether
The new evaluations were reflected in Communist tactical 
pronouncements. In Hay, 1924, Die Rote Fahne gave notice of a shift
in emphasis,
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"... the party has, in part, been pushing in 
the wrong direction. We fought only against 
the phantom of Fascism and overlooked that the 
völkisch movement was already deeply compromised, 
with its Hitler nonsense, its Bierkeller 
revolutionaries, its silly anti-Semitism, its 
nationalist hue and cry against France, which no 
one takes seriously anymore...The Krautjunker... 
and the threatened bourgeois, who follows the 
big capitalist land owners and the industrialists, 
have triumphed over Hitler...We must turn the 
whole front around against German national big 
capital and not against the petite bourgeoisie."16
In practice, however, the "front" did not so obviously turn.
The revised understanding of Fascism and the new situation in 
Germany did not lead to a complete break in the continuity of 
Communist tactics. It is important to notice that such changes as 
there were, were changes in emphasis only, and were traceable almost 
entirely to the weaknesses of the Fascist parties and not to any 
fundamental rethinking of tactical priorities. There were no new 
departures, no equivalents to the Stuttgart and Berlin conferences 
which had been influential in shaping tactics for 1923. All the 
elements of the old tactics remained, although in a subdued form 
appropriate to the new situation.
Understandably, there was less sense of urgency in the measures 
of self defense undertaken by the Communists. The Kampfbund 
remained inactive and there was no attempt made to construct 
organizations equivalent to the defunct Hundertschaften and 
Arbeiterkontolausschüsse. There was the Rotfrontkämpferbund (RFB), 
which was founded in 1924. The RFB, however, could not be regarded
as the logical successor to the earlier anti-Fascist organizations. 
It was conceived primarily as a counter to the SPD dominated
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Reichsbanner and the SPD and to this end the bulk of its agitational
efforts were directed at these targets. ^  Nevertheless, the
confrontational and self defense themes remained in anti-Fascist
tactics and the RFB had as a second priority, the defense of the
party's organization against the German right. Although on occasion
the NSDAP and the völkisch groups entered the RFB's calculations,
18the main effort was now directed at the Stahlhelm.
What differed in the activities of the RFB when compared to 
those of the Hundertschaften, was the more explicitly hostile stance 
which it adopted towards the SPD. Both the Hundertschaften and the 
RFB were ostensibly "united front" organs. Yet in the case of the 
RFB, few distinctions were allowed between the right wing groups and 
the SPD's organizations. The Reichsbanner was always numbered among 
the enemy and in an important sense the campaign against it, and 
the SPD generally, could be understood as part of the Communist 
"anti-Fascist" effort. Such an approach followed from the united 
front from below policy adopted at the Frankfurt Parteitag and it 
conformed also to the argument that Social Democracy was itself a 
"branch of Fascism". Even when this particular formulation was 
not stressed, the SPD was still treated as a party which both 
tolerated and aided the Fascists. In particular, SPD influence 
within the police forces of Berlin and other major centres was used 
in an attempt to show that police efforts to control Communist 
demonstrations reflected the "Fascist" orientation of the SPD 
leaders.^®
During these years the confrontational dimension of KPD tactics
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was supplemented by a new emphasis on undercover work within various
political organizations and government institutions. The targets of
such "Zersetzung11 activities included the SPD, the trade unions, the
armed forces, the police, the civil service, as well as the NSDAP
and other Fascist parties. Confidential party circulars revealed
that the KPD attempted to establish a network of sympathizers within
these organizations and to conduct pro-Soviet and pro-Communist
21propaganda among their membership. This work was conducted by
special cadres of the KPD Nachrichtdienst and was directed by Moscow
22through the Soviet trade delegation in Berlin. Judging from
surviving examples of "Zersetzung11 agitational material, little had
changed from 1923. In the Wehrmacht, police, Stahlhelm and the
NSDAP, the emphasis was on National Bolshevik, anti-Republican and
anti-Semitic themes. Occasionally, mention of such undercover tactics
surfaced in the Communist press. During 1927, in a series of
articles on Communist tactics in the factories, the Soviet trade
union paper, Trud, reminded comrades in capitalist countries of the
need to penetrate enemy factory institutions and to sieze leading
positions within them. This was to be accomplished no matter what
political outlook was required to be feigned, "Amsterdam,Christian,
National Socialist, etc.". The Communists were to keep their real
affiliations secret and were to pose as the honest representatives 
23of the enemy. Internal KPD directives added to this, the need 
to persuade new recruits not to declare openly for the Communists 
but to remain within their own parties in order to perform
intelligence gathering, recruitment and sabotage functions. 24
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The shift in emphasis also affected other aspects of the
party's work. The Fascist issue declined in importance for the
purposes of the KPD's united front appeals to the Social Democrats,
but again, this element of the party's tactics did not entirely
disappear. Continuity was, for example, apparent with respect to
the threat of Fascist penetration of the factories. Although this
theme received nothing like the attention that it had in 1923, the
Communists continued to monitor (and to take seriously) all attempts
by the Fascist organizations to recruit among the workers and on
occasion they exploited the issue in their united front work among
25the Social Democrats.
There were other continuities. Just as in 1923, the KPD did 
not restrict its understanding of united front tactics. With respect 
to the NSDAP and the völkische, something of the "Schlageter" 
approach remained. In the obituary commentary on the NSDAP there 
was the same confident expectation expressed that National Socialists 
were susceptible to Communist appeals, and as National Socialism 
declined, the Communists expected to gain recruits from among its 
former following.^ The same united front theme could be inferred 
from the curious note of regret which was sometimes sounded in the 
Communist analysis of German Fascism. The newly consolidated 
bourgeois order and the new, so to speak, "conservative" Fascism, 
were contrasted with the more congenial petit bourgeois radicalism 
of the Nazis and the Völkische,
"In 1923 the Fascists ate a Jew with every 
breakfast, today they are their truest allies...
In 1923 the Fascists behaved as if they were
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the mortal enemy of the Jewish government, 
today they sit in office themselves or are 
the most loyal lackeys of the governments."27
Despite the evidence for the survival of earlier attitudes, there
seemed at first sight to be little basis for the continuation of any
part of the Schlageter initiative. In January, 1924, in a
declaration of the Russian Party's Politburo before a Central
Committee Plenum, Radek's views were singled out for attack. He was
accused of an "opportunistic overestimation of the differences of
28opinion within the Fascist ranks". At the Frankfurt Parteitag 
and again at the Fifth Comintern World Conference the attack 
continued and centred, in the first place, on Radek's Schlageter 
speech. Speaking for the KPD at the Fifth Congress, Freimuth 
criticized the party's tactics,
"It is clear that Fascism and Communism oppose 
one another like fire and water and an alliance 
between them is an impossible thing. Today we 
see in the tendencies which were expressed in 
the Schlageter article and in the whole campaign, 
a deviation from the methods which we should have 
used in the fight against counterrevolution and 
that special form of counterrevolution, Fascism."29
The rejection of Schlageter, expressed as it was in such a high level
and public forum, seemed complete. Yet care must be taken to
determine exactly what was being questioned. Most of the underlying
assumptions of the Schlageter initiative remained untouched by the
proceedings of the Fifth Congress. There was, for example, the
familiar emphasis on the importance of the"national question" both
30in general.and for the German party in particular. In the 
discussions and resolutions concerned with Fascism, much of the old
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position remained. Indeed, in the same speech which condemned
Radek and the Schlageter tactics, Freimuth emphasized the need for
united front work with the Fascist following and potential following.
Taking up positions which were subsequently endorsed in the resolutions
of the Congress, he called for a continuation of the agitation and
propaganda campaign among small farmers and the Mittelstand groups.
He also emphasized the importance of the attempt to reach the
Fascists themselves. There was to be a continuation of "public
31disputes with the Fascists". At the same time Freimuth revealed 
that the party continued to recognize the essentially radical or 
"revolutionary" nature of part of the Fascist programme. The party 
was to,
"...carry on a vigorous propaganda...for the 
demands which the Fascists put forward in 
their own programme, thus placing the Fascists 
in the dilemma of being obliged to carry out 
their own programme."32
At most, what was being questioned concerned, once more,
questions of emphasis rather than content. To be sure that could be
important. For many in the party it must, for example, have been
gratifying to see the anti-Semitic aspects of Communist united front
appeals publically questioned, as indeed they were at the Frankfurt 
33Parteitag. Yet, upon closer examination, the issue of the 
exploitation of anti-Semitism in fact supported the argument for the 
essential continuity in the approach to German Fascism, for despite 
the apparent rejection of such tactics, anti-Semitism remained in 
the Communist propaganda arsenal.
It is not difficult to accept the limited nature of the changes
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in Communist tactics when it is remembered that the Schlageter speech 
was, at least in part, exploited as a weapon of convenience in a 
more general attack on Radek and the right opposition in Germany. 
Fascism, as an issue which confronted Communist parties, was receding 
in importance. It was therefore cheap and easy to reject publicly, 
this aspect of Communist policy which had been so closely associated 
with Radek. It was, however, a rather dangerous, double handled 
club, with which to beat the opposition. Radek, in his defense of 
his past record, had no difficulty in demonstrating the wide 
consensus which had surrounded the Schlageter initiative, a 
consensus which had included the new "left" leadership as well as 
the "right". In fact, as Radek shrewdly observed, two prominent 
members of the new leadership, Fischer and Remmele, were guilty of
34a "crude" application of the united front approach to the Fascists. 
Judging from the practice of Communist tactics, as distinct from 
the public discussions of past errors, part of that original 
consensus must have survived. Between 1923 and the last days of the 
Republic, tactics which were closely linked with the Schlageter 
initiative remained. This was apparent with respect to joint 
Communist-Fascist meetings. These had provided the main practical 
content of the Schlageter tactics in 1923. After 1923, Communists, 
National Socialists and VBlkische continued to visit one another’s 
political meetings. Certainly on the Communist side, more was 
involved here than the simple intention to harass and discredit the 
Fascist speakers; the speeches and even the heckling of the 
Communists made it clear that the former united front objectives
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were still being pursued. The united front character of the 
meetings was further indicated by the fact that both sides occasionally 
invited the other to provide participants and speakers.
The Communists made the same attempt to exploit the language 
and prejudices of their National Socialist and völkisch audiences.
As in the past, this included appeals to anti-Semitic, anti-Entente 
and anti-capitalist sentiment. If it had been an intention of the 
Frankfurt Parteitag and the Fifth World Congress to divest the party's 
tactics of any suggestion of a "united front from above" approach 
to Fascism, such an intention made little apparent impact on 
Communist conduct at this level of day to day contact with the 
Fascists. Police intelligence reports frequently noted the 
co-operative and sometimes downright cordial atmosphere which 
prevailed in the meetings. The Communists made every effort to 
de-emphasize contentious issues. From both sides there were 
recruitment appeals and invitations to join in common action against 
shared enemies.
As was the case during 1923, there was some positive response 
from the Nazis,
"I will never lead an SA troop against the 
Communists...On the contrary I will appeal 
to them— join us, I will show you whom you 
must shoot."37
"...outside of the National Socialists the only 
ones, in my view, who have a half way healthy 
policy are the Communists."38
"In eight years the Soviet government has 
liberated its people from the Czarist swamps 
and placed them on the correct road...From this 
hour on the NSDAP will march shoulder to shoulder 
with its KPD brothers against the Social 
Democratic profiteers and the Western Pact..."39
35
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"We belong together... stand with us so we 
can overthrow the present hated system."40
These sentiments sometimes led to such limited co-operation as
combined street demonstrations and joint declarations. One meeting
ended with a resolution calling for the dissolution of the 
41Reichstag.
The most serious obstacles to a more ambitious co-operation
were raised by the Nazis. The original objections to the Communists
remained firmly in place. From the Nazi point of view, it was the
international and "Jewish" character of Communism which stood in the
42way of better relations. In the meetings the Communists followed
the earlier example of Fischer and Remmele; they tried to overcome
this problem by arguing that anti-Semitism was a variety of anti- 
43capitalism. For their part, the Nazis also tried to overcome
ideological differences. For Communist audiences, they emphasized
the "socialist" and "revolutionary" character of their party, and
they sought to convince Communists to free themselves from a
corrupt and false understanding of revolution,
"Communists wake up! Don't allow yourselves 
to be abused as slaves of the Jews and the 
Jesuits."44
Although the Communists assigned less importance to these 
aspects of their united front work between 1924 and 1928, it was 
clear from the party's tactical guidelines that the underlying 
motive remained much the same as it had been earlier. The 
proletarian and petit bourgeois elements in the NSDAP and other 
right wing groups were to be "revolutionized" and either won for
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the party or "neutralized". This was to be accomplished through a 
propaganda campaign conducted in the press, in special agitational 
literature designed for the Fascists and in the public meetings.**'* 
Beyond this there were other less openly stated motives. 
"Neutralizing" the Fascists meant in practice the attempt to limit 
conflict with them and to turn their hostile attentions to other 
targets. Thus in joint meetings with National Socialists and in 
agitational literature designed for Nazis, the Communists were 
always concerned to point out that it was the SPD and not the KPD 
which was the appropriate "Marxist" enemy in Nazi propaganda. This 
conformed well with other evidence for the presence of such concerns 
in the party's tactical calculations. According to reports in the 
Communist opposition press, the party and the RFB made strenuous 
efforts at this time to avoid open conflict with the National 
Socialists and Völkische. One such report, which claimed to be 
based on the private papers of the RFB leader and former Communist 
youth leader, Willi Leow, alleged that in 1925 Leow forbade 
confrontation with the völkische. Acting on information supplied 
by a völkisch organization, Leow apparently intervened to expel 
members of the Communist youth organization who were involved in 
such incidents. Leow's correspondence revealed that his actions 
had nothing to do with the unlawful character of such activities 
and there were no similar disciplinary measures taken against 
Communists for fighting with the Reichsbanner or the SPD. In the 
case of conflicts with the Fascists, however, it was Leow's 
conviction that "nothing effective could be accomplished".^ When
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there was violence, it followed as a result of initiatives taken by
the Fascists. Even in such cases of violent assault on the members
of Communist organizations, there were complaints that the KFB held
47back, "did nothing" and tried to avoid conflict.
It was not clear that the KPD gained much by placing the 
emphasis on a united front approach. Certainly it did not yield 
many successes during these years. The Communists did manage to 
establish contacts with individual Nazis. Examples of this were
48common enough to attract the attention of the police authorities 
and to convince one notable spokesman on the völkisch side that 
the Schlageter era was not over. Writing in January 1926, Graf zu 
Reventlow optimistically observed,
"The völkische just as the Communists are the 
mortal enemies of capitalism and its 
representatives...The Communist struggle against 
this capitalist democracy is welcomed by the 
Völkische...The idea that Communists, National 
Socialists and Völkische can go 'ein Stück Wegs' 
together has not yet been given up."49
Despite such expressions of sympathy, the potential of the 
National Scoialists and Völkische as allies in either of the senses 
of Communist united front tactics, was strictly limited. There were 
no significant recruitment successes which the Communists could 
point to. Nor was there, given the barriers of prejudice and 
suspicion which separated the two sides, any serious suggestion of 
an open alliance. There was only a recognition that they had 
enemies in common and beyond this, it was possible to see a desire 
to keep all questions of their relations secondary to other tactical 
concerns. Nothing much more need be infered from the "ein Stück
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Wegs" Idea. Nevertheless, even when given such a restricted 
interpretation, the idea was still interesting and it could have 
significant consequences. Most notably it exerted an influence on 
the parliamentary life of the Republic. Since both the Communists 
and the Nazis were permanently in opposition, the fact that they 
shared enemies could find an easy expression, unhampered by 
considerations of the differences which separated them.
The SPD and the Communist opposition parties frequently 
complained that an unofficial voting alliance existed between the 
KPD and NSDAP at all levels of government. For the Social Democrats, 
especially, this provided a main line of criticism of KPD policy 
both during these years and later.^ They took it as sufficient 
evidence that the SPD continued to be defined as the main target of 
Communist hostility. Indeed, even in the absence of other 
indications, the KPD's voting behaviour, especially in the Reichstag 
could be expected to provide a good indication of Communist 
priorities. At this level of the party's activities the control of 
the central leadership was most easily and most clearly applied.
Few difficulties were, therefore, placed in the way of the outside 
observer in infering the basic priorities which underlay Communist 
behaviour.
When the KPD's Reichstag voting behaviour is examined, it can 
readily be seen that there was a strong foundation for the SPD's 
criticisms. On the basis of an analysis of one hundred and ninety- 
seven votes selected over the period 1924 through 1932, the 
following general relationships e m e r g e . I n  one hundred and
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forty-five cases out of the one hundred and ninety-seven, or 73% of
the time, the KPD and NSDAP voted on the same side. On the other
hand, in one hundred and thirty-five cases, or 68% of the time, the
SPD and the KPD were on opposite sides. Out of the one hundred and
seven votes selected from the five year period, 1924-1928, the KPD
and the NSDAP were on the same side for seventy-one of the votes, or
66% of the time. If the votes for 1926 are not taken into the
reckoning, then the alignment between the two parties is as strong
as the average for the whole period (74%). Although in every year
except 1926 the KPD voted with the Nazis more frequently than with
the SPD, the yearly variations clearly suggest that in the periods
of "left" orientation (1924-1925 and 1928-1933) Nazis and Communists
were closest together in the Reichstag. In 1924 and between the
end of 1930 and the end of 1932, to know how the Nazis voted is to
know that in more than nine cases out of ten the KPD was on the
52same side and that the SPD was on the opposite side. When the 
votes of five parties are examined —  KPD, NSDAP, SPD, DNVP,
Zentrum —  the following general relationships are indicated. 
Although there were significant yearly variations, the most frequent 
alignments were, the DNVP, NSDAP and KPD on one side and the SPD 
and Zentrum on the other. When the votes over the whole period were 
counted, there was more positive correlation between the KPD and 
the NSDAP than between any other two parties, from among the 
five parties which were considered. The strongest negative 
correlation was between the KPD and the SPD. Given the small size 
of the Nazi Reichstag delegations before 1930, this kind of
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"objective" collaboration could not be so important. Like other
aspects of the relationship between the two parties at this time,
it was more important as an indication of continuity in the KPD's
policies. Continuity was revealed by the fact that there was no
change in voting alignments after the NSDAP became an important
parliamentary party, except that the trend which was already
established between 1924 and 1928 became even more obvious.
The Communist opposition to the SPD, which was so frequently
revealed in the Reichstag, found expression in all aspects of the
KPD's activities, in the party's public statements and in the
Communist press. The campaign against the SPD passed through three
stages of varying intensity between 1923 and 1928. Each stage
parallelled, and to some extent was the subject of, the main
53factional struggles in the party. The first phase extended from
November 1923 until the Tenth KPD Parteitag in 1925. This was the
period of the dominance of the "left" line of Ruth Fischer and
Maslow. The Social Fascist thesis was developed and total war was
declared on SPD dominance in the trade unions. The party pledged
itself "never again to work in alliance with counter-revolutionary
Social Democracy".^ Even personal contact with individual Social
55Democrats was forbidden to the KPD's cadres.
In 1925, as part of the campaign against the "ultra left", this 
position was modified and the possibility, under certain conditions, 
of co-operation with the SPD and trade union leaders was cautiously 
r a i s e d . i n  the third stage, from the Seventh Tagung of the EKKI
in December 1926 until the Sixth World Congress of the Comintern in
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July 1928, there was a gradual return to the more outspokenly 
militant anti-SPD line.
The shifts in emphasis in the united front tactics adopted 
between 1923 and 1928 should not be allowed to obscure the under-, 
lying consistency of Communist policy. At no time did those shifts 
of emphasis involve questioning the view that it was Social 
Democracy which was the principal threat to Communist objectives in 
Germany. Certainly on the Soviet side the attack on the "left" in 
the KPD had little to do with any left attitude towards the SPD.
What must be kept in mind is that "left" referred to two separable 
issues —  the general tactical approach of the KPD within German 
politics, on the one hand, and on the other, the attitudes of 
particular KPD leaders to the relationship which existed between the 
KPD and the Russian party. It was this last aspect of the "left" 
which was of greater importance from the Soviet point of view. What 
the Russians managed in 1925 was to split the left. The split 
involved the retention of much of the previous policy in Germany 
while at the same time removing those "leftists" who were suspicious 
of the dominance of Soviet interests in the formulation of the KPD's 
policies. It was the attitude towards Soviet domination which 
distinguished the unacceptable "leftists", Maslow and Fischer, from 
the acceptable "leftists" such as Thälmann, and not the more 
limited issues of Party policy. Both Fischer and Thälmann had been 
equally strong critics of Brandler. In the end, however, it was 
Thälmann who managed to be most convincing in his acceptance of 
Soviet leadership.
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The central importance of the relationship to the Soviet Union 
was made abundantly clear in the course of the proceedings against 
Fischer and Maslow. It was emphasized in the series of meetings 
in Moscow between delegations from the KPD Zentrale and the 
Comintern Executive which took place after the Tenth Parteitag. It 
was stressed in the EKKI "open letter" which made the results of 
these meetings public and in the reports of the special Comintern 
Commission which was set up to report on the errors of the Fischer- 
Maslow leadership and again in the resolutions of the Seventh 
Tagung of the EKKI.”^
In the reports of the special commission and in the Comintern 
resolutions, all distinctions between "left" and "right" broke down. 
Fischer and Maslow were accused of entertaining "right deviationist" 
positions. They were charged with promoting the same anti-Soviet 
line as the SPD. This was a revealing argument. The central 
importance of Soviet interests and Soviet leadership was shown to be 
an issue which could not easily be accommodated within the left-right 
dichotomy of factional struggle. The issue clearly transcended all 
such terms of reference.
As for the effect of the campaign against the left on KPD 
tactics, it was soon apparent that nothing much was to change. 
Understandably, distinctions between a united front from below 
approach to Social Democracy and one which allowed co-operation 
"under certain conditions" were vague and difficult to act upon for 
Communist functionaries. Rank and file Communists who later commented 
on the party's tactics during these years, claimed to notice little
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difference at the grass roots level, either as a result of the
shift to the left at the end of 1923, or during the swing away from
58the left in 1923-1926. Most in the KPD understood the party 
exclusively by its work among the unemployed and in the factories.
It was, therefore, not surprising that shifts in tactical emphasis 
would only become apparent for the party as a whole when there was 
a clear change in the pattern of the KPD's work at that level. The 
consistent factor between 1924 and 1928 was that the Communists 
worked within the established trade union and factory institutions. 
For the average party member decisive change only came when this 
ceased to be true. After 1928, as a new departure in the continuing 
attack on the SPD, the KPD attempted to split the working class 
organizations. Following the Fourth Congress of the RGI in the 
spring of 1928, the Communist opposition brought forward its own 
lists for factory council elections and the Revolutionäre Gewerk­
schaftsopposition (RGO) began to act as an alternative trade union 
59organization. In other words, for the first time, the form of 
competition with the SPD changed decisively and in ways which were 
immediately felt by the KPD membership.
Nevertheless, before 1928, opposition to the SPD majority was 
something which was clearly understood at all levels in the party. 
This perception remained unchanged no matter what the balance in 
united front tactics happened to be. A shared participation in the 
life of the main line working class institutions, as well as a 
shared commitment to the cause of improving conditions of labour, 
necessarily brought Communists and Social Democrats together in
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strikes and other common enterprises. It was always difficult, in 
practice, to establish the boundary between the united front from 
below and the united front from above implications of these 
activities. Yet it must be remembered that both forms of the united 
front were weapons in the anti-SPD arsenal. For the Communist 
leadership, shared enterprises were almost always seen in the light 
of the opportunities they afforded for influencing SPD workers and 
for undermining the SPD leaders.
These points were well illustrated with respect to the most 
important example of the "new" united front course. In 1926 the KPD 
launched a united front referendum campaign for the expropriation of 
the German princely estates. According to the Communists, this 
campaign represented the clearest and most successful example of 
what united front tactics could be supposed in practice to mean. It 
was obvious from the Communist commentary on the referendum that an 
anti-SPD conception had been dominant throughout. The mass support 
which was mobilized in favour of expropriation was interpreted as 
representing a defeat for the SPD leadership. Against their will, 
and under the pressure of their Communist influenced members, they 
had been "forced" to support the Communist initiative and they had
been thwarted in their attempts to organize their own independent
, 60 campaign.
If the practical approach to Social Democracy continued largely 
unchanged, so too did the principal underlying motives which 
supported that approach. Above all, the idea that Social Democracy 
was an important enemy of Soviet foreign policy interests remained
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central to Communist calculations. In the Communist press and in 
public statements this point was illustrated time and again. All 
the old considerations were there. First there was the concern, 
clearly expressed on the Soviet side, that the Ostorientierung 
tendencies in German foreign policy needed to be encouraged. There 
was a recognition that former advantages were being eroded. 
Stresemann's foreign policy and the very real progress made towards 
an improvement in the relations between Germany and the Entente 
powers had undermined the whole basis of the Soviet Union's German 
policy. In the space of two years, there was the acceptance of the 
Dawes plan on reparation payments, the ratification of the Lacarno 
Treaty, the evacuation of the first of the three zones of military 
occupation in the Rhineland and Germany's admission into the League 
of Nations.
It was apparent to the Soviet leaders that the situation of 
1923 had dramatically altered. In 1923 German foreign policy had 
worked against the danger of British and French dominance on the 
continent. Now Germany was finding its old, pre-war place among 
the Western imperialist powers.^ Yet Germany was an imperialist 
power with a difference. Bukharin, for example, expressed optimism 
concerning the new relationships. In his view German foreign policy 
would continue to fluctuate between West and East. In Germany 
important elements of the bourgeoisie favoured close relations with 
the Soviet Union and these elements would remain influential. 
Bukharin could therefore argue that the changed situation,
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"...absolutely does not mean that every tie 
with us will be cut off. The position of 
Germany differs from that of other imperialist 
states...Germany even today, though to an 
incomparably lesser degree than before, 
nevertheless represents that type of bourgeois 
state, which pursues a relatively conciliatory 
policy towards us."62
The SPD was the main enemy of such hopes. Every Communist
pronouncement on German foreign policy identified the SPD as playing
a major role in all the unfavourable developments in Soviet-German 
63relations. Through its dissemination of "anti-Soviet" hate and
because of its support of a pro-western orientation for Germany,
the SPD continued to reveal itself as the "most active enemy of the
Soviet Union" and as the "open agent of Entente imperialism". The
Russians and their KPD allies were particularly sensitive to SPD
(and Communist opposition) criticism of the Soviet Union's German
policy. In 1926, it was the SPD and elements of the Communist
opposition which led the campaign of "revelation", concerning the
secret understandings between the Wehrmacht, German industry and the
64Soviet government. Nothing could better illustrate Communist 
priorities than the fury of the reaction to these events and to the 
SPD's foreign policy position generally. When it came to the defense 
of the remaining benefits of the threatened Os torient ierung, the 
strongest terms in the Communist scatological armoury were scarcely 
sufficient. The SPD, "lackey toilet flusher of the bourgeoisie", 
was linked together with all the most uncompromising enemies of the 
Soviet Union from Ruth Fischer to Chamberlain.^"*
The attack against the SPD's influence on German foreign policy 
contrasted sharply with the Communist understanding of the National
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Socialist and völkisch role on this question. It was evident that 
there was the same easy acceptance of the essentially useful anti- 
Entente orientation of these parties as there had been in 1923. 
Although their parliamentary representation was weak, they were 
seen as exerting a positive influence on German foreign policy in 
the Reichstag and they were identified as part of the "opposition" 
which together with the KPD Reichstag representatives resisted the 
alignment with the Western powers.^
It was easy to overlook these judgements. The Nazis were weak 
and the SPD was by far the most serious rival for the KPD, no 
matter which Communist objectives were seen as the dominant ones. 
Nevertheless, the conclusion that the SPD was a principal enemy on 
foreign policy questions, while the Nazi attitude was helpful, 
assumed a significance out of all proportion to the importance of 
the Nazis at that time. It had enormous potential as an influential 
factor in the formation of the KPD's tactical priorities. It was a 
consideration which operated independently of the strength of the 
Nazis and indeed independently also of any threats which the Nazis 
might in other respects pose. In other words, there was a 
conservative influence here, which worked against changes in 
priorities. As long as the SPD continued to be regarded as the 
more serious foreign policy threat, there would be scope for the 
same ambivalence and the same low level priority which had so far 
characterized the KPD's response to the Nazis.
These considerations were likely to be all the more persuasive, 
in light of the fact that by 1928 the KPD had lost its ability to
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respond independently to any perceived threat. The "bolshevization" 
process was by then complete. Indeed that process had pretty much 
run its.course by ly25. Little of a critical or independent dis­
position remained after the expulsion of Brandler and Thalheimer 
and then the left and "ultra left". As Stalin's grip tightened on 
the Russian party, so it did on the KPD. If it had been necessary 
to judge on the basis of institutional arrangements only, the 
dependence of the KPD on the Soviet Union would have been obvious 
enough. Besides the authority of the Comintern resolutions and 
"open letters", there were a growing number of direct organizational 
links between the Russian and German parties. There was the special 
"German Commission" set up in 1926 with Stalin as its Chairman. In 
February 1928, supervision was further extended with the 
establishment of a Comintern Bureau for Western Europe with its 
headquarters in Berlin. The Russians also maintained their own 
chain of command in Germany which existed without reference to the
KPD, and through which they exercised wide ranging financial and
67other control functions.
It might seem then that the organizational requirements were 
finally in place for a really effective helpmate role for the KPD. 
Something near enough to complete peace reigned —  Democratic 
Centralism on an international scale. That seemed adequately 
confirmed in the KPD's public statements. After making a reasonable 
allowance for the technical deficiencies of international 
communications and taking into account the unavoidable confusions of 
a sometimes rapidly changing political situation, the KPD's policies
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could be seen to move In perfect harmony with those of the Russian 
party. When the KPD had made up their minds so had the Russians.
Yet it could, of course, never be as simple as that in practice. 
Bolshevization was possible for German Communism but not Bolshevism. 
The KPD had to pay too much attention, always, to problems which 
had nothing to do with its democratic centralist stance. The 
democratic environment of Weimar was the other side of the KPD's 
organizational coin.
With hindsight, it is possible to see the fateful conflict 
between these two influences. As a "bolshevized" party, the KPD was 
charged with a more or less clear responsibility which could be 
readily comprehended just because it was "bolshevized". It was, 
however, as a "democratic" party that the KPD had to meet that 
responsibility. It could not, for example, destroy the influence 
of the SPD in the unions and factories if it failed to persuade the 
workers to follow it. Nor could it easily assign a second priority 
to the struggle against the Nazis if it was just that struggle which 
was becoming all important from the simple point of view of 
protecting its following.
In the years after 1928 the KPD was to make important electoral 
gains relative to the SPD. Nevertheless, in an important sense the 
Communists had already lost their battle against the Social 
Democrats, Before 1928 those structural weaknesses which were 
later to wreck the party's morale and confuse its purposes were 
already apparent. Despite the consistent emphasis on the need to 
expand the Communist following in the factories, the KPD's share of
153
the employed workers declined. As early as 1924 the KPD began to
rely heavily on the unemployed. By March 1925 in the district of
Mittelrhine, no less than fifty percent of the membership was
unemployed while in 1927 nearly a third of the total membership was 
68unemployed. To make matters worse, reliance on the unemployed 
raised serious organizational problems. The unemployed were hardly 
susceptible to political organization at all and certainly not to 
the rigid discipline which the Communists sought to impose. Out of 
desperation the unemployed were attracted to the party and its mass 
organizations by what seemed the Communist dedication to dramatic 
solutions for a dramatically bad situation. But the call to arms 
never came and there was little chance that these unhappy people 
would be content with the inscrutable and second-hand purposes of 
the party’s leaders. Consequently, there was always a high turnover 
rate among cadres and members. During 1927 in the district of 
Berlin-Brandenburg, 2,373 joined the party while 3,577 left. In 
1928 for the same district the figures were 6,086 in and 4,965 out.^ 
The weaknesses of the Communist organization stood in marked 
contrast to the stability of the SPD with its entrenched position in 
the trade unions. In fact, it must be said that the Communists were 
scarcely in a position to compete with the SPD at all. Less than 
one percent of the industrial work force were members of the 
Communist party and in the large factories there was virtually no 
Communist representation. In 1927, of the total Communist strength, 
only two and a half percent was based on factories with five 
thousand or more employees, while over thirty-six percent was based
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on factories with fifty or fewer employees.^ In the Ruhr, nearly 
one quarter of all workers belonged to a trade union but of these 
fewer than one in thirty was a Communist. The situation with 
respect to factory cells was no better. Despite the great 
importance attached to these, their numbers steadily declined.^
As a consequence of these weaknesses, the KPD was ill equipped
to meet the new dangers which were to come after 1928. Faced with
a struggle against the SPD which it was already losing, the party
was called upon to try new forms of competition which could only
intensify its internal difficulties. At the same time the growing
strength of the NSDAP put unbearable strains on the party’s
priorities. The same factors which limited the effectiveness of
the KPD in its competition with the Social Democrats worked also
to draw it into closer contact with the Nazis and to leave it more
vulnerable to the Nazi threat than was true for its SPD rival. The
SPD had its factory organizations as a line of defense against the
72Nazis. The KPD was mainly on the streets. The SPD had the 
majority of the employed workers. The KPD had to share the allegiance 
of the unemployed both with the SPD and with the Nazis.
Then there was the final and most serious handicap. 
"Bolshevization" had provided the KPD with the coherent purpose 
which it otherwise might have failed to find. Yet it was just this 
bolshevization, understood as the tie with Soviet interests, which 
was to do most to obscure the reality of the Nazi threat. There 
was irony here, for as it turned out, an adequate response to the 
Nazi threat was essential If the party was to continue in the
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service of any purpose whatever. Had the bolshevization process 
been less complete, the party would have been in a better 
position to respond to the dangers and obstacles which confronted
its rank and file.
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CHAPTER IV
COMMUNIST TACTICS AND THE NAZI ADVANCE, 1928-1932: 
THE RESPONSE TO NEW THREATS
Although, at the time, it could scarcely be noticed against
the background of their central preoccupations, 1928 marked a
watershed in the development of the relationship between the KPD
and the NSDAP. In the years after 1923, the Nazis, as a
consequence of their weakness, had always been at the periphery
of Communist concerns and they had scarcely entered the KPD’s
tactical calculations in a serious way. By 1928 the Nazis were
still weak. Throughout 1927 they had stagnated. Growth in
membership was at a virtual standstill^ and in the Reichstag
elections of May 1928 they managed to capture only twelve
mandates and 2 .6% of the vote, which was a considerably poorer
2showing even than that of December 1924. After just two years,
however, this situation had changed dramatically. The Nazis had
achieved the status of a mass party. In the Reichstag, they had
a larger representation than the Communists and with 107 deputies
and 18.3% of the vote they were second only to the Social 
3Democrats.
The spectacular gains of 1930 had been foreshadowed in 1928 
by the steady increase in Nazi activity which had followed the 
lifting of the speaking ban on Hitler, and it was apparent that
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Nazi agitation was reaching a wider audience. At the end of 
1928 and throughout 1929 the worsening economic situation expanded 
the potential for Nazi gains and this was reflected in the steady 
advance in local and Land elections. They gained everywhere, 
sometimes by as much as three hundred percent (Berlin and Bochum).^ 
In the elections to the Koburg city council, they increased their 
seats from four to thirteen, which gave them an absolute majority. 
In the May elections in Saxony, their vote was nearly four times 
what it had been in 1926 and twice what it had been in 1928. They 
also made impressive gains in Leipzig, Chemnitz and Mecklenburg- 
Schwerin. In the Thuringian elections, at the end of the year, 
they gained 11.3% of the vote and one of their candidates, Frick, 
entered the Land government as the Minister of the Interior.^
The shift in the Weimar political balance, which these results 
so clearly reflected, was to place a serious strain on the KPD’s 
established priorities. That did not mean that there was any 
immediate recognition of new threats; no sudden alarm was sounded. 
Indeed, on the surface at least, the Communists responded with 
optimism to the situation which took shape after 1928. In the 
first place, they too benefited from the Weimar crisis of 
confidence. Between May 1928 and November 1932, their share of 
the vote in Reichstag elections grew steadily both in absolute 
terms and relative to their SPD rivals and by November 1932 the 
KPD, with 16.9% of the vote was only 3.5% behind the SPD.^ The 
history of Weimar seemed to have come full circle. Once more the
4
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extremes of left and right led the assault on the institutions 
of the Republic and once more the idea of revolution was in the 
air.
After a long absence the revolutionary theme reappeared in 
the Communist analysis of the German situation. At the Ninth 
EKKI Plenum in February 1928 and again at the Sixth Comintern 
World Congress, the position was advanced that the contradictions 
within the world capitalist system were intensifying and that 
"capitalist stabilization" was giving way to a new era of
g
revolutionary activity. The most powerful support for capitalism,
in a new age of revolutionary crisis, was Social Democracy. It
therefore followed that the main attentions of Communist parties
9everywhere had to be directed at the Social Democrats. In its 
main outlines this idea was to govern Communist priorities for the 
remainder of the' Weimar years. There was, of course, nothing new 
in the formulation. Exactly the same arguments had been exploited 
all along as the basis of Communist competition with the Socialist 
parties. From the perspective of their relations with the Social 
Democrats the Ninth Plenum and the Sixth World Congress simply 
underscored what had always been the ascendant "left" policies.
To be sure, it was a dramatic underscoring which was to have 
profound consequences for the party.
For one thing, competition was to assume a new and more 
assertively militant form. At the Fourth Congress of the RGI in 
April 1928, the Communists declared war on the trade unions.
169
These were depicted as the most important of the institutions 
which supported capitalism and the largest obstacles to 
revolutionary ambitions. The power of the unions was to be broken 
through a concerted united front from below campaign.^ As this 
resolve was translated into practice in the years after 1928, the 
Communists sought to split the working class organizations in the 
factories. They began to institutionalize their oppositionist 
status. They brought forward their own lists for the elections 
to factory councils and although they made an effort to retain 
representation in the main line unions, the emphasis shifted to 
their own opposition organizations. More than ever before, the 
centre of effort became the factory cell and the factory council.
It was hoped that the factory cell would compensate for the general 
weakness of the Communist position within the unions. Moreover, 
a factory cell based structure would sharply distinguish the 
Communists from their trade union rivals. This was to be the 
culmination, in structural terms, of the "Bolshevization" process. 
Within the unions themselves, the Communists began to assign more 
importance to their own opposition organizations and increasingly 
these began to take on the character of rival unions.^ At the 
same time, there was a new stress placed on the "Social Fascist" 
argument and the propaganda attack on Social Democracy assumed 
a more strident tone.
In Germany the united front from below campaign lost all 
sight of the distinctions between the SPD leadership and the
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ordinary rank and file trade unionist. Party circulars and the
KPD press made it clear that the struggle against "Social Fascism"
was not to be understood in a restricted sense,
"The Social Fascists know that there can be no 
co-operation between us. There can only be a
war of extermination. . . " 1 2
At times the attack on the SPD plumbed the depths of hysteria.
Even the children of Social Democrats were to be victims in the
war of extermination. The Communist school children's organization
Rote Lanzen was, at one point, instructed to throw its little
13"Social Fascist" rivals out of the playgrounds.
By comparison, National Socialism was seen as much less of an
obstacle on the road to revolution. The Nazis, too, were depicted
as a support for an increasingly crisis ridden and embattled
bourgeois order, but in the Communist view it was Social Democracy
which remained the main support of German capitalism. Nor could
it be said with any confidence that the Communists always saw
National Socialism as the most serious rival of Social Democracy
for this role. As late as January 1932, Thälmann could argue
that it was the Zentrum which most clearly represented the interests
of the dominant sections of German finance capital and it was the
Zentrum which had the closest ties with the main enemy -- Social 
14Democracy. The Stahlhelm, too, continued to be represented as 
a Fascist organization which in some ways was more important than 
the Nazis. Compared to the Stahlhelm the NSDAP was too contradiction 
laden and unreliable to be an effective part of the foundation for
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German capitalism.^ In fact, the rise of the Nazis was taken to
be as much a symptom of the disintegration of the capitalist
system as anything else. The note of alarm in the Communist
analysis of Nazi electoral successes was usually tempered by
considerations of what were perceived as the positive implications
of the Nazi gains. The commentary on the 1929 communal elections
provided a good example of this kind of ambivalence. Nazi gains
and SPD losses were both interpreted positively,
"The success of the National Socialists no 
less than the setbacks of the Social Fascists, 
reflect the deep crisis of capitalist 
stabilization in Germany."^
The Nazi voter was depicted here as a radical and an anti­
capitalist, who had not yet found his way to the Communists.
There were dangers especially with respect to Nazi inroads among 
the workers and the unemployed and the party had to pay more 
attention than in the past to the problem of countering Nazi 
"National and social demogogy". Nevertheless, it was still true 
that,
"The political defeat of Social Fascism is 
without doubt the main result of the elections".
These themes remained after the Nazi electoral successes had
taken on a more threatening character. The Landtag elections in
Saxony in June 1930 resulted in an almost threefold increase in Nazi
representation in the Landtag and yet the result was once more
interpreted as a defeat for Social Democracy and as representing
18a symptom of capitalist decay. Later in the year, in an
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analysis of the results of the September 1930 elections, Pravda 
observed that the National Socialist gains meant that,
"New millions have awakened from their 
political winter's sleep".19
This theme was developed further in the Communist journals. In 
an analysis which was reminiscent of his 1923 "Schlageter" 
position, Radek argued that the Nazi electoral triumph demonstrated 
that the German bourgeoisie had "lost the confidence of the masses". 
It was true that the Nazis were meant to be a new support for 
capitalism but it was unlikely that they would be successful in 
that role. This was so because the National Socialist leadership 
and the masses which supported them were at cross purposes,
"... the masses which follow this party, do not 
follow it for the purpose of supporting trust 
capital, for then they would not have needed to 
abandon the German Nationalists, the Volkspartei 
and the Staatspartei. They follow the Fascist 
party because it promised deliverance from the 
German trusts and from world capitalism which 
sucks Germany dry through the Young plan".20 .
The optimism of some of the German Communists was even more explicit.
While commenting on the Nazi gains Remmele noted that,
"Of the fourteen million votes which were cast 
against the Young Plan only four and a half 
million were votes for Soviet Germany. Six 
and a half million are still temporarily with 
the Nazis...What has hitherto most stood in 
the way of the revolution was the passive 
masses who supported the bourgeois parties.
However these have now been set in motion. To 
be sure, they have been caught up by the Nazis.
Yet the fact that the most difficult obstacle 
has been overcome is what makes this election 
a turning point" . 2 1
As it turned out, Remmele's optimism was ill founded. In
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1930 no less than in 1923, it was wrong-headed to cast the Nazis
in a revolutionary role. It was also true that factors other
than a commitment to revolution continued to be present in the
Communist analysis. Yet, armed with hindsight, it is too easy
to dismiss the revolutionary element in such statements as
Remmele's. It is not necessary to discount altogether either his
sincerity or his arguments, in order to draw attention to other
more central realities in the Communist position. It was not
impossible, after all, to argue that at least a part of the Nazi
following was revolutionary in its outlook and in the sense
that a Communist could understand. Nor was it entirely foolish
to believe that the KPD could have competed successfully for the
allegiance of these people. Whatever else may have lacked
sincerity in their outlook, there could be little doubt that the
Communists honestly believed that the Nazis were bound to fall
apart as the contradictory elements in their appeal became
apparent to their misled supporters. This belief followed
logically, indeed, inescapably, from the Marxist viewpoint and
just as in 1923, it was a belief which blunted the awareness of
danger. This side of the optimism in the Communist analysis was
22thus also present in the reaction to the Nazi successes.
When this is said, however, it is still necessary to look 
beyond the expression of revolutionary sentiment. As in the past, 
revolution as an objective was defined in such a way as to place 
much of the emphasis on the task of defending Soviet interests in
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Germany. Every aspect of the KPD's work was, In one way or
another, related to this central concern and not just in the most
abstract sense of theoretical rationalization but also at the
down to earth level of the day to day activities of the party.
The most subordinate local cadre was given instruction on how he
could best serve the interests of the Soviet Union. Everything
from strike action to the smallest detail of factory work could be
and was pointed in this direction.
At the Twelfth Parteitag in June 1929, Thälmann described a
situation of increasing danger for the Soviet Union. In Europe,
the constellation of forces ranged against Soviet interests and
security was expanding and the danger of a war of intervention was
becoming more threatening. The most important force which was
supporting and directing this hostility was Social Democracy.
Social Democracy had become the "most active campaigner" for the
23war policy which was aimed at the Soviet Union. The determination
to resist the perfidious anti-Soviet intentions of the SPD coloured
all aspects of the KPD's tactics. In the factories and in trade
union work the party's stated objectives clearly reflected a
dominant concern for Soviet security. The "war danger" resolutions
of the Sixth World Congress were specific on the matter of
priorities. The Communists were to concentrate their efforts in
those industries which were of most strategic importance - the
24transport, metal and chemical industries.- The tactical 
implications were spelled out in quite surprising detail. In a
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report of the KPD Central Committee, in November 1929, it was noted
that in trade union work in the transport industry, it was
necessary to concentrate on the West-East lines of communication,
especially the central railway interchanges for the Eastern
frontier in Berlin-Brandenburg. It was also important to upgrade
agitational efforts among women workers, since they were
increasingly vital to the munitions and other war related
industries. Similarly, a strong Communist presence in the largest
factories was essential because it was these which formed the
basis of strategically important manufacturing. The struggle
against the SPD was directly relevant to these tasks since it was
one of the principal aims of the SPD to preserve the German
transport, communications and heavy industrial base for service
25in French and British anti-Soviet designs. In another report 
it was claimed that Germany had undertaken the "international 
obligation" (with the connivance of the SPD) to allow allied 
troops to cross Germany to reach the Soviet frontiers. Hence, the
need to sabotage these plans by achieving Communist control over
 ^ 26 the transport system.
The war danger theme in these directives could largely be 
discounted without doing damage to the central intent which 
underlay them. If it was doubtful that anyone in Moscow took the 
dangers of a war of intervention seriously, it was nonetheless 
true that there were grounds for pessimism concerning changes in 
Germany’s foreign policy orientation. What was at risk from the
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Soviet point of view was not a war of intervention but an 
irretrievable loss of the Soviet Union's advantages in Germany. 
From the point of view of the "Ostorientierung" the years of the 
SPD dominated government under Hermann Muller were the most dismal 
in Weimar's history. Before the summer of 1928 Germany's 
improving relations with the West had coexisted with close and 
valuable connections with the Soviet Union. With the advent of 
the Muller government, however, that balance began to shift 
decisively. Trade and customs negotiations, which were under way 
between the two governments, lost tempo and then lapsed altogether 
in June 1929. There was also a flurry of German Western oriented 
diplomatic activity. The Hague Protokol was signed, then the 
Kellog-Briand Pact and then the Young Plan. The reparations 
arrangements were further softened with the Young Plan and the 
evacuation of troops from the Rhine continued —  all this in the 
space of a few months. ^
The strongly anti-Social Democratic resolutions of the Ninth 
Plenum and the Sixth World Congress were prepared before the 
formation of the Muller government. Nevertheless, foreign policy 
considerations obviously still made themselves felt. In Germany, 
the baneful influence of the SPD on German foreign policy was not 
something which the Communists suddenly discovered; it had been 
a central determinate of the KPD's tactics all along. Early in 
1928, the foreign policy consideration was evident in the 
Communist analysis of the approaching Reichstag elections. The
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"anti-Soviet hate" and the pro-Western orientation of the Social
Democrats were presented as central reasons for directing the
28KPD's electoral campaign efforts against the SPD. Moreover,
the election results made it clear, that whatever the exact shape
of the new coalition, the SPD would have a larger voice. The SPD’s
share of the vote increased nearly to thirty percent and their
delegation in the Reichstag expanded to one hundred and fifty-
three from one hundred and thirty-one; this was the best result
for the party in all seven Reichstag elections between 1924 and 
291933. *
It was undoubtedly true that the struggle against the right in
the Russian party and in the Comintern also helped to shape the
left orientation of the Sixth World Congress but for the member
sections of the Comintern it was the foreign policy content of
the resolutions and the defense of the Soviet Union theme which
30had the larger relevance for party tactics. For the KPD this 
did not mean that the war danger thesis and the active intervention­
ist role of the SPD necessarily needed to be interpreted literally.
A less dramatic idea was present alongside the war danger arguments 
in the Communist commentary of the SPD’s foreign policy 
orientation. As in the past, it was the SPD which continued to be 
identified as the main influence which worked against close Soviet- 
German relations. The task of weakening the SPD thus continued to 
make sense within a straightforward framework of Soviet policy 
calculations. If the attack against the SPD could be managed in
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such a way as to increase the KPD's presence within important 
sectors of the German economy then so much the better. Should 
the effort to salvage something of the "Ostorientierung" fail 
altogether, then a strong Communist presence in vital sectors of 
German industry could perhaps be exploited to weaken the strategic 
impact of any French-German combination. Anyway, the stress on 
the war danger argument provided an agreeably dramatic and 
"revolutionary" rationale for the tasks of the KPD.
The Nazis entered the Soviet foreign policy equation in a
more complicated way. After the September 1930 elections the
Soviets began to examine the NSDAP's foreign policy. Izvestia
in a lead article on the foreign policy implications of the
elections noted the danger of worsening relations with Germany,
31should the National Socialists enter a German government. Yet, 
other considerations had to be set against the perception of 
threat. The Communists noticed the confusion in the Nazi foreign 
policy position. There were some in the Nazi ranks who continued 
to favour the Ostorlentierung and, in any case, it did not make 
sense that Hitler could simultaneously pursue an anti-French and 
an anti-Soviet policy. A choice would necessarily have to be made 
and judging from the Nazi electoral campaign, which had stressed 
the anti-Western themes of rejection of the Young Plan and 
Versailles, it appeared as if the anti-Western orientation was 
the more important for the NSDAP. It was certainly this aspect of 
Nazi nationalist propaganda which caught the attention of the
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Communists.
What the Communists took to be the inherent weaknesses of 
National Socialism also had a bearing on their understanding of 
the foreign policy implications of the Nazi advance. The 
reasoning which led Thälmann to the conclusion that the Zentrum 
was a more important support for German capitalism than was the 
NSDAP also operated in the realm of foreign policy. The Zentrum, 
according to Thälmann, had the more important connections with 
outside interests. It was thus able to implement the pro-Western 
policies of fulfilment more "smoothly" than the German Nationalists 
and National Socialists. It was also, and for the same reason, a 
more effective promoter of the anti-Bolshevik line in German 
foreign policy,
"Beside the Second International as an agent 
for the preparation of a war against the Soviet 
Union, one can also speak...of a Catholic international 
which has set itself the same task".33
By contrast, the Nazis served to alienate Germany from the West.
As Karl Radek saw it, the capitalist powers, and France in
particular, feared the nationalism of the Nazis and in his view
France would "vote against" the inclusion of Hitler in any coalition
34government by recalling short term credits.
Radek's argument can be seen to have conformed well to the 
priorities of the Soviet and Comintern leaders. Until well into 
1932, the Communists downplayed the possible dangers in the Nazi 
foreign policy position. Until that time they continued to 
regard the Nazis mainly as a force which operated to the benefit
180
of the Soviet Union's German policy. The best evidence for this
interpretation was provided by the programme declaration which
was adopted by the KPD in the summer of 1930 for the purpose of
35fighting the September elections. The programme of "National
and Social Liberation", as the title suggested, was an attempt to
compete directly with Nazi election and propaganda slogans.
At the time, the programme was attacked by the Communist
opposition for its "National Bolshevik" arguments and to be sure,
3 6it did borrow something from Laufenberg and Wolfhelm. The
"Volksrevolution" slogan which was closely associated with the
programme, if it suggested anything at all, recalled the idea of
the "Volkskrieg". There was the same emphasis on the idea of the
German "Volk", rather than the German workers or the international
proletariat. There was also the same insistance that it was only
under the leadership of the Communists that Germany could achieve
its National emancipation. If, however, the criticism that the
programme was "National Bolshevik" was meant only to suggest that
it was a misguided formula for revolution, then it fell wide of
the mark. It was not the ideas of the Hamburg Communists which
were finding a fresh expression but rather those of Karl Radek's
Schlageter speech and it is interesting, in this regard, to notice
37that Radek likely played a part in drafting the programme.
Like the Schlageter initiative the revolutionary language 
disguised other non-revolutionary purposes. Even within the 
provisions of the programme itself the defense of Soviet interests
181
theme was well developed as was the argument that Social Democracy
was an agent of "French and Polish Imperialism". Anyway, any
possible revolutionary intent was at odds with the position, held
by the Communists at this time, that Germany was not yet ready 
38for revolution. On the other hand, it is likely that part of
the intention was to "neutralize" the Nazis through direct
competition with their nationalist propaganda. It is nevertheless
still difficult to see this as the main purpose. The unexpectedly
large gains of the Nazis should have suggested that the tactic had
misfired, since an atmosphere of increasing mass nationalist
hysteria apparently worked mainly to the advantage of Hitler. Yet,
instead of dropping or modifying their own nationalist propaganda
39the KPD actually placed more stress on it after the elections.
What was strongly suggested was that the nationalist stance of the 
KPD was not meant simply as a tactic to redirect the Nazi 
supporters to the KPD. It also reflected the view that the mood 
of militant nationalism, while it needed to be controlled, was 
nevertheless useful within the context of Soviet foreign policy 
requirements.
Against this interpretation, it might be thought that the 
anti-Communist dimensions of the National Socialist programme 
would have been a sufficient barrier against the temptation to cast 
the Nazis in this essentially positive role. Yet there was every 
indication that the Soviets, at least, were not overly troubled by 
such considerations. They repeatedly stressed to the German
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authorities that the fate of the KPD had no special significance
for the course of Soviet-German relations and they pointed to the
examples of Turkey and Italy where Communist parties had been
suppressed by governments which continued to enjoy good relations
40with the Soviet Union. That the "Fascism" issue had little, if
any, bearing on Soviet foreign policy appreciations was well
illustrated in the course of a conversation between Curtius and
41Litvinov in in November 1930. In explaining the foundations of 
Soviet foreign policy, Litvinov pointed out that in the Soviet 
view, "Everything depends on isolating France and its dependencies". 
As part of the struggle against French hegemony in Europe, the 
Soviet Union sought to establish its policies on the foundation 
of "friendship with Germany and Turkey" and good relations with 
Italy and England. On the question of good relations with Italy, 
he drew attention to recent Italian attempts to move closer to 
France, despite the "deep and inevitable" differences between the 
two countries. Fascist Italy was a natural ally in any struggle 
to limit French power. For this reason Litvinov argued that 
Germany should seek inclusion in an Italian grouping whenever such 
an opportunity presented itself.
It would seem, then, that the Nazi advance had little
effect on the outlook of the Communist leaders. Their priorities 
remained consistent and clear. What was less clear was whether 
the KPD could carry them out. Even without the rising power of 
the Nazis, the new tactics which were imposed upon the party in
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1928 were bound to do damage to its organization. The burden on
functionaries became unbearable. As the oppositionist stance of
the KPD hardened in the factories, the SPD dominated unions
responded by withdrawing union rights. Deprived of protection,
many Communist functionaries were made vulnerable to management
reprisals and as unemployment rose, Communists were the first to
lose their jobs. There was understandable reluctance among the
employed rank and file to risk jobs and union rights by becoming
active in Communist factory organizations. Consequently the street
cells became attractive alternative organizations even for employed
members and this put an additional strain on the party’s already
42weak representation in the factories.
Under these circumstances the structural weaknesses which had 
been apparent before 1928 were exaggerated. Reliance on the 
unemployed and membership fluctuation reached disasterous 
proportions. In January 193U, the party’s membership stood at 
133,000. In the course of the year there were 143,000 new recruits, 
yet at the end of the year there were only 180,000 members. In 
1931 the situation was worse. During that year 210,000 joined the 
party but at the beginning of 1932 the total membership was no
I  Q
higher than in 1930. As bad as this was, the affiliated "mass" 
organizations fared even worse. The KJD had a one hundred percent 
turnover rate in 1929 while that for the RGO was only slightly 
lower.^ At the same time the proportion of the unemployed in the 
party and its mass organizations relentlessly Increased. At the
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end of 1931, approximately eighty-five percent of the membership 
were unemployed while at the end of 1932 only eleven percent of the 
party’s members were factory workers.^
Had there been more stability in the party, it would still
have been very much in doubt whether it could have discharged its
growing number of responsibilities. The Communist army was simply
stretched too thinly across too many fronts. There were continual
calls for stepped up action against management, against assorted
government authorities, against the Communist opposition groups,
against the SPD and the trade unions, against the Zentrum and the
Stahlhelm and finally against the Nazis. Energies were further
dissipated through the attempt to devote more attention to the
development of the various mass organizations. There was the
growing emphasis on the RGO and the attempt to build new anti-
Fascist organizations. There could be little wonder when some
among the KPD leaders openly questioned the party’s ability to
manage all this. There were complaints that functionaries were
overburdened. At the Sixth World Congress, for example,
Munzenberg noted that "some comrades" were concerned that the party’s
mass organizations could only develop at the expense of the party
46itself and that there were too few functionaries to go around.
Such doubts were well justified. Structural weaknesses took a 
large toll of the party's morale. A mood of complete depression 
became apparent at the grass roots level. • Meetings of party workers 
revealed a situation which was completely at odds with the
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revolutionary optimism of the KPD press. In one such meeting in
1932 the main speaker, Isidor Piontek, a party secretary, painted
a dismal picture of the KPD's progress. He spoke first about the
great challenges facing the party. This was a time of increasing
threat to the Soviet Union. Japan was preparing to attack Soviet
territories in the East. In Europe the balance of power was
shifting against the Soviet Union. Germany was being drawn ever
more closely into the anti-Soviet camp. Still, with all these
problems and dangers, the KPD's activities remained hopelessly
inadequate. The whole Communist organization was "a great dung
heap of internal decay". It presented a "giant facade" of activity
but inside it was "hollow". He complained that despite the huge
apparatus of the RGO, it had "talked a lot but done nothing". It
had failed to gain any significant foothold in the factories. As
for strike activity, "most comrades were too lazy and cowardly to
go to work, to say nothing of striking". The party press was
scarcely read. The local factory papers were of the poorest quality
and none of the workers whether Communist or non-Communist bothered
with them. Party finances were in a shambles because of the
47backlog of unpaid fees. Reports of other such meetings, 
mentioned that there was often an atmosphere of "deep passivity". 
Sometimes the audience broke up before the meeting was to close, 
often there was no applause for speakers and at times there was 
jeering.
Poor morale, passivity and the lack of continuity among local
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cadres led to the breakdown of party discipline. There were 
complaints, from the highest levels, of party functionaries failing 
to implement official directives. For the KPD one of the most 
important of these directives was to keep the issue of relations 
with the Nazis secondary to their main concerns. The party was not 
to exaggerate the new threats posed by the rising strength of the 
Nazis. This proved the most difficult of all the burdens placed 
upon the KPD. The strain was apparent from the fact that among the 
rank and file there were many who showed themselves to be susceptible 
to the rival SPD understanding of what constituted correct tactics 
on the Nazi question.
In contrast to the Communists, the SPD developed the position 
that any constellation of political power in Germany was preferable 
to a government dominated by Hitler. Hindenburg, Papen and Schleicher 
deserved support, as the "lesser evil", if the clear alternative to 
providing that support, was to make it more likely that the Nazis 
would come to power. There were repeated warnings in the Communist 
press and in party circulars against the dangers of the "lesser 
evil swindle". There was "confusion among some comrades" on this 
point and a tendency to accept the "false distinction between 
Fascism and liberal Social Democracy." The most important single 
instance of rank and file resistance to the authorized priorities 
of the party, occurred during the Presidential elections of 1932.
The drop in support for Thalmann from 5,000,000 votes on the first 
ballot to 3,700,000 on the second, was attributed to the growing
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passivity of the party and their failure to combat sufficiently the 
popularity of the lesser evil slogan. Against the SPD position the 
KPD had argued that it was Social Fascism and not National 
Socialism that represented the more serious threat. Social Fascism 
was the "most active part of Fascism", the struggle against Fascism 
was therefore inseparable from the struggle against the SPD,
"The SPD and the Zentrum have tried to popularize 
the idea of the 'lesser evil* and have confused 
the masses and even some of our comrades were 
made irresolute by the slogan and in this way 
Hindenburg won. The SPD say Fascism has been 
stopped. That is false. Hitler couldn't govern 
any differently from the way Bruning does today...
The methods of the SPD represent pure Fascism.
The Nazis too cannot govern without the help of 
the SPD."50
There was also another dimension to the disciplinary problem.
The Social Democrats and the Communist opposition groups, when 
faced with the growing Nazi threat, argued for the end of self­
destructive conflict on the left and for the formation of a broadly 
based anti-Nazi alliance. Such united front initiatives were seen 
as threatening enough to call forth a large volume of propaganda 
material directed at the "left" manoeuvres of the SPD. The 
"manoeuvres", so the Communists argued, were designed "to confuse 
the workers...with speeches about a 'united front against Fascism"'.^
The KPD was warned against this danger from the pinnacle of the Communist 
hierarchy. In an "open letter" of October 1931, Stalin linked the 
struggle against the united front from above suggestions, with the 
campaign against Trotsky and other oppositionist elements of both 
the left and the right. Stalin made it clear that the struggle
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against Trotsky and against both the "left" and the "right" in
Social Democracy were inseparable. The main task was to discredit
all "left" manoeuvres since they obscured the central realities of
Social Democracy in the minds of its supporters. The Social
Democrats and the Communist opposition groups were in no sense to
be understood as allies but rather as the main targets of Communist 
52hostility. Yet, Stalin's warnings, no matter how tirelessly they
were repeated in the KPD press and party circulars, could not alter
the realities of the party's day to day life. The truth was that
by the time of the open letter it was not the Social Democrats but
rather the Nazis who had become the most serious problem which the
Communists faced. All the dangers of 1923 had reappeared.
Beginning in 1928 the Nazis stepped up their terror attacks
53on both the major working class parties and for the first time
since 1923 questions of self defense became urgent. To counter
Nazi strong arm tactics, the Communists relied on two organizations -
54the RFB and the Kampfbund gegen den Faschismus (KgdF). Neither 
of these was well suited to meet the growing Nazi menace. Many 
of the problems which had limited the effectiveness of the old 
Hundertschaften had resurfaced together with serious new 
difficulties.
The internal circulars of both organizations revealed a chaotic 
situation. No clear division of labour had been established. Some 
in the new KgdF saw it as a successor and rival to the RFB, and 
others saw it as a kind of "red SA" . 5 5 Functionaries complained of
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overloading and of staffing difficulties. The attempt to develop 
the new organization was draining functionaries from the RFB and in 
some places this was leading to the dissolution of the RFB.^^ 
Against this confusion, the party attempted to distinguish the 
self defense and combat role of the RFB from the "mass action" 
united front objectives of the KgdF.^ Given the shortage of 
personnel, this division of labour meant little in practice. In 
most cases the organizations were staffed by the same overworked 
people and despite the supposed "united front" character of the 
KgdF, there was little non-Communist participation and thus to a 
large extent its membership overlapped with the RFB. Under these 
circumstances, it was not surprising that most members were 
entirely in the dark about what they were supposed to be doing.
Was the principal task self defense or was it anti-Fascist united 
front work with the members of rival parties?
The confusion was compounded further by the complete lack of
clarity with respect to the targets of anti-Fascist activities.
It was not just the Nazis but also the Social Fascists, the
Communist opposition, the Stahlhelm and the Zentrum which were
represented as dangerous enemies, against whom it was necessary to 
58defend the party. At the same time, the members of these parties 
were all identified as suitable recruits for the "anti-Fascist" 
organizations. The KgdF was told that,
"In the Hitler party there are numerous 
dedicated revolutionary elements who struggle 
against the Fascist course of Hitler and his 
consorts and think along anti-capitalist lines".
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It followed that one could be a member of the NSDAP and still be
59acceptable to the KgdF.
By the end of 1931, the internal circulars and directives
painted a picture of an army in full retreat. There was a growing
fear of the SA and the SS and against this the party could only
offer assurances that the Nazis were about to disintegrate under
the impact of their own contradictions. The Communists argued that
it had taken the party ten years to bring the SPD to the edge of
defeat. What had taken ten years of struggle against a well
established and powerful enemy could be accomplished with the
NSDAP in a matter of months.^ Such promises, however, could not
carry much conviction. It was clear that the Nazis had the more
effective methods and the clearer sense of purpose. That fact was
conceded in the KgdF directives, members were urged to adopt the
methods of the SA in such matters as agitational work and fund
raising.^ It was the Communists, not the Nazis who were in
disarray. A general atmosphere of "passivity" and "defeatism"
prevailed everywhere. Apathy was indicated by the large backlog
of unpaid fees and by the fact that less than half the local groups
read or disseminated the official anti-Fascist pamphlets, "Fanfare"
and "Alarm". The problem of membership fluctuation was acute and
62in some places the KgdF had melted away. There was also poor
co-ordination between the main organization and its affiliated 
, 63youth and women s groups.
If, as a result of these difficulties, the RFB and the KgdF
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were less than adequate in their self defense roles, it was as 
"united front" organizations that their greatest limitation was 
exposed. It was not just that they failed to gain significant 
numbers of non-Communist recruits; that much was obvious from the 
various anti-Fascist demonstrations, public meetings and propaganda 
campaigns which they attempted to organize. Host of the time
64these activities only succeeded in arousing the party faithful.
What was, however, more important, was the limitation built into 
the terms of reference of the whole Communist anti-Fascist effort. 
These allowed even less room for co-operation with other anti- 
Fascist forces than had been true in the case of the old 
Hundertschaften. Some groups, such as the KPO, were denied entry 
to Communist sponsored anti-Fascist meetings. There was grim 
irony here, for although former comrades were barred, Nazis were 
welcome.^ As for the SPD, as long as discipline held, the Social 
Fascist theme effectively excluded the possibility of co-operation.
Discipline did hold and even in the darkest days on the eve 
of Hitler’s siezure of power, there was no co-operation between 
the self defense forces of the two parties. The SPD dominated 
Reichsbanner and the Iron Front specifically forbade participation 
by their members in any of the Communist led anti-Fascist actions,^ 
On the positive side there was only the unofficial co-operation 
which sometimes occurred in the streets. There were, for example, 
reports of detachments of the rival anti-Fascist groups taking the 
precaution of remaining closely together on the streets so as to
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discourage the attentions of the Nazis. ^
Such incidents, although not so important in themselves,
nevertheless accurately reflected the mood of many Communists.
As the pressure of the Nazis mounted, it was natural to seek comfort
where it could be found. In fact, the rank and file were
preoccupied with the problem of defending themselves and with the
desire to strike back. These concerns frequently brought local
functionaries into conflict with the central leadership. There was
a tendency towards undisciplined and spontaneous action which the
party never fully succeeded in controlling.
"Isolated acts of terror" (as the Communists called them), were
always condemned. This was so despite the fact that the party,
at the end of 1929, had seemingly encouraged undisciplined violence
with the adoption of the slogan, "Beat up the Fascists wherever you 
68meet them". Understandably, this was widely understood as an 
invitation to attack the Nazis. Nevertheless, it was apparent from 
the beginning that there was no consensus concerning the 
application of the slogan. In the first place, the Nazis were never 
meant to be the only targets. Bearing in mind the broad definition 
of "Fascism" with which the Communists operated, it was perhaps not 
so surprising to see alongside, "Schlagt die Faschisten wo ihr sie 
trefft" also such refinements as, "Schlagt die Sozialfaschisten..." 
and "Schlagt die Versöhnler...".^
It was also true that there were important qualifications 
placed on the slogan. As the Nazi tide rose there was less and
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less room for violence In the official statements of the party’s 
leaders. At the Eleventh EKKI Plenum in the Spring of 1931,
Thälmann was openly critical of the "Schlagt die Faschisten..." 
slogan. In his view it had been applied in a "very rigid and 
abstract way" and it was, in any case, only appropriate where Fascism 
had not yet become a mass movement. In the new situation, the 
struggle against Fascism had to stress "ideological work"; the 
tactics of confrontation were always to be combined with those of 
persuasion.^ Later in the year, the party went further and 
officially condemned "...senseless, isolated action and isolated 
armed attacks...". These, it was pointed out, served only to hold 
the workers back from "real" class struggle and gave the 
bourgeoisie a "cheap excuse" for their murderous anti-Communist 
hatred.^
Even before the Eleventh Plenum, in fact almost from the time 
of its introduction, it was possible to see the party's attempt to 
distance itself from the slogan. Many saw it as an influence which 
seriously compromised the effectiveness of the KPD's on-going united 
front from below efforts with the Nazi supporters. Communist 
speakers in Nazi public meetings were especially handicapped. When 
asked by members of their audiences where they stood on the 
question of the slogan, the wrong answer could lead to an ugly 
scene. In June 1930, in the course of one such meeting, Ulbricht 
revealed thatthi3 difficulty had been considered shortly after the 
adoption of the slogan and had led to the decision to de-emphasize
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The rejection of violence, or at least the decision to avoid 
violence as far as was possible, made a lot of sense in light both 
of the party's capabilities and its priorities. Given the 
steadfast rejection of any form of genuine anti-Fascist alliance, 
"ideological struggle" offered the only hope for meeting the Nazi 
challenge. The Communists were right to point out that it was not 
just the strong arm tactics of the Nazis which needed to be 
considered but also the Nazi influence among large numbers of 
people who might be persuaded to support the Communists. Anyway, 
more was involved than considerations of how best to defeat the 
Nazis; the Communists had to protect themselves from the challenge 
to their own following.
As the KPD's dependence on the unemployed grew, so too did its
awareness of the Nazi challenge for the allegiance of this group.
Indeed, even before the Nazi advance got under way, this was seen
as a potentially serious problem. During 1927 the Nazis launched
a campaign to expand their following among the workers and the 
73unemployed. Judging from their internal party circulars, the
Communists were already concerned at this time both by the direct
threat to their own membership and by the distortions which Nazi
activities were capable of inducing in the party's work,
"The National Socialists were especially active 
in industrial areas. Above all they tried to 
win support among the unemployed...Since there 
are also many unemployed among our comrades,
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these are daily belaboured with National 
Socialist agitation. That leads to an 
overestimation of National Socialism among 
our comrades and in turn leads to the 
downgrading of much more important work..."74
After 1928 the threat to the Communist hold on the unemployed
increased. The SA, especially proved successful in attracting
large numbers of unemployed. Between January 1931 and January 1932
the SA's membership tripled from one hundred thousand to three
hundred thousand and by various estimates, from sixty to seventy
percent of the SA following was from the unemployed.^ The Nazis
also established special "cells" for work among their unemployed
supporters and they published propaganda literature meant
76especially for this group. At the same time, it was clear that 
considerable numbers of recruits for the SA were coming from the 
Communists. There were claims that in some industrial cities up to 
seventy percent of local SA detachments were made up of former 
Communists.^ Despite its determination to concentrate its efforts 
on the struggle against the SPD, the KPD simply could not ignore 
a problem of such magnitude. As a mass party the NSDAP might have 
been able to afford a defeat in the competition for the unemployed 
but the KPD could not. Without the continuing support of large 
numbers of these people the KPD would simply have ceased to exist 
as a major force in Weimar politics.
Consequently, the tendency to "downgrade" the more important 
work among the membership of the working class organizations in 
favour of competition with the Nazis continued. Indeed, by 1930
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something close to a de-facto reversal of priorities could be
detected in Communist united front efforts. In agitational
literature designed for the unemployed and in official statements
concerning united front tactics, the Nazis and especially the SA
were identified as important targets of the party's recruitment
and propaganda campaign. The Communists also directed more
propaganda at the Mittelstand and at the farmers, sections of the
population considered to be especially susceptible to Nazi appeals.
As part of this effort the KPD announced a "Farmer Aid Programme"
in 1931 at the Berlin District Parteitag. Communists were to
organize the farmers against forced mortgage closures and low
78prices for agricultural products. The affiliated mass
organizations, such as the KgdF, were instructed to establish a
presence in the countryside and to pay special attention to the
79problems of recruiting farmers.
With respect to the employed workers, too, the Communists 
became increasingly sensitive to the activities of the Nazis. At 
first sight this is surprising, since the Nazis never assigned 
first priority to their work in the factories and their influence 
there was never very important. Still, there was always some 
Nazi presence and it was indicative of the KPD's own weakness that 
it had to take seriously any additional challenge to an already 
marginal position. The Communists recognized that the Nazi advance 
was taking place across a broad social front, which included the 
employed industrial workers. After 1928, as the Nazis developed
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and expanded their own affiliated working class organizations,
there was a possibility that they would succeed in establishing a
presence in the factories which was larger than that of the KPD.
There had long been pressure within the NSDAP to establish a
National Socialist trade union organization and in 1928 that
pressure resulted in the formation of a new Nazi affiliate, the
80Nationalsozialistische Betriebszellen-Organisation (NSBO). With
the founding of the NSBO, the Nazi presence in the factories
expanded at an alarming rate. In January 1931, there were about
three thousand members of the NSBO; by the end of the year this
had become thirty-nine thousand and at the end of 1932, nearly
81three hundred thousand. When full allowance is made for the fact
that many among these were white collar personnel, the membership
figures still reflected important gains relative to the Communists
and on the eve of Hitler's siezure of power it is likely that the
working class representation of the NSBO equaled or exceeded that 
82of the RGO. Nor was it just the absolute size of the NSBO which
was worrying; its organizational structure was an additional cause
for concern. The Communists were facing a rival in the factory
who was self-consciously using Communist methods. There was the
same concentration on the factory cell as the centre of agitation
and recruitment and there was the same "transmission belt"
relationship between central authority and local functionaries.
Moreover, the Nazis appealed to many of the same radical fringe
83elements as the RGO.
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At the district level in the industrial areas, the Communists
carefully monitored the increase in the number of NSBO cells and
they called for a stepped up agitational campaign to counter them.
There was a note of urgency. RGO operatives and Communist shop
stewards were exhorted to fight against the "passivity" of Communist
factory cells in the face of the growing Nazi presence. They were
told to upgrade the "modest beginnings" of criticism of the Nazis
84in the Communist factory papers.
The effort to meet the Nazi challenge on the basis of 
"ideological struggle" rested, as before, on the assumption that the 
Nazi following and membership were "objectively" open to Communist 
recruitment efforts. The Communists argued that there were those 
among the Nazis who completely misunderstood the real nature of the 
NSDAP's goals. Some saw the main objectives of their party as 
having to do with a radical re-ordering of economic relations, as 
the basis for national liberation and a new Germany. These were 
obviously susceptible to Communist united front efforts and they 
could reasonably be expected to change allegiance, given a 
strenuous enough effort on the part of the Communists.
Thus the KPD endeavoured to make its own members understand 
the basic contradictions in National Socialism. There were 
repeated urgings that comrades ought to accept their commonality 
of interest with the "simple" and "honest" Nazi worker or 
unemployed worker. As one Communist circular from May 1932 put it,
"It is self explanatory that, in the struggle 
against the National Socialists, one must
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differentiate between leaders and masses 
and by organizing action campaigns, whether 
they be strikes in the factory or actions 
on behalf of the unemployed, tactics 
must be implemented for dislodging the Nazi 
proletarian followers from their leaders.85
Despite the emphasis here on influence through example and 
"action" the most notable practical consequence of the increasing 
emphasis on united front efforts with the Nazi following was the 
greater attention paid to the development of agitational work among 
the Nazi rank and file. Judging from surviving examples of the 
KPD's directives which governed this work, the intention was to 
integrate the major Nazi propaganda themes with the KPD's own 
programme of "National and Social Liberation" and the "Volksrevolution" 
slogan. As one party directive explained,
"The mass struggle against Fascism must be 
advanced under the flag of our freedom 
programme with the slogans of national 
and social liberation. This permits the 
exploitation of all the basic issues of 
German politics. " 8 6
Communist functionaries were instructed to point out that the
exploitation of the National issue against the Nazis involved
emphasizing that the NSDAP, far from standing for German national
liberation, was actually a Young Plan fulfilment party, which was
fully committed to the Weimar system. In fact, all parties, with
the exception of the KPD were to be regarded as fulfilment and
"coalition" parties. The Nazis, despite their radical sounding
"national and social demogogy", were interested only in obtaining
87ministerial appointments in coalition governments.
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The same kind of argument was to be advanced against the
Nazi social and economic programme. The "socialist" sounding
phrases were to be exposed as the mask behind which the Nazis
pursued their pro-capitalist purposes. In this connection the
Communists also continued to exploit Nazi anti-Semitic prejudice
and in a more public and direct way than ever before. The anti-
Semitic theme found its way into everything from the party's
circulars and factory papers to the speeches of Communist deputies 
88in the Reichstag. For the purpose of their work among the Nazi
rank and file, functionaries were told to stress that Hitler was
89receiving money from the rich Jews. As in the past, the
intention was to convince the Nazi supporter of the close connections
between his party and capitalist interests. When it came to basic
(class) questions Nazi anti-Semitism could not be taken seriously.
Jewish factory owners, for example, could count on the Nazis to
90play a strike breaking role. In public meetings Communist
speakers made the same points, only sometimes in a more brutal way.
In one of these meetings a Communist spokesman, Florin, criticized
the Nazis for the narrowness of their anti-Semitism. Whereas they
only attacked the "Black Jews" (one must suppose this to mean
people who were Jewish by birth and culture), the Communists
attacked also the "white Jews", that is, people who were Jewish
91in practice and by conviction —  all capitalists.
The same argument could be found in the Communist press, with 
the difference that on occasion the "anti-capitalist" message
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was altogether lost In the highly unpleasant, mocking tone of the 
commentary. One such article criticized Frick, the Nazi Minister 
of the Interior in Thuringia, for his part in supporting government 
aid to religious establishments. Given the blanket nature of such 
support, Frick had found himself, as a Nazi and supposed anti- 
Semite, caught in the "contradiction" of approving support for 
Jewish institutions. Rote Fahne had this to say about the supposed 
gratitude of the Jewish community,
"As we understand, a conference of Thuringian 
Rabbis has taken place, which out of gratitude, 
has elected Frick as an honourary member of the 
Jewish community. The reception ceremony takes 
place some time in the next few weeks. The 
circumcision knife, to be used on this occasion, 
is decorated on the handle with a Swastika and 
the Star of David."92
Anti-Semitism did not provide the only example of Nazi
influence on Communist propaganda. The attempt to break down the
barriers which separated the Nazi following from the KPD involved
the Communists in the deployment of such Nazi images and concepts
as, "interest slavery" (Zinsknechtschaft) and "workers of brain
93and fist" (Stirn und Faust). Although the KPD continually 
promoted its claims as the only anti-Fascist party in Germany and 
the only alternative to Hitler, this kind of propaganda, together 
with the overriding importance which it continued to assign to the 
struggle against "Social Fascism", suggested something entirely 
different. Despite assurances to the contrary, there was an 
implicit admission in Communist tactics that only the Nazis were
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capable of exploiting the Increasingly radical mood of the country. 
More than a little helplessness was evident here —  the final 
surrender of the party's own self confident revolutionary antecedents. 
In striving to "neutralize" the Nazi threat, the Communists 
apparently saw that nothing more was required of them than the mere 
scramble to capture the resentments and the confusions of the day.
The helplessness was especially evident in another aspect of 
the KPD's approach to the Nazis. The attempt to shorten the 
ideological distance between the two parties was not just related 
to recruitment considerations. As in the past, the Communists 
sought to deflect Nazi hostility to more appropriate targets. Thus 
in speeches for Nazi audiences and in the special pamphlet literature 
which the Communists designed for use among the Nazis, there was a 
stress on a commonality of interest, especially with respect to 
common enemies and there was frequently a pleading concern to 
reduce conflict. One RGO pamphlet from December 1930 captured these 
sentiments well,
"Daily the press issues more or less lying reports 
concerning bloody clashes between "Nazis" and 
"Communists". First one side and then the other 
is declared 'guilty' and with sweat on their 
faces the hireling writers of the trusts and the 
Brüning government seek to sow discord among the 
working people. We don't want these fights.
We want much more the development of what the 
servants of the exploiters of the people fear 
more than the plague: the united front of all 
the working people (Werktätigen)*. Therefore we 
turn to you. We know that you are a National 
Socialist. We know also that the infamous, hate- 
filled press and other influences of the last 
years have sown mistrust between us. However, 
we know equally well that all of us, as workers
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have common interests. Together we find 
ourselves in need. Together we bear the lash 
of the attack on pay, salaries and relief 
support and of rising prices and social 
reaction. Together we groan under the Young 
whip and we want to break the chains of slavery.
The manipulators of this slavery have been 
concerned to convince you and those who think 
like you, that Marxism is responsible for our 
misery. In reality, Social Democracy betrayed 
Marxism decades ago and has sunk to the level of 
a prostitute of international finance capital . 
Therefore, we are convinced that it is not 
recriminations but sincere discussion, concerning 
our political ideas, that is necessary in the 
struggle against international finance capital 
and its agents. We will and must succeed as 
workers in forming a united front against 
international finance capital and its agents, 
against capitalism and tribute slavery*, for 
upon that depends our fate and the decisive 
victory of the national and social liberation
struggle."94
(The terms which are followed by an asterisk 
represent concessions to Nazi vocabulary.)
The united front theme also lent itself to more aggressive
applications. The Communists reacted with hope to any evidence of
discontent within the Nazi ranks and they were especially gratified
by the defection of elements which could be seen as Socialist and
anti-Western in their outlook. They took such events as the
defection of Otto Strasser and the SA revolt in Berlin in 1931 as
95a vindication of their whole approach to National Socialism.
They sought to deepen the discontent and to attract the Nazi 
malcontents to the KPD. In pursuit of this goal the Communists 
relied primarily on a propaganda campaign which was built around 
Nazis who had come over to the KPD and one .of these, a Wehrmacht
officer by the name of Richard Scheringer, became a symbol for
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the whole tactical line. Oberleutnant Richard Scherlnger had been
arrested for his part in Nazi recruitment and propaganda activities
in the brmy. While in prison, he discovered himself to be a
Communist and he defected to the KPD in March 1931. Kippenberg,
on behalf of the KPD delegation, announced the defection before the
Reichstag on the 19th March.^ Thereafter, in a barrage of
pamphlet literature, Scheringer became the Communist hero and
example for all the disaffected and revolutionary elements in the
Nazi ranks. The content of this material, and the so-called
"Scheringer course" generally, once more underscored the continuing
relevance of the ideas which had previously found their expression
in the Schlageter initiative. National Bolshevik arguments were
again stressed —  the need for an alliance with the Soviet Union
and the role of the KPD as a party which fought for national 
97liberation.
Despite the clear overtures to the Nazi dissidents, there was 
not much in the "Scheringer tactics" which suggested that the 
Communists were interested in a straightforward alliance with any 
of the Nazi splinter groups which emerged after 1930. The 
attitude to these was mixed. On the one hand, they provided whatever 
evidence there was for the presence of the self-destructive 
contradictions which the Communists claimed (and hoped) were 
present in National Socialism. There was, therefore, a temptation 
to encourage their activities. On the other hand, the Nazi 
opposition offered an alternative to the main line party. Since
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the Communists were trying to present themselves as the only
alternative for the dissidents, they could not help but see the
Nazi opposition as an obstacle to their recruitment plans.
There was an obvious similarity here with the Communist
attitude towards the left wing opposition parties. In the party’s
circulars and in the Communist press there were repeated warnings
against the tendency to see the left socialist, Sozialistische
Arbeiterpartei (SAP) as a bridge between the KPD and the Social
Democratic membership. The Communists argued that parties such as
the SAP and the KPO were even more dangerous than the SPD because
of their "sophisticated" arguments (such as, "sophisticated"
suggestions for a genuine united front against the Nazis) and the
98fact that they deflected potential recruits away from the KPD.
Exactly the same points were made with respect to Strasser’s
Kampfgemeinschaft Revolutionärer Nationalsozialisten (KGRNS). The
KGRNS, too, used "sophisticated" arguments and acted, not as a
99bridge, but as a dam against the united front struggle.
As might be expected, however, there were difficulties in
distinguishing between the two senses of Communist united front
tactics. There was, for example, some contact between the KGRNS
and the KPD:^^ Space was made available in the Communist journals
for right-wing opponents of Hitler.^^ The Communists also
helped to produce and to distribute at least one of the Nazi
opposition papers, the "Sturmbanner, Sprachrohr der revolutionären 
102SA". More importantly, involvement with the SA opposition led
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the Communists to try to construct "Scheringer" detachments of 
a "Red SA" and plans for this were underway by early January 
1933.103
With some of these more covert operations it was difficult to
decide where united front work ended and so-called "Zersetzung"
work began. Enough of a documentary record survives to establish
that the KPD, as part of its defensive reaction to the rise of
the Nazis, intensified its undercover operations against the NSDAP
after 1928. As in the past, such operations involved disguising
Communist agents as members of the enemy organization. According
to one secret report of the KPD Nachrichtdienst, which was siezed
by the police in 1932, agents were to work to promote factional
struggle and to gather information about the enemy, especially
concerning his own undercover work.3"*^
The extent of the KPD*s success in these matters cannot be
known but it is clear that there was some penetration of the SA.
It is, of course, not difficult to believe that some of those
Communists who went over to the SA were agents. Certainly many
contemporary observers thought so, and there is good evidence of
SA men being involved in such activities as the distribution of
Communist agitational material. Apparently there were cases of
105this even after the Nazis came to power. There is good 
documentary evidence in the more sensational cases, where 
Communists achieved high ranking positions of trust within the SA. 
One case involved a well known Bavarian SA leader, Stegemann. In
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1931, severe factional struggle in Stegemann's organization was
traced to the activities of one of Stegemann's senior advisers and
organizers, a Dr. Hoehne, who was subsequently exposed as a 
X06Communist agent. Unfortunately for the Communists, undercover 
operations cut both ways. This was one of the obvious dangers of 
the united front tactic. A danger which was especially marked in 
the case of the KgdF and the RFB. Their work with the Nazis left 
them open to penetration by Nazi agents and there was ample 
evidence for this in the secret "black lists" of the KPD's own 
Nachrichtdienst.
The variety and the apparent flexibility of the tactics which 
the Communists generated to meet the growing Nazi threat and the 
obvious importance which was attached to them by many Communists, 
did not alter the fact that the KPD continued to regard its anti- 
Nazi efforts as secondary to its main purposes. This has always to 
be borne in mind when assessing the effectiveness of these tactics. 
They were never allowed to follow their logical course. That is, 
they never fully reflected the fact that the struggle against the 
Nazis had become a matter of life or death for the KPD. To the 
extent that this elementary fact penetrated the consciousness of 
the party it did so mainly at the level of the rank and file.
There were fewer obstacles to awareness there because when all was 
said it was the ordinary member who had to carry the burden of the 
party's tactics. There was, to be sure, some recognition of the 
terrible strain which the KPD's priorities were imposing and on
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several occasions the struggle against the Nazis was officially 
108upgraded. At no time, however, did this lead to a reversal of 
priorities. The attack on the Nazis could only be a more or less 
important part of a more general struggle against "Fascism".
This always included, as a top priority, the problem of defeating 
Social Democracy as the main support of the bourgeois order and the 
main enemy of the Soviet Union.
It was of course, not sufficient only to assign more importance
to the anti-Nazi effort, without an unequivocal reversal of
priorities. Despite the call for a war on two fronts against the
SPD and the NSDAP, the party simply did not have the resources
which would have allowed it successfully to divide its attentions 
109in that way. The impression which was left was one of a party 
caught between its own instincts and an essentially alien purpose —  
of a leadership, with seemingly endless patience, explaining over 
and over again why its embattled following could not save itself.
The problem was amply illustrated by the tension between, on the 
one hand, the widespread influence of the SPD’s "lesser evil" 
formula and the propensity to "isolated acts of terror", and on 
the other hand, the leadership’s insistence on a two front 
"ideological struggle".
The emphasis on "ideological struggle", at least as it was 
interpreted at the time, made it. clear that the KPD’s effort to 
balance its defensive requirements with its refusal to alter its 
basic priorities, had led it full circle in its relationship with
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National Socialism. Just as in 1923 it was possible to see at 
the heart of Communist tactics the desire to control, rather than 
to oppose, the sentiments which were feeding the Nazis. At no 
time was there much of a suggestion that the elements of hysterical 
nationalism and racism in the Nazi appeal, were somehow 
illegitimate within the terms of reference of Marxist revolutionaries, 
and therefore worth resisting just for that reason. The 
Communists insisted on criticizing Nazi ideas from the standpoint 
that they were misguided expressions of basically healthy and 
useful sentiments which only Communism could properly comprehend 
and direct. Thus it was that "ideological struggle" did not at 
any time mean what it might reasonably be expected to have meant.
It too much compromised whatever opportunity there may have been 
to confront the Nazi appeal with an alternative, and so it could 
not, in the end, pose much of a threat to the Nazis. Rather, it 
only helped to draw the Communists into an essentially unhealthy 
relationship which emphasized not only the danger but also the 
illusory opportunity which the Nazis represented.
210
FOOTNOTES
1 See, Jeremy Noakes, The Nazi Party In Lower Saxony, 1921- 
1933, Oxford University Press, 1971, pp. 104-103.
2 See, Alfred Milatz, "Das Ende der Parteien im Spiegel der 
Wahlen", in Erich Matthias and Rudolf Morsey, Das Ende der 
Parteien 1933, Düsseldorf, 1960, p. 782.
3 Milatz, Ibid. , pp. 777-778 and p. 782.
4 See, Karl Dietrich Bracher, The German Dictatorship: The 
Origins, Structure and Consequences of National Socialism, 
Penguin University Books, 1973, p. 172 and pp. 180-181.
5 See, Lenzer, "Die Kommunalwahlen in Deutschland", KI^ , No. 45,
(20 Nov. 1929), p. 1692.
6 Bracher, op. cit., p. 213.
7 Milatz, op. cit., pp. 777-778.
8 See, Protokoll des 6. Weltkongresses der Kommunistischen 
Internationale (Juli-September 1928), Hamburg, 1929, p. 13 ff.
9 See, for example, Protokoll, ibid, p. 45 ff. and "Die Beschlüsse 
des neunten Plenums der Exekutive", _I, No. 6 , (15 March 1928), 
pp. 162-163.
10 See, Hermann Weber, Die Wandlung des deutschen Kommunismus:
Die Stalinisierung der KPD in der Weimarer Republik, Frankfurt 
am Main, 1969, Vol. 1, p. 223 ff.
11 The tendency to see the RG0 as an alternative trade union 
organization was apparent at the Fifth Congress of the RGI, 
where it was announced that separate Communist unions were 
desirable under "certain conditions". The first "red unions" 
made their appearance at the end of 1930. See, Thomas 
Weingartner, Stalin und der Aufstieg Hitlers: Die Deutschland­
politik der Sowjetunion und der Kommunistischen Internationale, 
Berlin, 1970, pp. 28-30; Ossip K. Flechtheim, Die KPD in der 
Weimarer Republik, Frankfurt am Main, 1969, pp. 271-273.
12 KPD Rundschreiben, Berlin, (14 July 1932), SA Bremen, IV.13K, 
as cited in Weber, op, cit., Vol. II, p. 241.
Ruhr Echo, (23 Oct. 1929), as cited in GdS, No. 46, (16 Nov. 
1929), p. 11. In contrast to other parties, there seems to have
13
211
been unusual enthusiasm for the Social Fascist theses in the 
KPD: "With the exception of the organs of the KPD...the 
Communist press has not dealt with the problems of Social 
Fascism...In England... the majority of the old Central 
Committee...were entirely unable to understand the Social 
Fascist development of the Labour Party and the trade unions." 
Forgarasi, "Die Fragen des Faschismus und der Sozialfaschis­
mus in der internationalen kommunistischen Presse", KI,
No. 8 , t26 Feb. 1930), p. 464.
14 Emst Th'almann, "Das Zentrum, die führende Partei der deutschen 
Bourgeoisie", _I, No. 1, (Jan. 1932), pp. 6-26; cf. Willi 
Munzenberg, "Wer bleibt Sieger? Bolschewismus oder National­
sozialismus?", RA, No. 8 , (Aug. 1930), p. 410.
15 Heinz Neumann, for example, made the claim that the Stahlhelm 
was the most dangerous of the "National Fascist" parties in 
Germany. See, Peer H. Lange, Stalinismus versus "Sozial­
faschismus" und "Nationalfaschismus", Göppingen, 1969, p. 248 
and see, Rote Stern, No. 5, (May 1931). Here the Stahlhelm 
is characterized as a Fascist organization which was "more
stable" than the NSDAP and which needed to be opposed with 
as much energy as the Nazis; and cf. Hans Jaeger, "Die 
Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei: VII Der 
Stahlhelm", Inprekorr, No. 48, (10 June 1932), pp. 1533-1534.
16 Lenzer, op. clt., (fn. 5 above), p. 1694.
17 Lenzer, op. cit., (fn. 5 above), p. 1687. See also the 
report on the Saxon elections in Pravda, as cited in RSD,
No. 20, (23 May 1929).
18 See, H. Jacobs, "Das Ergebnis der sächsischen Landtagswahlen", 
Inprekorr, No. 53, (24 June 1930) and "Lehren der Sachsenwahl", 
RF, (24 June 1930).
19 Pravda, (18 Sept. 1930), as cited in GdS, No. 39, (27 Sept.
1930), p. 577; see also, "Das Ergebnis der Reichstagswahlen 
in Deutschland", Inprekorr, No. 78, (16 Sept. 1930), pp. 1939- 
1940; Fritz Heckert, "Die deutschen Reichstagswahlen und die 
Aufgaben der KPD", Inprekorr, No. 79, (19 Sept. 1930),
pp. 1953-1954; RF, (15 Sept. 1930).
20 Karl Radek, "Der Ausgang der deutschen Wahlen", RA, No. 10,
(Oct. 1930), p. 525.
21 Remmele in a speech before a KPD assembly in Berlin Neuküln,
(19 Sept. 1930), as cited in GdS, No. 39, (27 Sept. 1930).
212
22 Thälmann argued that the propensity towards disintegration in 
the NSDAP meant that "...the 14th of September was Hitler's 
best day, no better only worse will follow", Ernst Thälmann, 
"Die Lage in Deutschland und die Aufgaben der Kommunistischen 
Partei Deutschlands, (XI. Plenum des EKKI)", Inprekorr,
No. 52, (5 June 1931), pp. 1210-1212. This theme was featured 
in numerous articles in the Communist press. See, for 
example, RF, (15 Sept. 1930), "The so called electoral victory 
of the Nazis is the beginning of their end..."
23 Thälmann, in Bericht über die Verhandlungen des 12. Partei­
tages der KPD, Berlin, 1929, p. 72; cf. "Das XI. Plenum des 
EKKI, Thesen und Beschlüsse", Inprekorr, No. 38, (24 April
1931), "The strongest party of the Second International the 
SPD, the accomplice of the German military clique, who 
imposed the robber peace of Brest-Litovsk...is the same 
party that is now the most active organizer of the 
international imperialist, anti-Soviet front with the 
reactionary militaristic France of Poincare, Tardieu and 
Briand. Breitsheid, Weis and Hilferding are the instruments 
of Russian Menschevik scoundrels and interventionists in 
preparing the ground for intervention." (p. 954).
24 Cf. "The Sixth Congress of the Communist International", in
Jane Degras, (ed.), The Communist International, 1919-1943: 
Documents, Oxford University Press, I960, Vol. II, 1923-1928, 
pp. 447-448. See also, A. Stoll, "Fur die revolutionäre 
Einstellung im Kampf gegen den imperialistischen Krieg", RGI, 
No. 13/14, (July 1932), pp. 817-827; 0. Herclet, "Wir müssen
den Kampf gegen die Kriegsgefahr verstärken", RGI, No. 13/14, 
(July 1932); Ernst Wollweber, "Die Antikriegsarbeit der RGO", 
IGPK, No. 52, (10 July 1931).
25 KPD Rundschreiben, "Der Kampf gegen den imperialistischen 
Krieg", HSA Düss. RDP, 30642(a), R.ko., 2854, (29 Nov. 1929); 
see also, "Schulungsmaterial des 12 EKKI Plenum und die 
Reichsparteikonferenz", HSA DÜss. RDP, 30671, (Sept. 1932), 
"...for the defense of the Soviet Union, the conquest of the 
large factories, the armament factories, the chemical works, 
the railways is indispensable"; W. Kaasch, "Die Reichs- 
Organisations-Konferenz der KPD", Inprekorr, No. 33, (30 March 
1928), p. 619.
26 KPD Rundschreiben, Ruhrgebiet, (28 April 1932), HSA Duss. RDP, 
30657(g), Pp Duisberg, (9 May 1932).
Not only was the SPD government preoccupied with its relations 
with the West, it also sought to distance Germany from the 
"Rapallo" policies. The SPD continued to exert pressure
27
21 3
on the Foreign Office against the Ostorientierung after it 
left the government. See, Harvey Leonard Dyck, Weimar 
Germany and Soviet Russia 1926-1933. London, 1966, pp. 152- 
156; Weingartner, op. cit., (fn. 11 above), pp. 21-22. The 
Communist commentary on the development of German foreign 
policy made it clear that the Soviets regarded the advent of 
the Muller government, with its "boundless commitment to the 
Westorientierung", as a grave threat to their German policy.
See, W. Koenen, "Deutschlands aussenpolitische Isolierung", 
Inprekorr. No. 94, (31 Aug. 1928), pp. 1747-1748; Pravda (lead), 
(12 July 1928), "Die Aussenpolitik der deutschen Links­
regierung", as cited in Inprekorr, No. 67, (17 July 1928), 
pp. 1214-1215.
2b See, for example, W. Stoeker, "Die Bilanz des neudeutschen 
Imperialismus vor den Wahlen", Inprekorr, No. 39, (20 April 
1928), pp. 698-699; P.R. Dietrich, "Die politische Lage in 
Deutschland", Inprekorr. No. 33, (30 March 1928), pp. 611-612;
W. Koenen, "Der Wahlkampf in Deutschland und die Sozial­
demokratie", Inprekorr, No. 46, (15 May 1928), pp. 811-812.
29 Milatz, op. cit., (fn. 2 above), p. 777.
30 Weingartner argues that the foreign policy consideration only 
made its appearance as a major factor in 1929/1930 and that 
within the "left course" of 1928 the foreign policy role of 
the SPD was "fully subordinate" to the continuing campaign 
against the "right" in the Russian party and the Comintern.
In support of this, Weingartner points to the fact that the 
left positions were formulated before the Muller government 
took office and that it was only after the defeat of the 
right that the foreign policy motive came forward more 
strongly (pp. 24-25). Although the attempt to establish a 
heirachy of motives must remain a doubtful enterprise, 
Weingartner's argument misses the continuity in the Communist 
position on the foreign policy role of the SPD. Beyond that, 
there is a risk of exaggerating the campaign against the 
"right"; certainly, the KPD "right" had no influence whatever 
at the Sixth Congress. Its fate had been decided in the 
course of secret negotiations between the EKKI and the 
German delegation to the Ninth Plenum in February. See 
Weber, op. cit., (fn. 10 above), Vol. I, p. 191.
31 "The international significance of the German elections", 
Izvestia, (18 Sept. 1930), cf. Karlheinz Niclauss, Die 
Sowjetunion und Hitlers Machtergreifung: Eine Studieuber 
die deutsch-russischen Beziehungen der Jahre 1929 bis 1935,
Bonner Historische Forschungen, Vol. 29, Bonn, 1966, p. 77
and see also, Argus, "Hitler rüstet zum Krieg gegen die UdSSR", 
RA, No. 11, (Nov. 1930), pp. 615-621.
214
32 Cf. Karl Radek, "Die Bilanz der Reichstagswahlen", Inprekorr,
No. 81, (26 Sept. 1930)j Weingartner, op. cit., fn. 11 above, 
pp. 46-48.
33 Thälmann, op. cit., (fn. 14 above), p. 21.
34 Karl Radek, "Die Lage in Deutschland und die deutsche 
Sozialfaschismus", RA, No. 1, (Jan. 1931).
35 RF, (24 Aug. 1930).
36 "Noch einmal der spiessbürgerliche Nationalismus der KPD 
Führung", GdS, No. 37, (13 Sept. 1930), pp. 553-554; "Die 
Exekutive und die KPD", GdS, No. 39, (27 Sept. 1930), p. 577.
37 For Stalin's probable intervention in the drafting of the 
programme see, Schüddekopf, Linke Leute von rechts; Die 
nationalrevolutionaren Minderheiten und der Kommunismus in 
der Weimarer Republik, Stuttgart, 1960, p. 289; for Radek's 
possible influence see, Lange, op. cit., (fn. 15 above),
pp. 269-270.
38 See, for example, Ernst Thälmann, "Einige Fehler in unserer 
theoretischen und praktischen Arbeit und der Weg zu ihrer 
Überwindung", Inprekorr, No. 11, (1 Dec. 1931), p. 2565,
"...We find ourselves in that stage of revolutionary upheaval 
in which the direct power struggle of the revolution itself 
is not yet on the agenda, but the preconditions for a 
revolutionary crisis in Germany are maturing at an accelerating 
pace." Cf. Pravda, (24 May 1931), in Inprekorr, No. 50,
(29 May 1931). Here the prospects for revolution are related 
to the war danger theme. The stress is placed on the need 
to transform the coming imperialist war into a revolutionary 
war. In the meantime it was "an important central task for 
all Communist sections" to work for"a breathing space" for 
the Soviet Union in order that the tasks of socialist 
transformation and socialist construction could be completed. ; 
cf. "Die Lage in Deutschland und die Aufgaben der KPD", KI, 
(lead), No. 25/26, (7 July 1931), p. 1150. Here it is noted 
that the party will not be in a position for revolutionary 
struggle until it overcomes its reliance on the unemployed.
39 Thus Thälmann speaking before the Eleventh EKKI Plenum 
observed, "This programme of national and social liberation
of the German Volk, which was not just adopted for the purpose 
of preparing the party for the Reichstag elections, constitutes, 
as before, the axis of our entire policy.", Inprekorr, No. 52, 
(15 June 1931), p. 1209; cf. Weingartner, op. cit., (fn. 11 
above), p. 46.
215
40 See, Niclauss, op. clt., (fn. 31 above), p. 80; Lange,
op. clt., (fn. 15 above), p. 271; Gustav Hiliger and Alfred 
G. Meyer, The Incompatible Allies: A Memoir-History of 
German-Soviet Relations 1918-1941, New York, 1953, p. 252.
41 AA, Büro des Reichsministers, Akten betr. Russland, Vol. 26, 
pp. 561876-561882, "Niederschrift über eine Besprechung mit 
dem russischen Volkskommisar Litvinov, (3. Nov. 1931)"; AA, 
BdR, Akten betr. Russland, Vol. 26, pp. 561917-561921, 
"Besprechung mit dem russischen Volkskommisar Litvinov
(8. Nov. 1931)".
42 See, for example, W. Kaasch, "Die Reichs-Organisation- 
Konferenz der KPD", Inprekorr, No. 33, (30 March 1928),
pp. 619-621; E. Auer, "Die Arbeit der Partei und RGO in der 
reformistischen und anderen reaktionären Gewerkschaften", 1^, 
No. 7, (July 1931), p. 304.
43 See, Weber, op. cit., (fn. 10 above), Vol. I, pp. 280-294; 
Siegfried Bahne, "Die Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands", 
in Erich Matthias and Rudolf Morsey, Das Ende der Parteien, 
1933, Düsseldorf, 1960, pp. 660-661.
44 Weber, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 287.
45 Bahne, op. cit., p. 661; Weber, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 284.
46 Munzenberg, (Tätigkeitsbericht des EKKI), Inprekorr, No. 71, 
(24 July 1928), pp. 1293-1294.
47 HSA DÜss. RDP, 30671, (15 March 1932).
48 See, BA (Koblenz), R 58 390, (24 Dec. 1931); HSA Duss. RDP, 
30671, (21 March 1932) and (7 May 1932).
49 See, Ernst Thälmann, op. cit., (fn. 38 above), p. 2562.
50 KPD Rundschreiben, HSA Duss. RDP, 30671, Pp. Essen, (21 March
1932); see also, KPD Rundschreiben, HSA Duss. RDP, 30642(c), 
Pp. Duisberg-Hamborn, (18 April 1932); BHA (Koblenz),
R 58 390, "Referenten Material zur Diskussion in allen 
Einheiten der Partei: Zur Vorbereitung der UB Parteitage 
und des Bezirks-Parteitages, April 1932".
51 "Beschlüsse der neunzehnten Bezirksparteitagung, Berlin- 
Brandenburg, Dezember 1932", in BHA (Koblenz), R 58 390.
52 For the text of the letter see, "Letter to the Editors of 
Proletarskaya Revolyutsia" in J. Stalin, Problems of Leninism, 
Moscow, 1947, pp. 378-389.
216
53 The Nazis apparently made the decision to "go over to the 
offensive" and to step up their attacks against the SPD
and the KPD early in 1928. See the report of a confidential 
meeting of HJ, SA and SS leaders in Cologne in HSA Duss.
RDP, Pp. Essen, (17 May 1928). Cf. NSSA (Hannover) Des.
122 a. XI, Massnahme zum Schutz der Republik, Vol. 82, 
"Zusammenstossen politische Gegner", (18 Dec. 1930)" and 
BHSA-Abt. II, MA 100 426, Akten betr. Nationalsozialismus 
1932, "ÜbersichtMvlber die in Bayern in der Zeit vom 1. Jan. 
bis 31. Dez. veruten politischen Gewaltaten". These two 
reports indicate that it was the SPD which was the most 
frequent target of Nazi hostility.
54 Although the RFB was outlawed after the May Day riots of 1929, 
it continued to function illegally. The KgdF was founded
in August 1930.
55 See, "Alarm" (Organ of the KgdF), No. 16, (Jan. 1932), HSA 
Duss. PA, Pp. Diiss., (28 Jan. 1932).
56 RFB Rundschreiben, (8 Dec. 1930), HSA DÜss. RD APA, Pp. Duss., 
(5 Jan. 1931).
57 See, the statutes of the KgdF, BHSA-Abt. II MA 100 417,
(24 Oct. 1930).
58 KgdF Rundschreiben, No. 7, (1 April 1931), BHSA-Abt. II MA 
100 417, RMI, (15 April 1931); RFB Rundschreiben, (8 Dec. 
1930), HSA Dvlss. APA, Pp. Duss., (5)(Jan. 1931); RFB. 
Rundschreiben, (8 Dec. 1928), HSA Duss. RDP, 30657(a).
59 KgdF Rundschreiben, No. 14, (5 Dec. 1931), HSA Duss. RD APA, 
Pp. Duss.,
60 KgdF Rundschreiben, No. 14, ibid.; cf. HSA Duss. RDP,
30671, Pp. Essen, (7 May 1932), secret KgdF Rundschreiben 
on low morale and full retreat before a stronger Nazi enemy.
61 Reichsleitung KgdF Rundschreiben, (30 March 1932), HSA DÜss. 
RDP, (April 1932); See also report of a general meeting of 
the KPD functionaries in Essen in March 1932, HSA Duss. RDP, 
30671, Pp. Essen, (21 March 1932), "...the party continues to 
work in the same idiotic way. Everywhere you see groups of 
SA and SS who make themselves conspicuous through their
self confidence and belief in victory. And where is the 
Kampfbund?...the RFB hides in its mouseholes..." (KPD 
speaker).
62 Alarm, No. 16, op. clt., (fn. 55 above).
217
63 Alarm, No. 16, Ibid.
64 See, GdS, No. 19, (Sept. 1932), p. 224; GdS, No. 20, (20 Sept. 
1932), p. 238.
65 GdS, No. 36, (6 Sept. 1930).
66 See, Kurt Klotzbach, Gegen den National Sozialismus:
Widerstand und Verfolgung in Dortmund, 1930-1945, Hannover, 
1969, p. 63.
67 See, Christopher Zimmermann, "Die Arbeiterjugend und Arbeiter­
kinderorganisationen in Dortmund bis 1933", Schriftenreihe
des Archivs der Arbeiterbewegung, Dortmund, No. 2, 1978, p. 50.
68 Heinz Neumann, "Schlagt die Faschisten wo ihr sie trefft!"
KF, (9 Nov. 1929). Brandler in 1923 was apparently the 
original author of the slogan; see Ruth Fischer, Stalin and 
German Communism, Harvard University Press, 1948, p. 287.
69 Ulbricht reminded the readers of Rote Fahne that the slogan 
was to be applied against both "Social" and "National"
Fascists, RF, (28 May 1930); see also, "Schlagt die Sozial­
faschistischen Kinder wo ihr sie trefft!", GdS, No. 46,
(16 Nov. 1929), p. 11 and "Schlagt die Versöhnler wo ihr sie 
trefft!", GdS, No. 41, (12 Oct. 1929).
70 Thälmann, "Die Lage in Deutschland und die Aufgaben der 
Kommunistischen Partei Deutschlands", (XI. Plenum desEKKI), 
Inprekorr, No. 52, (5 June 1931), p. 1208. Thälmann had 
pointed out the need to stress "ideological struggle" earlier 
at the Berlin Parteitag in 1929; see, RF, (27 May 1930).
71 RF, (13 Nov. 1931); see also, "Die KPD gegen den individuellen 
Terror, für den revolutionären Massenkampf!", Inprekorr,
No. 109, (17 Nov. 1931), p. 2474. It was clear, however, that 
spontaneous action continued and was a source of disciplinary 
problems. See, Alarm, No. 16, (fn. 55 above).
72 In response to the inevitable question from a Nazi heckler, 
Ulbricht replied that the KPD Politburo had decided that 
the slogan was "inexpedient for the present intensified 
stage of the struggle", RF, (28 June 1930); cf. GdS, No. 23,
(7 June 1930).
73 See, Max H. Kele, Nazis and Workers:- National Socialist 
Appeals to German Labor, 1919-1933, University of North 
Carolina Press, 1972, pp. 122-126.
218
74 KPD Rundschreiben, "Die Arbeit unter unseren Gegner seit der 
IV. Reichskonferenz", BHA (Koblenz), R 431 2673, R.ko.,
"Bericht an der Nachrichtenstellen der Lander", (22 April 
1927).
75 Kele, op. cit., p. 183.
76 This included a special newspaper "Der Erwerbslose". See,
Kele, ibid., p. 154.
77 HSA Düss. RDP, 30653(d), Pp. Essen, (30 Sept. 1931); BHSA- 
Abt. II, MA 101 238, Pp.M., (12 July 1931); NSSA (Hannover), 
Hann. Des 310 I B2, NSDAP Gau Hannover, Prop. Abtl. an 
Reichsleitung der NSDAP, (15 Feb. 1932) and see also, Hitler’s 
claim that two thirds of the SA were former Communists, BHA 
(Koblenz), R 431 2683, Prvlssische Ministerpräsident- 
Reichskanzler, (4 March 1932).
78 See, for example, KPD Rundschreiben, HSA Duss. RDP, 30642(b), 
Pp. Essen, (4 March 1932).
79 See, Alarm, No. 14, HSA Dilss. RD APA, 17186, Pp. Dviss.,
(5 Dec. 1931) and Alarm, No. 16, op. cit., (fn. 55 above).
80 For example, see NSSA (Hannover) Hann Des 310 NSDAP, Gau 
Hannover, (30 May 1925), "The Ortsgruppe Braunsweig considers 
the founding of a National Socialist trade union of pressing 
importance and requests the national leadership in Munich to 
take the necessary steps immediately". See also, Hans-Gerd 
Schumann, Nationalsozialismus und Gewerkschaftsbewegung:
Die Vernichtung der deutschen Gewerkschaften UND der Aufbau 
der "Deutschen Arbeitsfront", Frankfurt am Main, 1958, 
pp. 34-35; Kele, op. cit., (fn. 73 above), pp. 148-151.
81 Schumann, ibid., p. 167.
82 See, BHSA-Abt. II, MA 101 239, Pd.M., (20 Oct. 1932); 
according to this report the NSBO had 200,000 members and 
9,000 cells in October 1932; cf. Kele, op. cit., (fn. 73 
above), p. 170. By comparison the RGO and the "red unions" 
together numbered approximately 255,000 in January 1933; 
allowance must, however, be made for the fact that most of 
the members of the so-called "red unions" were also members
of the RGO. If these are subtracted, then the total Communist 
trade union representation was approximately 160,000; see, 
Bahne, op. cit., (fn. 43 above), pp. 664-665. On the other 
hand, a large percentage of the NSBO membership was in the 
Angestellte and Handwerker categories; see Schumann, op. cit., 
p. 39.
219
83 For the Communist recognition of this kind of direct competition 
with the Nazis see, Walter Ulbricht, "Der revolutionäre 
Aufschwung und die Taktik der Einheitsfront", I_, No. 10,
(oct. 1931), pp. 436-437.
84 See, for example, KPD Rundschreiben, Bl. Ruhrgebiet, (April
1931) , HSA DÜss. RDP, 30657(e); KPD Rundschreiben, HSA Duss. 
RDP, 30642(b), (12 Aug. 1931); KPD Rundschreiben,
"Arbeitsplan für November 1930", HSA Düss. RDP, 30657(d).
85 KPD Rundschreiben, (11 May 1932), BHA (Koblenz), R 58 485; 
see also, KPD Rundschreiben, (6 March 1931), BHA (Koblenz),
R 58 390; KPD Rundschreiben, Bl. Rg. Abt. Org., Essen,
(26 Nov. 1931), HSA Duss., RDP, 30657(f).
86 KPD Rundschreiben, "Arbeitsplan für Februar 1931", HSA Duss.
RDP, 30657(d); cf. KJVD Rundschreiben, Agitprop, (22 Dec.
1932) , BHA (Koblenz), R 58 672, "Much more attention must be 
paid to the popularization of the manifesto against Versailles. 
Such questions as Danzig, Upper Silesia, East Prussia, Tirol, 
Alsace Lorraine and Saarbrücken are the starting points for 
the mobilization of the young workers in the struggle against 
the imperialist subjugation of the nation."
87 See, for example, KPD Rundschreiben, Essen, (4 Nov. 1930),
HSA Düss. RDP, 30642(b); cf. RF, (20 Dec. 1929).
88 See, for example Maria Reese, Verhandlungen des Reichstags, 
Stenographische Berichte, V. Wahlperiod, 1930, Vol. 444,
p. 157; in this speech Reese accused the Nazis of insincerity 
in their anti-Semitism. According to Reese, Hitler "had 
breakfast with the rich Jews" and only disliked poor 
Bolshevik Jews.
89 One directive was accompanied by a pamphlet which listed 
the "friends of Hitler", among these were "the Jewish Jacob 
Michael interest and Middendorf of the Jewish Rothchild 
Bank trust", BHA (Koblenz), R 58 626, (8 . Dec. 1930).
90 "Heini's Reich", Rotgardist (organ of the RFB), (Aug. 1932),
HSA DÜss. RDP, 30671. This is a particularly grim little 
anti-Semitic piece which alleged that a Jewish factory owner 
had organized a Fascist group among his workers. Cf. KPD 
Rundschreiben, Rg. Agitprop, HSA Duss. RDP, 30657(e), "For 
the unlucky ones who have been persuaded by Nazi demogogy 
there remains the last glimmer of hope, the Jew. These 
parasites, these blood suckers, they will surely be expropriated 
by the Nazis. We cannot allow the duped even this".
220
91 HSA DÜss. RDP, Pp. Essen, (1 Aug. 1930).
92 O.P. (Oscar Plenge?), "Wird Frick Jude?", RF, (8 July 1930); 
cf. this verse from Rote Fahne, "Die Jobber, Juden und 
Jungdogesellen —  Verhandlen mit Junker und Industriellen",
RF, (27 Aug. 1930). See also, "Nazis als Helfer des 
Jüdischen Kapitals", RF, (26 April 1932); "Nazis für 
jüdisches Kapitals", RF, (7 Sept. 1932); "Nazis betteln beim 
jüdischen Kapital", RF, (7 Jan. 1933); "Die jüdische 
Bourgeoisie verbrüdert sich mit Hitler", Rote Stern, No. 10,
(19 May 1933).
93 See, GdS, No. 3, (31 Jan. 1931) for a criticism of the KPD's 
use of Nazi slogans. See also, the KPD's use of the Nazi 
slogan "Brot und Freiheit", in RA, No. 9, (Sept. 1930),
p. 519.
94 BHA (Koblenz), R 58 626, Pp. Bochum, (8 Dec. 1930). For a 
similar appeal, see Heinz Neumann's speech before a Nazi 
assembly in October 1930, GdS, No. 45, (8 Nov. 1930).
According to this report, Neumann greeted his Nazi audiences 
as "Young Socialists" with whom the Communists wished to 
avoid "fraternal struggle". For a different version of the 
meeting, which does not mention these highlights see, RF,
(29 Oct. 1930); Neumann appeared at several large Nazi 
assemblies where he delivered the same message; see, "Verbrüder­
ung zwishcen KPD und Nazis", SDPK, No. 12, (Dec. 1931), p. 751.
95 The Communist press followed with great interest the evidence 
for factional struggle within the NSDAP. The argument of 
numerous articles was always the same. Defections were 
interpreted as resulting from the growing contradiction 
between the Nazi leaders and their misled lower class 
following. See articles on this theme in Rote Fahne from
29 June, 1930, and 4, 6 , 13 and 18 July, 1930. See also 
articles by Hans Jaeger, in Der Rote Aufbau, "Die 
Richtungskämpfe innerhalb der NSDAP", RA, No. 3, (March
1931), pp. 132-137; "Hitler-Stennes", RA, No. 6 , (May 1931), 
pp. 303-306; "Hitler-Goebbels-Strasser-Stennes-Ehrhardt",
RA, No. 19, (15 Nov. 1931). Kele is misleading when he 
suggests that the Nazi defections went largely unnoticed by 
the Communists. See, Kele, op. cit., (fn. 73 above), p. 160.
96 See, Schüddekopf, op. cit., (fn. 37 above), p. 287 ff.
97 See. "Die Offensive", BHA (Koblenz), R 58 626, (8 April 1931) 
and "Rote Angriff", BHA (Koblenz), R 58 486, (31 Aug. 1932).
These are agitational papers meant for distribution among 
the Nazi workers and functionaries.
221
98 See, KPD Rundschreiben, Berlin, HSA Duss. RDP, 30657(g),
Pp. Essen, (4 March 1932).
99 See, KPD Rundschreiben, HSA Duss. RDP, 30642(b), Pp. Bochum,
(7 Nov. 1930). See also, "Der Kampf gegen den National­
faschismus in Deutschland", (lead), KI, No. 29/30, (13 Aug. 
1930), p. 1597.
100 BHSA Abt. II, MA 101 237, Pd. NF., (18 Dec. 1930); BHSA
Abt. II, MA 101 239, Pp. M., (20 Oct. 1932). Cf. Schüddekopf, 
op. cit., (fn. 37 above) for a discussion of the sympathetic 
attitudes in the Nazi opposition towards the KgdF. See also, 
a letter from Stennes to Papen which alludes to contacts 
between the Stennes opposition and "leaders of the so-called 
left camp"; Stennes to Reichskanzler, (16 Sept. 1932),
BHA (Koblenz), R 431 2684.
101 See, K. Paetel (Gruppe Sozialrevolution'arer Nationalisten - 
GSRN), "Volkskampf gegen Faschismus", RA, No. 2, (Feb. 1931), 
pp. 81-83, "the Gruppe Sozialrevolutionarer Nationalisten 
has made it their obligation to collaborate in the RGO and
in the Kampfbund gegen den Faschismus and to work closely 
with the KPD...".
102 See, BHSA-Abt.II, MA 101 239, Pd. NF., (31 Oct. 1932), where 
this claim is made. The report includes a copy of the 
"Sturmbanner...".
103 BHA (Koblenz), R 58 626, "Bericht über die Sitzung der . 
Nazibearbeiter in Bereich des UB 5", (18 Jan. 1933).
104 BHSA-Abt. II, MA 101 239, Pd. N., (31 May 1932).
105 NSSA (Hannover), Hann Des 310 I c4, Gau Sud Hannover 
Braunschweig, (8 May 1934). This is a Nazi report concerning 
Communist attempts to organize an anti-Fascist demonstration, 
"We have observed that SA people are sympathetic to those 
preparations and express themselves in the KPD sense. As
we have already noted in previous reports there are many 
Communists in the SA...". Cf: IGKP, No. 34, (29 July 1933);
No. 35, (7 Aug. 1933).
106 BHSA-Abt. II, MA 102 153, Halbsmonatsberichte der 
Regierungspräsident, 1931, (1. Jan.-31. Mai); Reports No. 375 
No. 431 and No. 501 have information on the "Stegemann 
affair".
107 See, HSA Duss. RDP, 30656(g), Rp. Duss., (July 1932);
HSA Duss. RDP, 30642(b), Pp. Essen, (30 Oct. 1931); HSA 
Duss. RDP, 30642(b), Pp. Duisberg, (16 June 1931).
222
108 Besides the error of "overestimating" the importance of 
the struggle against National Socialism, a new error of 
"underestimation" was introduced at the end of 1931. At 
that time, the party called for an intensification of the 
"ideological struggle" against the Nazis and this call was 
to be repeated in the Communist press until Hitler came to 
power. This was not, however, to be at the expense of the 
party's efforts against the SPD which continued to be seen 
as central. See, Ernst Thälmann, "Einige Fehler in unserer 
theoretischen und praktischen Arbeit und der Weg zu ihrer 
Überwindung", Inprekorr, No. 113, (1 Dec. 1931), p. 2564.
For the call for a "two front struggle" see, Thälmann, ibid., 
p. 2564.
109
223
CHAPTER V
COMMUNIST TACTICS, 1928-1932:
THE RESPONSE TO NEW OPPORTUNITIES
Optimism and pessimism competed strongly in the Communist 
response to the Nazi advai'cc. Certainly it was pessimism which 
dominated among the rank and file. Although the changed balance of 
political power had forced modifications in the party’s position, 
at least to the extent that the anti-Fascist tactics which were 
already in place were given more emphasis, the mood was still one 
of despondent "passivity". The breaches of discipline and the high 
turn-over rates showed only too clearly that the anti-Nazi effort 
was inadequate in the eyes of many Communists. Against this 
pessimism, however, had to be set the continuing optimism of the 
leadership's forecasts. The Nazis would disintegrate. The radical 
attitudes of Nazi supporters would eventually rebound to the benefit 
of the KPD. A resurgent Fascism was a symptom of capitalist 
weakness and decay —  and in the background another side of optimism; 
the increasing mood of outraged nationalism would exacerbate Germany's 
relations with the West and so help to keep the door open for the 
Ostorientierung. There was a contradiction here, or perhaps 
something worse. "Contradiction" too much suggested a necessary 
choice which once taken would lead the party out of all its
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difficulties. No such choice existed, at least not for the KPD. 
Stalin alone could act to bring the party's priorities into some 
more meaningful relationship with the tactical requirements of its 
survival. In the meantime, a lack of urgency characterized the 
response to the Nazis.
The lack of urgency was a result of a confusion of purpose which 
extended in other directions. It was not just that the defensive 
reaction was less than the situation demanded; it was also 
inconsistent. In the end there could be no effective separation 
of purposes and tactics. The primacy of the battle with Social 
Democracy necessarily impinged upon all aspects of the KPD's tactics 
and threatened to make a nonsense of the suggestion that the 
Communists were fighting a war on two fronts. Since the KPD lacked 
the resources for effective struggle against even one of its major 
rivals, it was understandable that it would be tempted to seek 
accommodations with one or the other of them. If Social Democracy 
was to be the main enemy, then it followed that accommodations would 
have to be found with the Nazis. "Accommodation" might involve 
nothing more than the attempt to avoid or limit competition and this 
was always an important part of the Communist approach to the Nazis. 
It might, however, also involve more active arrangements of 
collaboration or, in Communist language, "united front from above". 
The Communists had experimented with the united front from above 
approach to National Socialism in 1923 and they did so again after 
1928. The difference was that after 1928 the extent of the
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collaboration was greater and the consequences were more serious.
In 1923 the Communists had been lucky. As it turned out they could 
allow themselves their experiments. Fascism as a mass movement had 
been short lived and it quickly melted away (with little or no help 
from the confused and tentative anti-Fascist efforts of the KPD).
Now the Nazi gains were more menacing and more strongly based and 
collaboration was correspondingly a more serious and ill-advised 
matter.
Collaboration, of course, can mean many things. In some of its 
senses it was a factor which was consistently present in the history 
of the relationship between the two parties. There was the shared 
hostility to republican and democratic values and the coincidence in 
outlook on important foreign policy questions; these factors 
exerted their impact on the parliamentary life of the Republic.
More generally, there was the continuing contribution which so much 
of Communist and Nazi activity made towards undermining the German 
public’s confidence in the existing order. All this added up to 
what a Communist would call "objective" collaboration; but what also 
needs to be examined is "collaboration" understood in a more prosaic 
sense of getting together to advance a common enterprise or to plan 
mischief against others.
The structural weaknesses of the KPD exacerbated the problems 
which were posed by the Nazis but the same weaknesses increased the 
opportunities for collaboration. The importance of the unemployed, 
for both parties necessarily brought them together in recruitment
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competition but there was still room for co-operation. There were 
reports of Communists and Nazis achieving a "community of interest" 
in the construction of committees of the unemployed and in such 
other matters as the drafting of grievance petitions.'*' This kind of 
activity was in itself not very remarkable, except when it is 
remembered that large barriers stood in the way, even of such 
innocent enterprises, when it was a question of co-operation with 
the SPD or with the Socialist and Communist splinter groups. In 
fact, many examples of united front from above work with the Nazis 
would have been entirely overlooked if it had not been for the 
indignation which they inspired among the KPD's working class rivals.
The factories provided a more important setting for this kind
of co-operation. The minority and oppositionist status of the RGO
organizations drew the Communists into close contact with other
minority groups including the Nazis. Once more there was an element
of competition in the situation as the Communists fought for the
allegiance of disgruntled and radical members within the main line
working class institutions. Just because of their minority status,
however, the opposition groups were tempted to seek accommodations
with one another. This sometimes had an impact on the elections to
factory councils. Communists, for example, occasionally voted with
the NSBO, company union and Stahlhelm delegates against the lists
2of the trade unions.
Strike action also provided examples of collaboration. It did 
so when it was organized in an "united front from above" sense which
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involved the Nazi and Communist factory organizations in close 
co-operation. In fact, the spectacle of Communists and Nazis jointly 
planning and leading strikes, in opposition to the trade union 
leadership, provided a rare glimpse of what united front from above 
could be supposed in practice to mean. Until 1930, the poor 
representation of both sides in the factories limited the opportunity 
for co-operation of this kind. After 1930, the deteriorating 
economic situation and the succession of deflationary emergency 
decrees of the Brüning and Papen governments worked to the advantage 
of the Communists. The KPD had a powerful weapon to use against the 
trade unions in its attempt to rally the workers behind the RGO.
The Communists could hope to make political capital out of the SPD’s 
"lesser evil" approach to Brüning and Papen, since they could reasonably 
claim that this policy meant that the SPD shared the responsibility 
for the austerity measures. In the atmosphere of crisis the Communists 
were in a strong position to circumvent the official trade union 
channels. Assemblies of workers called by the RGO, in defiance both 
of management and the unions, sometimes resulted in the necessary 
support for unofficial strikes. An important limitation on the RGO’s 
ability to pursue such a course was its chronic shortage of manpower 
and especially of active picketers. This problem made co-operation 
with the NSBO attractive since the Nazis could call upon the SA to 
provide especially active and effective picketers.
Beginning in 1930, an increasingly militant Nazi attitude to
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industrial unrest expanded the opportunity for co-operation with
the Communists. The militancy was apparent in the Nazi press. In
June 1930, for example, the National Sozialist attacked Bruning's
deflationary policies as a "social reactionary offensive" and
promised that National Socialism would oppose wage reductions, "with
3all legal means and if necessary with a general strike". The press 
campaign was matched by a growing involvement in strike action. 
Between March 1931 and March 1932 the NSBO supported four major 
strikes and by the end of 1932 they were involved in no less than 
twenty-six strikes. In order to make NSBO participation more
4effective the Nazis also established a national strike fund. 
Participation sometimes involved following the lead of the majority 
trade unions. In other cases, however, where the NSBO representation 
was particularly strong, the NSBO took more initiative in organizing 
strikes. The Nazis were especially strong in sections of the mining
5and metal working industries and among the Berlin transport workers. 
There were cases of co-operation between Communists and Nazis 
in all three of these sectors and also on the fringes of industry, 
in small factories, where both the RGO and the NSBO were relatively 
better represented.^
In the mining industry the NSBO and the RGO established at least 
one joint strike committee.^ In the Berlin Metal Workers’ strike 
in the autumn of 1930, the NSBO supported the minority RGO's call for 
a strike which was in defiance of the majority trade union decision. 
NSBO and SA men (the latter in full uniform) then joined their
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Communist colleagues on the picket lines. This example of joint 
strike activity took place against a background of occasional 
co-operation in the metal working industry. Vorwärts complained of 
the willingness of the RGO and the "red trade union" (the Einheits-
Qverband der Metallarbeiter - EVMB) to "do business with the Nazis".
Evidence from the EVMB’s own resolutions and circulars supported
the allegations. In the first place the RGI resolutions which
founded the EVMB specifically mentioned that the organization was
open to all workers including Nazis and members of the NSBO.^ It
was also EVMB policy to resist the firing of Nazi workers,
"The KPD does not support the dismissal of 
Nazis because through clarification and education 
Nazi workers can be won over for the revolutionary 
front."11
As for the Nazi attitude, the EVMB material makes clear that the
NSBO was prepared at times to accept the leadership of the Communists
against the majority unions and it demonstrated that willingness by
12voting for the Communist lists in factory elections. Given such 
a history of tactical accommodation, it is not surprising that the 
Communists and Nazis sometimes took the more adventurous course of 
open co-operation in strikes, both in the metal working industry and 
elsewhere. The best known and most important example of co-operation 
took place on the eve of the November 1932 Reichstag elections.
Acting together the RGO and the NSBO managed to bring the Berlin
transport system to a standstill for five days, from the third to the
13eighth of November. This strike offered both parties a unique
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opportunity to play leading roles. Both the NSBO and the RGO were 
especially well represented among the transport workers. Moreover, 
the attitude of these workers was militant and at odds with the 
trade union leadership.
The deepening crisis of unemployment had affected Berlin 
particularly badly. One of the consequences of this was that the 
transport system (Berliner Verkehrs-Gesellschaft - BVG) was under­
utilized and seriously in deficit. To relieve the pressure the BVG 
management announced a wage reduction for all workers for the month 
of November. The BVG Betriebsrat. which had an RGO majority, 
rejected these proposals and threatened to strike. On the first and 
second of November the RGO, with the support of NSBO representatives, 
called assemblies of the workers to vote on strike action. The votes 
produced a clear majority in favour of a strike but not the 
necessary three-quarters majority required by union statute.
Following the votes the trade union leadership announced that, in 
the absence of the required majority, there would be no strike. At 
the same time, the Betriebsrat convened a meeting and an RGO-NSBO 
majority proclaimed a strike in defiance of the union. Faced with 
illegal industrial action, the BVG authorities tried to bring in an 
emergency work force. It was in this context of the BVG’s strike­
breaking decision that the most interesting questions of Communist- 
Nazi collaboration arose.
A strike committee was formed which was dominated by the RGO 
14and the NSBO. A combined committee, of course, suggested a
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particularly close collaboration. Police reports of local meetings 
of strikes left the impression of a spirit of co-operation which 
extended from the central committee to the picket lines.^ Picketing 
relied heavily on the SA and there were suggestions at the time 
that the Communists could not have launched the strike at all without 
the support provided by the SA."^ The Communist reports on the 
strike supported the impression of an intimate co-operation. Walter 
Ulbricht offered the fullest account from the Communist side and 
his version of events pointed to a close co-ordination between the 
central strike leadership and the various local strike committees.^ 
Directives and information sheets were prepared twice daily to form 
the basis of discussion and planning in the local meetings. Since 
Ulbricht stressed that the directives followed from the unanimous 
decisions of the combined strike leadership, it is safe to conclude 
that there was a high degree of co-operation between the two parties 
at all levels.
Co-operation was directed in the first place simply at the 
problems of sustaining morale and providing pickets; but that was 
not all. Another purpose was to resist the deployment of the BVG’s 
scab emergency force. According to Ulbricht, this involved violence 
and he catalogued a wide variety of violent acts,
"...strike breaking cars were overturned, pelted 
with stones, rails were ripped up, trees felled, 
obstacles placed on the rails, switches and lines 
made unusable..."18
He went on to discuss in detail how such things were organized.
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Each member of the central strike leadership (hence also the Nazi
representatives) was made responsible for a group of tram stations
and co-ordinated the activities of local committees with the
19directives of the leadership. As well as claiming that there was 
agreement at the top, the report stressed the viscious nature of 
the opposition to the strike and the co-operation "in word and deed 
of NSDAP workers and functionaries". The only reasonable inference 
is that the strike involved the two parties in a co-ordinated and 
violent attack on the BVG and its strike breakers. It may well have 
been true, as Ulbricht pointed out, that the RGO rejected a Nazi 
plan to attack installations with explosives, but even without 
explosives the strike was sufficiently violent. The KPD and the 20Nazis together accounted for over one hundred indictable offenses.
Besides providing insight into the details of the conduct of
the strike, Ulbricht's account offered a good overall summary of
the' KPD's tactical priorities with respect to strike action and with
respect to the question of co-operation with the Nazis. The strike
was seen as providing the best available example of the party's
united front tactics. Indeed, it was presented both to the KPD and
to the Comintern as a model for future Communist involvement in 
21strike action. Beyond this, the familiar warnings about the need 
to concentrate on winning more support within the trade unions were 
repeated as was the summons to assign the first importance to breaking 
the SPD and ADGB hold on the workers. The main reason for the 
ultimate collapse of the strike was attributed to the Social
233
Democratic and trade union "bureaucracy". The Communist reports 
pointed to the fact that some Social Democrats had broken ranks 
and joined the strike and this was used as evidence for the success 
of the party's united front tactics.
The same line was adopted with respect to the Nazis. A clear 
distinction was drawn between the NSDAP-NSBO leadership and the 
simple Nazi workers and functionaries who had followed the Communist 
lead. In the case of the BVG strike, however, this claim did not 
bear examination. There was no breach of party discipline on the 
Nazi side and no justification for regarding the Nazi decision to 
participate in the strike as a purely local one. The NSDAP 
leadership was involved at least to the extent of approving the 
action. On the third of November Munich announced the decision of 
the Gauleitung Gross Berlin to participate in the strike and pledged 
the support of the whole party,
"We National Socialists recognize the demand of 
the BVG workers. We will not tolerate a state 
of affairs where under the Papen government the 
living standards of the German worker are forced 
down below the level of a Chinese coolie. We 
are therefore not only with the justified BVG 
strike but we stand fighting and leading at the 
front. Attention! No National Socialist will 
undertake strike breaking work."22
This did not mean that there was complete certainty on the Nazi 
side. The party's efforts to gain the backing of industry and to 
expand its base of support among middle class voters had resulted In 
a marked ambivalence to strikes. In fact the whole question of the 
NSDAP's attitude to industrial questions put a great deal of strain
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on Nazi programmatical and tactical eclecticism. An earlier decision
of National Socialists in Saxony (most notably Otto Strasser) to
back a strike of metal workers in Dresden had been acutely
embarrassing for Hitler. Under pressure from Saxon industrialists,
Hitler had been forced to intervene personally with a signed
resolution of the party leaders which dissociated the party from 
23the strike. This action was an important factor in Otto
. 24Strasser's decision to leave the NSDAP.
Notwithstanding these difficulties Hitler was ready, two years
later, to condone the party's participation in a major strike; nor
is it necessary to search very far for an explanation. Support
from the workers and the unemployed was especially important for
the NSDAP in Berlin. It was therefore important to respond to the
grievances of these groups or risk the collapse of the party's
organization in the capital. That risk was perhaps unacceptable on
25the eve of a general election. As for the effect of the decision
on the party's connections with industry and on its middle class
supporters, it is likely that by 1932 Hitler was sure enough of their
allegiance that he could expect them to accept the decision as a
necessary tactical concession with little bearing on the overall
26Nazi view of industrial relations.
That the decision was nonetheless productive of controversy 
among the Nazi leaders, there can be no doubt. Concern was 
expressed among those who favoured the strike that there were some
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at the centre in Munich who were working against it. It is also
likely that the continuing ambivalence on industrial questions did
cost the party votes among its middle class supporters. Yet, in a
sense, the election vindicated the decision to join the strike,
since in Berlin the NSDAP suffered only half of the loss in its
28share of the vote that it experienced overall.
Despite the doubts the NSDAP did stand by its decision. In
fact, in the last two days of the strike the Nazis showed a greater
determination to continue and even to expand it than did the
Communists. In his report Ulbricht claimed that behind the scenes
the Nazis worked as hard as the Social Democrats to sabotage the
strike. All the evidence, however, including that supplied by
Ulbricht is against such an interpretation. As Ulbricht pointed out,
the Communist members of the committee tried to bring about "a
united and disciplined end to the strike" on the seventh of 
29November. The NSBO members rejected this and for the first time 
the committee split. There were earlier indications that it was the 
Communists and not the Nazis who were the first to lose interest.
On the fifth, the committee issued an appeal for support to the 
workers of Berlin. It was the NSBO which responded most whole­
heartedly to this. Under NSBO prodding the dustment joined on the 
fifth. Also on the seventh, NSBO gas,, water and electricity workers 
tried to organize a sympathy strike. To their surprise the NSBO 
factions in these industries received no support from their RGO
i i  30colleagues.
27
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The Communist explanation for the lack of support was weak and
completely at variance with an interpretation of the KPD's role
which in all other aspects stressed the militancy of the Communist
strikers. Ulbricht argued that the concessions on questions of pay
and working hours which were offered by the utility companies were
sufficient from the party's point of view; and were all the more
acceptable since they had been won as a consequence of management's
31fear of the strike. For this reason the RGO did not support an
expansion of the strike. Why, it must be asked, issue an appeal for
support while at the same time adopting a conciliatory stance?
The answer had to be that at some time between the fifth and the
seventh the KPD had decided to break off the strike.
There were several factors which likely contributed to this
decision. There was the suggestion that the strike was having a
32deleterious effect on party discipline and morale. Then there was 
the question of the drain on the KPD's strike fund at a time when 
the party also had to bear the expenses of an election campaign. 
These somewhat technical considerations aside, there was probably a 
more fundamental reason. Quite simply, the strike had become too 
dangerous. The Communists had sown the wind but were not prepared 
to reap the whirlwind of a first class confrontation with the Papen 
government. There can be little doubt.that a confrontation was in 
the offing. There were emergency discussions between Reicliswehr- 
minister, von Schleicher, Papen and General von Fritsch, the
commander of the Berlin garrison. All the indications were that the
237
government was considering martial law for Berlin. The Communists
knew of these developments. Ulbricht dropped a hint to that effect;
he mentioned the need for the party to strengthen its hold on the
factories in preparation to resist, "the threatening, unforeseen,
33illegal measures of the Papen dictatorship".
The strike was certainly not designed to provoke a crisis. At
the end of 1932 the KPD was as far from ready for "revolutionary"
action as at any time since 1923. Ulbricht conceded as much in the
section of his report which dealt with the weaknesses and shortcomings
of the strike action. These had to do with familiar task of making
greater efforts to demonstrate Communist strength in vital
communications and armaments related industries while at the same
time weakening the SPD's presence there. Other of the Communist
post-mortems on the BVG strike made it equally clear that it had been
planned for limited purposes which had to do with the defense of the
34Soviet Union theme and not with revolution.
The extensive co-operation between the Communists and the 
Nazis was an important part of the BVG strike but it did not, in 
itself, point to any fundamental shift in the Communist approach to 
the Nazis. In the first place, the strike was only the most 
important example in an already well developed trend. As in other 
cases of co-operation in the factories, it could be interpreted, on 
both sides, as a simple tactic of convenience which revealed nothing 
more of any larger purposes. The tactic of convenience had become 
available as a result of a coincidence of several factors. First
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among these, was the KPD's weakness in the factories. Its minority 
status outside the main line unions led it to look for support where 
it could be found. Beyond this consideration, co-operation with the 
Nazis could be made to seem consistent with the party's united front 
policy; although it still had to stand out as a somewhat eccentric 
application of that policy.
There were, however, other cases of co-operation which, although 
certainly equally opportunistic, did not at the same time fit the 
united front framework as it could be reasonably understood. There 
is evidence that at times Communists and Nazis worked together to 
terrorize the members of third parties and to disrupt their 
activities. In view of the covert nature of this aspect of the 
relations between the two parties all the details cannot be uncovered. 
Nonetheless, there is enough evidence of various kinds so that it 
can be reconstructed in its main outlines.
To begin with, there are a large number of allegations of 
co-operation between the Communists and Nazis in the contemporary 
memoir literature. Such evidence cannot, of course, stand on its own, 
but it is nonetheless interesting that the suggestions of co-operation 
were so numerous and that they originated from a variety of sources. 
Moreover, it is possible to check some of the claims against other 
sources — • documentary evidence, press reports and the memories of 
some of the likely participants in any co-operation.
The memoir literature contains numerous but nearly always 
obscure references to co-operation. In 1929, Goebbels, for example,
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stated publicly that Nazis would "not shrink from joining forces
35with Marxism at times". Again, sometime after 1933 he is reported 
to have said,
"There was once a time, before coming to 
power, when we co-operated with the Communists.
And I must say...in several ways we were working 
for the same things."36
Similar suggestions of an unspecified collaboration were also frequently
made by outsiders. Von Papen referred to collaboration between the
37Nazis and Communists as did Dr. Otto Meissner. Sometimes the
allegations point to substantial evidence. One letter to the
industrialist Arnold Rechberg offered documents, which supposedly
came from a former Soviet secret agent, in support of a claim that
there were extensive contacts between Soviet agents and right wing
38groups including the Nazis. The allegations also found their way
into the press. An article in the Berlin paper, Kreuz Zeitung from
November 1932 claimed that "the Hitler movement is in reality tied by
39an invisible thread to the International". Articles appeared from
4time to time in the Social Democratic press which made similar charges.
From the Communist side, too, vague suggestions were occasionally
heard. In an interview with the Danish newspaper, Ekstrabladet in
November 1932, a Communist member of the Prussian Landtag was
reported to have referred to "occasional co-operation between
Communists and National Socialists" and to have said that,
"Communists and National Socialists have certain 
common interests which they attend to when 
circumstances permit, although they usually 
oppose one another like fire and water."41
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Margarete Buber-Neumann was more specific,
"When ordered to do so by the leadership, the 
simple rank and file SA and RFB would turn 
from fighting one another to co-operation."42
The most detailed account from the Communist side was provided
43by Jan Valtin in his autobiography, Out of the Night. Valtin
(Krebs) maintained that as a Comintern agent he participated,
"during 1931 alone...in dozens of terroristic enterprises in concert
44with Nazi elements." According to his account, these operations 
followed as a result of direct instructions from Soviet and 
Comintern leaders. The instructions came in mid-January 1931 in a 
memorandum from Georgi Dimitrov to the KPD leaders. The memorandum 
supposedly called for,
"united action of the Communist party and the 
Hitler movement to accelerate the disintegration 
of the crumbling democratic bloc which governs 
Germany".45
Valtin provided considerable detail concerning the nature of these
"enterprises". He claimed that together with an SA organizer by
the name of Walter Tidow he arranged the disruption of a transport
workers union conference held in Bremen in the spring of 1931. In
this case he approached Tidow with the request that the Nazis join
with the Communists to disrupt the conference. They agreed, "as
they always did in such cases" and together they produced a plan of 
46action. This took the form of packing the meetings with Communists 
and Nazis who then co-operated to intimidate and shout down the 
speakers and to start fights and disturbances. In another incident
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the Nazis took the initiative and again Valtin and Tidow supposedly
47reached an agreement to disrupt a meeting.
It is not necessary to accept everything in Valtin's story to
notice that the details are remarkably consistent with other accounts.^
In the KPD papers Gegen den Strom and Arbeiterpolltik there were
frequent complaints that the RFB used strong arm tactics to break up 
49KPO meetings. Some of the reports notice the presence of SA men 
in plain clothes who worked closely with the RFB. The details of the 
disruptive tactics are identical to those which Valtin describes.
Motives were suggested which fitted the circumstances well. Attacks 
on the Communist opposition and on the Social Democrats were 
understandably not popular activities among many Communists.^ 
Co-operation with the SA offered one means of fleshing out over­
extended RFB attack groups with willing participants.
To some extent the KPO accounts can be checked against the 
documentary record. For one thing, the general style of the reported 
operations fits what is otherwise known about the activities of the 
SA. Police reports mention that SA men dressed in plain clothes in 
order more easily to penetrate and disrupt the meetings of opponents. 
Some of the details also conform well with other sources. The press 
reports, for example, notice that the Communists and Nazis respected 
one another's campaign materials. At times, they also appeared to 
co-operate to defend one another's placards and posters and to destroy 
those of mutual opponents. The same reports claimed that agreements 
had been concluded on these matters between the Communists and local
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Nazi functionaries.
Nazi records confirm the existence of such agreements. One
internal memorandum of the Hannover party organization makes a
casual reference to the "informal understandings" with the Communists53to respect one another's campaign posters and placards. It is 
not difficult to believe that the same understandings could have 
included arrangements to destroy the placards of mutual enemies. 
Indeed, the same Nazi document alludes to a more extensive 
co-operation with the Communists. The memorandum is a reply to formal 
complaints from an SA leader concerning the conduct of a minor party 
official, Jahns, who was an Ortsgruppenleiter - OGL in Salzgitter. 
Although the original report which outlined the specific complaints 
against Jahns no longer exists, it is reasonable to infer from the 
surviving memorandum that some of the charges had to do with the 
Salzgitter group's relations with the C o m m u n i s t s . I n  the memorandum 
one of the charges against Jahns was considered, "possible if one 
considers that an informal agreement exists between the NSDAP and 
the KPD..." (that is, with respect to the matter of placards and 
posters). Moreover, in light of the activities of Jahns, the 
memorandum went on to cast doubt on the sincerity of the Salzgitter 
group's anti-Communist activities.
Besides supporting the contention that there was co-operation 
of some kind, this document suggests that, on the Nazi side, local 
leaders had a strong influence on the form which the collaboration 
took. On the other hand, it would appear that such local initiatives
52
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were both widely known and tolerated at higher levels. Something 
more of the Nazi attitude to collaboration with the Communists can 
be inferred from this document. While an important accommodation 
with the Communists was treated with off-handed cynicism, in the 
same report, a minor overture to a right wing group was presented in 
a much more serious light. Among the other charges brought against 
Jahns, he was accused of extending a written invitation to the local 
Stahlhelm to participate in a Nazi sponsored "Deutschabend". This 
gesture was evidently a cause for considerable concern among the 
more senior party organizers. Anyway, the invitation was blocked 
through the intervention of higher authority and the whole affair was 
held to be sufficiently serious as to give rise to "skepticism" 
concerning Jahns's loyalty to National Socialism.
The impression which is left by this report is that the Nazis
continued to regard other parties as far more important obstacles
to their ambitions than was the KPD.^^ Thus as far as the Nazis
were concerned, it was not necessary to search very far for the
motives which led them to seek accommodations with the Communists.
What shines through the Nazi tactical approach to the KPD is a
characteristic opportunism and cynicism. For what it was worth to
then^the Nazis were interested in encouraging the KPD's hostility
to the Social Democrats and other left wing parties. That much was
clear from the Nazi press. There would be time enough to deal
with the Communists after the more important questions on the road
58to power were out of the way.
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Interviews with former members of the SA and the HJ suggested
59that such attitudes were widespread among the Nazi rank and file. 
Although all those who were interviewed in connection with this 
study confessed that they had disliked or had had contempt for the 
Communists, only one thought that the KPD had been the most serious 
of National Socialism's rivals and only one of the former SA 
thought that it was an important part of the SA's function to protect 
Nazi meetings from the Communists —  in the words of one of those who 
was interviewed, "that was what we always said but it really wasn't 
true, we had them on the defensive". On the question of 
collaboration with the Communists, one man remembered attending an 
SPD meeting in plain clothes and there had been some fighting during 
the main address but to his knowledge there had been no co-operation 
between his SA troop and the Communists. Another said that he had 
heard rumours of such things and that he would not have been 
surprised if they were true. No one dismissed the suggestion of 
co-operation out of hand.
Further questioning on the possible motives for any collaboration 
yielded uncertain and sometimes naive responses. All, including 
Strasser, understood that whatever real desire there was for 
co-operation had to be confined to the Communists and resulted 
from a kind of reluctant recognition of Nazi superiority. As 
Strasser put it,
"After the Russians— the Communists with all 
their different revolts got nowhere, and were 
more or less forgotten by Moscow. You know,
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they thought Russia would come into Germany 
and take over, and when this did not happen, 
they resented the attitude of Moscow very 
much, ’They really have betrayed us'. And 
it was with this feeling of being betrayed 
that they turned to the Nazis— 'And now let 
us try this; they are fighters, they certainly 
will need us’..."60
Strasser confirmed that there was tactical co-operation but the
impression left from the interview was that he did not regard it as
a serious matter. On the Communist side, co-operation, according
to Strasser, was limited by the consciousness of the "superiority"
of the Nazis, "they became alert to our superiority— our spiritual
61superiority of the nationalist was always there." On the Nazi 
side, the picture which emerges is of a tactic of opportunity 
directed by local leaders, generally accepted in the party, but to 
which no one, not even those directly involved, attached much 
importance.
It is impossible to draw such conclusions with respect to 
Communist participation in co-operative enterprises. It is not 
necessary to assume one-hundred percent adherence to party 
directives, to notice that in practice the KPD took its claims to 
tactical and organizational coherence more seriously than did the 
NSDAP. In the absence of approval from higher authority it is 
difficult to imagine a local Communist functionary arranging such 
things without earning some kind of reprimand. Tactical questions 
always assumed much more importance as matters of principle for 
the Communists than they did for the Nazis. It followed, that any
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reprimand concerning co-operation with the Nazis could, with justice, 
be interpreted as following from a general review of the party's 
tactical priorities and not from a mere disciplinary action against 
erring local functionaries.
Such warnings can in fact be found in two of the KPD's internal
circulars for 1932. The circulars in question contain strictures
62against working closely with the Nazis. They were addressed to
the question of the correct handling of the anti-Fascist struggle
and while they dwelt on the necessity of concentrating the party's
attentions on the Social Fascists, they went on to point out that
this could not involve joint action with the Nazis against the SPD
and the Reichsbanner but that the opposite course of action was
acceptable. This was a distinction which had to "be made clear for 
63the whole party". The fact that the party found it necessary to 
warn its membership in this way was of course in itself an indication 
that there had been some sort of co-operation with the Nazis (if 
perhaps unauthorized).
Two interpretations are possible. Either co-operation 
represented a breach of discipline or the party changed tack on this 
question. If there were lapses of discipline, they ran counter to 
the main disciplinary concerns of the party. The over-riding problem, 
which is always noted in the circulars, had to do with the tendency 
of comrades to down-play the importance of the struggle against 
Social Fascism and to yield to the influence of the SPD's "lesser 
evil" argument. Then there is the problem of timing. Why would
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the party wait more than two years before sounding the alarm on 
this question? The KPO drew attention to joint SA-RFB attacks on 
its meetings in 1929. Yet no circulars, which warned against 
co-operation with the Nazis, came to light for the years 1929-1932. 
If there were breaches of discipline on this question then they 
seem to have attracted attention only at certain times.
A more compelling conclusion is that the circulars reflected a 
shift in tactical emphasis. Even the language of the directives 
pointed in that direction. If it can be accepted that there was a 
change in tactical emphasis after 1928, as suggested in the memoir 
literature and the press accounts, then any subsequent re-thinking 
would have been relatively sudden, compressed into a few months in 
late 1931 or early in 1932. Local cadres could be expected to be 
taken by surprise and the warnings concerning collaboration with the 
Nazis supported such an inference. Such expressions as "must be 
made clear to the whole party" or "is still not clear to some 
comrades" were typical ways of reminding party members of important 
changes in established practices. The stereotypical quality of 
Communist language is reflected in Communist behaviour and this is 
a fact which hints at something more in the KPD's approach to 
National Socialism. Communists, more than most, do not lightly 
admit to past errors. Either one understands historical necessities 
or one does not. When forced by circumstances to modify behaviour 
and to admit error, the Communists were apt to find the process 
painful. Any shift on the Nazi question must have affected the
248
political careers of some at the top who were available for 
sacrifice to the new line. This could be expected from parallel 
situations in the past. The campaigns against the right and the 
left and the "Versöhnler" had all found their important victims.
In this case, it was clear that the victim was Heinz Neumann.
A campaign against Neumann was launched early in 1932, and was
foreshadowed by the party’s decree against "isolated acts of terror" 
64late in 1931; it continued through the early months of 1932 and 
culminated at the Twelfth EKKI Plenum in August when Neumann was 
expelled from the EKKI Secretariat and from the KPD Politburo. In 
other words, in June and July when the circulars indicating a 
possible change in tactical emphasis were issued, the attack against 
Neumann was at its height.
On the basis of the existing evidence, the Neumann case is 
difficult to interpret. Notwithstanding this, however, it still 
provided the best available indication, after the fact, of Communist 
priorities between 1930 and the end of 1931. Although some rather 
shadowy considerations may have entered the equation, such as the 
personal animosity which was known to exist between Thälmann and 
Neumann, it was certain from all the party’s commentary on the case 
that the central issue had to do with alleged errors in the KPD’s 
approach to the Nazis.^ So much is clear, but there certainty 
ends.
For one thing, it cannot be determined with precision from the 
Communist sources just where Neumann's errors were judged to lie.
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He was accused of being the main influence in leading the party 
both to "underestimate" and to "overestimate" the significance of 
the National Socialist phenomenon. The blame for alleged 
excesses associated with the "Schlagt die Fascisten..,!" slogan 
was laid at his door; his role in the introduction and application 
of the slogan was apparently an example of his propensity to 
underestimate the Nazis. "Acts of isolated terror" had distracted 
the Communists from vital united front work with the Nazis. The
slogan had rested on false assumptions concerning the fragility
66and lack of depth of National Socialism as a mass movement. This 
charge cannot, however, be taken seriously. Support for the slogan 
had been widespread and when it proved to be an embarrassment to 
the KPD's united front efforts, Neumann had been in the forefront of 
the campaign to extend united front work with the Nazis. He had, 
for example, attended and addressed Nazi assemblies and in the 
warmest united front language.^
Other evidence was adduced in support of the "underestimation" 
argument. In one post-mortem which was offered long after Hitler 
had come to power, Neumann was accused of underestimating the 
significance of Nazi electoral gains. The estimate which had been 
offered by Thälmann after the September 1930 elections, that the 
Nazi victory represented Hitler's "best day", was falsely attributed 
to Neumann. Nothing serves better than this slip to illustrate 
the fact that both Neumann and Thälmann shared in the so-called error 
of underestimating Hitler and that they did so with the full
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knowledge and support of the Comintern and of Stalin. One need only 
recall the sanguine assessments of the election which appeared at the 
time in the Soviet and Comintern press.
The same aroma of contrived evidence surrounded the other
charge of "overestimating" Hitler. Neumann was accused of
overestimating the significance of the Nazis as a symptom of
capitalist decay and of divisiveness within the German bourgeoisie.
This error was associated with a false application of the
69'^ Volksrevolution" slogan. Neumann was accused of misunderstanding
the nature of National Socialism to the extent of seeing in it a 
necessary development of German capitalism which could be exploited 
for revolutionary ends. He placed an exaggerated emphasis on the 
need to rechannel and capture the nationalist sentiments of the 
petit bourgeois following of the Nazis. In so doing he distracted 
the party from its essential objective of breaking the SPD's hold 
on the industrial workers. Both the realization of the KPD’s 
revolutionary ambitions and a successful outcome in the struggle 
against Fascism depended on the defeat of Social Democracy.
This charge was reminiscent of that brought against Radek at 
the Fifth Comintern Congress. Radek, too, had overestimated the 
significance of a Fascist mass movement and the potential benefits 
which it offered the Communists.^ Just as in 1924 the charge 
carried little conviction. Radek had had no difficulty in 
demonstrating the concensus which lay behind the Schlageter initiative. 
In 1924 it had been Radek, in 1932 it was Neumann who was sacrificed
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to historical necessities. In other words, it was quite impossible
to assign any particular responsibility to Neumann for any excesses
the KPD's attempt to exploit nationalist feeling in Germany. To be
sure Neumann had played an important part in the drafting of the
programme of "National and Social Liberation"; but he had done so
only under the guidance of the EKKI and Stalin.^ Then too,
Thälmann had been just as consistent as Neumann in emphasizing the
importance of the Volksrevolution slogan and of nationalist propaganda
72in general for the KPD's tactics.
What Neumann's close association with these tactics most
illustrated was not his errors but rather the position of trust
which he enjoyed in the Comintern and with Stalin. There is ample
evidence that in 1930 and 1931 it was Neumann and not Thälmann who
was closest to the Soviet leaders. It was Neumann who had been
entrusted with high level Comintern assignments and it was Neumann
who alone among the KPD leaders had sufficient command of the
73Russian language to move easily among the Soviet leaders.
Aside from these general considerations, Neumann's status was 
best revealed in 1931 through the part he played in the KPD's 
decision to support the referendum for the dissolution of the 
Prussian Landtag. This action was initiated by the Stahlhelm at 
the end of 1930 and was supported by the Nazis. Authorization for 
the first stage of the referendum process (Volksbegehren) was 
obtained in February 1931 and the Volksbegehren obtained enough 
votes so that a referendum (Volksentscheid) was called for the
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ninth of August. During the Volksbegehren stage and up to the eve of
the referendum itself the KPD was critical of the Stahlhelm and 
74Nazi campaign. Then in a few days in July the party suddenly
reversed itself. On the 21st of July the KPD Landtag delegation
issued an ultimatum to the SPD dominated coalition government.
Among the four conditions of the ultimatum was the impossible demand
for the immediated cancellation of the ban on the RFB. To no one's
surprise, least of all to the KPD's, the demands were summarily
dismissed by the SPD Minister of the Interior, Severing. On the
22nd the Communists announced their decision to support the
referendum and to transform it into a "red referendum".^ The agent
responsible for the about-face was Neumann. Against opposition in
the KPD Politburo which probably included Thälmann, Neumann
announced the decision of the EKKI to back the Stahlhelm and Nazi
76initiative; that decided the matter.
The KPD's part in the referendum affair is revealing of a 
number of things. In the first place it left no room for doubt 
that the party had lost all ability to manage its own affairs. The 
crucial decisions had been taken for it in Moscow. Secondly, it was 
Neumann who played the dominant role on the KPD side in the 
implementation of Moscow's policy. Finally, the decision to 
participate in the referendum left no doubts concerning the 
priorities of the Communists. The attack on the SPD was to be 
pursued up to the point of a public declaration of support for an 
action launched by the Fascists. The conduct of the campaign was
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equally revealing. Despite the argument that Communist
participation had altered the character of the referendum, it was
patently obvious that the "red referendum" argument was hollow.
The Communists never siezed the initiative during the campaign.
Nor did they, as they claimed, succeed in "exposing" the hypocrisy
of the Nazis and the Stahlhelm and thus winning influence among
the misled Fascist following.^ The opposite was true; all
indications pointed to the confusion and disillusionment which the
78decision caused among the Communist rank and file. Moreover,
there was evidence that the Communists, far from using the
referendum as part of some new ideological initiative against the
Nazis, actually sought to limit competition with them as part of an
79attempt to ensure the success of the referendum.
Motives were also clear enough. Against a background of the 
long standing antipathy to "Social Fascism" as the "main support" 
for German capitalism, it was possible to detect specific and 
immediate reasons for the decision. Social Democracy was not only 
a support for capitalism in a general sense, the SPD dominated 
coalition in Prussia also provided indispensible support for the 
Bruning government. Before the referendum, Bruning and Curtius 
went to Paris to negotiate new credits with the French government. 
The dangers of a closer tie between Germany and France had been 
the subject of worried speculation in the Soviet and KPD press.
The Communists saw the possibility of a "political capitulation" 
before France. In this situation, as in the past, it was Social
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Democracy and the pro-French and anti-Soviet pressure which it
was able to exert on German foreign policy which was the main
problem. As the Rote Fahne later put it, the SPD was the "gunpowder
80for German-Soviet relations".
Weingartner*s argument that these considerations led the 
Soviet leaders to speculate favourably on the effects of Nazi and
M ginationalist pressure on the Brüning government is persuasive.
As Weingartner points out, such an interpretation was indicated in
82the Soviet and Comintern press both before and after the referendum. 
Support for the referendum through the agency of the KPD offered 
the Soviet Union a possible and arguably the only possible means 
of affecting the outcome and the impact of the negotiations with 
France. In other words, the same kinds of considerations were 
likely present as had led to the decision to emphasize nationalist 
propaganda during the summer of 1930. There were indications of 
the limited, foreign policy purposes of the decision, even in the 
internal party circulars which tried to justify the referendum to 
the Communist membership,
"We wanted to sharpen the crisis of confidence 
in the Brüning government. International 
finance capital, in the first place the French 
bourgeoisie, demand political guarantees from 
Brüning, law and order, so as to be able to 
implement the exploitation of a half-colonial 
Germany. Brüning can implement his policies 
only with the help of Prussia. A blow against Prussia 
is a blow against Brüning. Our task is to accelerate 
the deepening crisis."83
It was, of course, true that such an explanation could not stand
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on its own, at least for Communist consumption. Although a limited 
foreign policy objective can be inferred from the Communist press 
and from such circulars as the one cited above, the main emphasis
84was placed on the "revolutionary" significance of the referendum.
A blow struck against Social Democracy, —  against Social Fascism —
was a blow struck for the revolution. Anything which weakened the
SPD brought the day closer when the KPD would be ready to launch a
successful attack on German capitalism. As was always the case, a
revolutionary rationale, no matter how contrived it could be seen to
be, had to be found to justify Communist tactics. When this is
borne in mind there need be no special difficulties in the way of
understanding underlying motives. In 1931, however, there were some
mysteries attendant on the revolutionary explanation for Communist
activities which did raise problems of interpretation.
Part of the charge against Neumann was that he had associated
the party with the false and "fatalist" notion that the revolution
85was only possible after a Nazi victory. The Nazi role, according 
to this argument, was seen by Neumann as objectively revolutionary. 
The Nazis were the "rearguard", the Communists the advance guard of 
the revolution. The Nazis would complete the job of smashing the 
Weimar system and in the process awaken the industrial workers to 
the awareness that it was only the KPD which could defend them 
against the Nazis. The SPD, at long last, would lose its control 
of the workers. A Nazi victory would thus represent only a stage in 
an on-going revolutionary struggle which would culminate in a Soviet
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Germany.
There can be little doubt that these ideas were widespread 
in the party. They were, at any rate, well enough represented that 
the KPD found it necessary during the 1932 Presidential elections 
to argue against them,
"Many workers discussed (and this was 
especially noticeable before the second ballot) 
the idea that we should vote for Hitler in order 
to help him into the government. In this way 
the anti-worker policies of the Nazis will be 
clearly expressed. The proletariat will rise 
in battle for the dictatorship of the proletariat 
in face of brutal open Fascism. The SPD used 
this...false estimation of Fascism against us... 
while in a falsified report on an EKKI meeting 
they wanted to attribute this tactic to us." 8 6
Although it would appear from this circular that such ideas were
opposed by the party in the spring of 1932, their earlier status is
less clear. There is evidence that during 1931 many at the top of
the Communist hierarchy accepted them (or used them). Margarete
Buber-Neumann claimed that in 1931 Stalin in a conversation with
Neumann remarked,
"Can you not see Neumann that if the National 
Socialists come to power in Germany, they will 
be so completely occupied with the West that we 
will be able to get on with building Socialism 
in peace?"87
If this was indeed Stalin's view of the meaning of a possible Nazi 
victory and the significance of the Nazi threat, then it must be 
expected that an available revolutionary rationale which could be 
made to serve it would be present, not only at the "fringes" of the 
party, but also at the centre. It should not, therefore, seem
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surprising that Neumann, as a close confidant of Stalin, should have
developed a position which stressed the revolutionary advantages
of a Hitler victory. Maria Reese claimed that it was Neumann and
not Thälmann who was dominant in the KPD Politburo at the time and
that a majority of the Central Committee and of the KPD Reichstag
delegation shared his "fatalist" but optimistic assumptions.
Indeed, Thälmann, too can be seen to have subscribed to the
"fatalist" position. In a speech in the Berlin Sportspalast in
June 1931, Thälmann spoke of the foreign policy options which were
89open to the German bourgeoisie. The German government could
continue on its existing course, remain loyal to the Young Plan
policies of fulfilment and seek more credits from America and
France. This, according to Thälmann, would involve nothing less than
the complete domination of Germany by international finance capital.
Internally it meant more dependence on the SPD and the "continued
exclusion of the Nazis and the German Nationalists from the open
90sharing of power". A second option involved the "abandonment
of the Stresemann policies". In this case, "the nationalist parties
91would openly or covertly be bound to the bourgeois government."
Having arrived at this conclusion, Thälmann went on to point out that 
the second option would have serious negative implications for the 
Nazis. As long as the Nazis were in opposition they had the 
opportunity to engage in "demogogic nationalist manoeuvres".
Sharing power would deprive them of this advantage and they would be 
quickly "bankrupted". It was just this "bankruptcy" thesis which
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Thälmann later attacked as a false notion which existed at the
periphery of the party" and which was at the heart of Neumann's
93"underestimation" of the Nazis.
There is also documentary evidence in the Foreign Ministry
Archives which can be seen to indicate that the same views were
represented in the Comintern and in the Russian party. The
materials in question are intelligence reports relating to a high
level review of Soviet and Comintern policy in Germany which
94supposedly took place in the autumn of 1931. Among the documents 
there is an abridgement of a lengthy report by the Soviet Consul 
General in Hamburg, Krumin. Apparently the report represented the 
findings of a special commission which had been set up by the 
Comintern to report on the prospects for successful revolutionary 
action in Germany. It included the following reference to the Nazis,
"...The money of the economic leaders and heavy 
industrial concerns flows in a broad flood into 
the pockets of Hitler's Sturmabteilung. This 
circumstance gives the Comintern an important 
trump in hand, since the Comintern, which for 
tactical reasons has supported nationalism, will 
be placed in a position, in its financial 
preparations for revolution, of being able to 
make certain economies. Because there are great 
sources of money in the country itself for the 
preparation of the German revolution, through 
Hitler."95
Krumin went on to observe that this situation was changing. The 
funds for the Nazis were drying up and that meant that the Comintern 
would have to bear more of the financial burden of preparing for the
revolution.
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The authenticity of any one such document must, of course,
remain in doubt. It is, however, interesting that in this case
unusual confidence was expressed in the source of the information.
There is a note in the margin in Bruning's handwriting, "Please,
strictly confidential do not reveal source". It might also be
important that Thälmann seemed to echo Krumin when he assured the
Eleventh Plenum, (on the basis of reliable information), that the
sources of funds for the Nazis were drying up and that the Stahlhelm
was gaining ground against the Nazis in competition for the
96financial backing of industry.
It must be emphasized that it did not really matter just who in 
the Comintern or in the KPD accepted arguments such as Neumann's 
as a genuine formula for revolution. From the perspective of the 
KPD's tactics what was important was that the formula both allowed 
and reflected a certain attitude to the Nazis. That attitude meant 
assigning a second priority to the struggle against Hitler and it 
made tactical accommodations with the Nazis possible. Moreover, it 
was always clear that Stalin, as the dominant influence on Comintern 
policy was not prepared to encourage revolution. For him limited 
foreign policy considerations had always to be at the centre of 
Soviet involvement in Germany. Similarly, it cannot be shown on 
the basis of any of the available evidence that Stalin or anyone 
of importance on the Communist side was prepared actively to work 
for a Nazi victory. Rather what is indicated is that, from the 
Communist point of view, worse outcomes of the German crisis were
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possible than the formation of a Nazi government —  for example, a
return to an SPD dominated coalition. Within this framework the
assessment of Hitler appears to have been positive on two counts.
First of all, until the presidential elections of 1932, the
possibility of a Nazi government was considered unlikely. Secondly,
it was thought that any Nazi government would be more of a problem
for France than for the Soviet Union.
It may have been that Neumann was in fact convinced by his own
arguments and that he found himself at odds with Stalin on the
question of revolution. There were those, such as Clara Zetkin who
97saw in him a person with "dangerous adventurist inclinations".
Perhaps, after all, Neumann contemplated some desperate revolutionary
venture. Ruth Fischer's characterization is much less convincing.
According to her, Neumann fought an heroic rear guard action against
Stalin's efforts to make the KPD into the willing tool of Soviet
foreign policy designs and it was precisely as a result of his
"sullen opposition" to Stalin's approach to the Nazis that Neumann 
. 98was removed.
Most everything is against Fischer's account. It is not at all 
in accord with Neumann's past record —  his known close connection 
with Stalin, (which Fischer acknowledges), his role in the 
development of the united front campaign with the Nazis, the part 
he played in the referendum decision and especially his close ties 
with the "fatalist" formula for siezing power after a Nazi success.
It is just too tempting to wield Ockham's razor in this case.
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There is an available and sufficient explanation which makes the
question of Neumann's own assessments of revolutionary possibilities
irrelevant. He was simply the man on the KPD side who was most
closely associated with positions which Stalin thought needed to be
modified. The sacrifice of Neumann was a way of distancing the
99Comintern from past practice. This was a well tried method which 
had claimed many victims before Neumann. Thus it was more than 
likely that Neumann's fate was tied to the doubts which arose as 
Stalin was forced to consider more closely both the likelihood and 
the foreign policy implications of a Nazi siezure of power.
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CHAPTER VI
FLUCTUATIONS IN COMMUNIST TACTICS DURING 1932: 
DOUBTS IN THE ELEVENTH HOUR
As Nazi strength increased, the optimistic assumptions in the 
Communist analysis were severely tested. The "contradictions" in 
National Socialism refused to take hold. The Presidential and 
Landtag elections in the spring of 1932 showed that Hitler's ability 
to attract new masses of voters was unimpaired.^- It must be said 
that the Communists were overly fascinated with "contradictions". 
Whatever the truth of their arguments, the Nazis still somehow 
eluded all Marxist schemes of reason. In a way, what the Communists 
took to be the self-destructive tensions in National Socialism were 
the sources of its strength. What besides the contradictions 
accounted for the success of Hitler's mass party? The Nazis had 
asserted their power against all class interests and it was clear 
for all to see that they had become an independent factor in German 
politics. Blinded as they were by their own categories, it appeared 
as if the Communists were influenced by these realities and it 
seemed for a short time (all too short a time) that they were 
finally ready to realign their tactical priorities.
There were signs that a far reaching change was being considered. 
The attack against Neumann suggested that the Nazis were to be seen 
in a new and more serious light. There were the warnings in the
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party circulars against tactical accommodation with the Nazis and
in local party meetings of Communist functionaries new instructions
were issued to cease "acts of isolated terror" against SPD 
2colleagues. At the same time, more attention was directed at the 
problem of resisting Nazi terror. This was so despite the ban on 
"isolated acts of terror" and the continuing emphasis on 
"ideological struggle" as the main weapon in the Communist arsenal. 
During the first half of the year Communist commentary on tactical 
questions seemed to sanction a more aggressive response to Nazi 
terror. There was, for example, the suggestion that confrontation 
with the SA was an important means of mobilizing the workers behind 
the KPD.3
For those in the SPD and the Communist opposition, who hoped to
construct a broad anti-Nazi alliance, there were even more
encouraging indications of change. For a time the Social Fascist
thesis was downplayed in the KPD’s statements and in the Communist
4 Mpress. In his May Day speech Thalmann had ignored Social Fascism 
altogether and had concentrated his attack on "bloody Hitler 
Fascism".-3 If Hitler had indeed become the main enemy, the way 
seemed open to the anti-Fascist alliance. Such hopes had arisen 
in April. During the Presidential elections the KPD campaign had 
focused with familiar bitterness on the SPD but then the emphasis 
shifted. On the eve of the Prussian Landtag elections the KPD
announced its willingness, to co-operate,
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"...with any organization of the working class 
which is really prepared to fight against cuts 
in salaries and relief payments..."6
No matter that the appeal was addressed to local SPD and trade union 
functionaries and not to the Social Democratic leadership, this was 
the closest thing to a genuine united front suggestion that had 
appeared on the Communist side since 1928.
In May there was more evidence for the shift in emphasis. The 
KPD delegation in the Baden Landtag had sponsored a motion for the 
dissolution of the SPD dominated "Iron Front" and the Nazi 
paramilitary organizations.^ The Baden comrades could be excused 
for believing that their decision to include the SPD organization 
within their proposal fell well within the party's tactical guidelines. 
Social Democracy was, after all, the principal enemy and the most 
dangerous of the Fascist parties. It followed that any action meant 
to weaken the SPD would be acceptable to the party as a whole. This 
line of reasoning must have appeared all the more persuasive in light 
of a similar motion which had just recently been introduced by the 
Communists in the Hamburg Bürgerschaft and which had been restricted 
to the demand for the dissolution of the SA. Given the party's 
established priorities, both proposals made sense. If there was a 
difference, then the Baden motion had the virtue of even-handedness 
in its hostility to both of the KPD's Fascist enemies.
Notwithstanding these considerations, the party's leading
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theoretical journal, Die Internationale, condemned the Baden motion
oas, "a serious error and a blow against the red united front". The
two motions were not equivalent. Despite the fact that the Hamburg
Bürgerschaft had rejected the Communist proposal, it was argued that
its popularity had nonetheless given the KPD an advantage in its
united front work with the Social Democratic workers. By contrast,
the Baden Communists had provided the party with a bad example of the
"mechanical" application of the Social Fascist thesis. They had
"mechanically equated the Reichsbanner with the Nazi murder 
9organizations". It was also clear that the criticism was not meant 
to be restricted to the errors of the Baden Landtag delegation,
"The Baden motion is only new evidence for the 
fact that the changes in our agitation and 
propaganda which were demanded by the Central 
Committee Plenum, have not yet been implemented."10
The direct language of this reprimand provided good evidence 
for the confusion of purpose in the KPD. It could not, after all, 
have been so obvious to anyone in the party that the tactical emphasis 
had shifted as far as the article suggested. There was an attempt to 
establish a new balance in the approach to the Social Democrats and 
the Nazis but this was not meant to leave the way open for the 
opportunistic error of a genuine united front arrangement with the 
SPD. In June, Thälmann tried to clarify this point. In a major 
statement on the party's anti-Nazi tactics, he argued that there had 
been no re-ordering of priorities.^ If the campaign against the 
Nazis had in certain important respects been neglected and
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misunderstood, it was nevertheless still wrong to lay the blame for
this on past decisions to concentrate on the problem of breaking 
12the SPD. He attacked the idea that the Nazis had replaced the
Social Democrats as the main support for German capitalism. Such a
formulation could be used to justify a complete re-orientation of
united front policy, but Thälmann insisted that this was not to be,
"We must express unequivocally that the party 
does not contemplate such a change..."13
The war on two fronts argument was reasserted. Whereas others may
have seen the decisions of the KPD's February Plenum as pointing the
way to a new policy of seeking tactical accommodations with the SPD,
Thälmann's interpretation was different. On that occasion the party
had reaffirmed the "central strategic objective" of breaking the
SPD's hold on the industrial workers and not the slightest concession
was to be made to "fraudulent manoeuvers for an anti-Fascist united
front. The struggle against Social Democracy and against "Hitler
14Fascism" were to remain inseparably linked.
There was thus next to no basis here for any continuing hope 
that the campaign against Neumann and the other indications of change 
pointed the way to a genuine and broadly based anti-Nazi alliance. 
Thälmann left open only one small possibility that such a course 
might be considered in the future. He suggested that negotiations 
with SPD and trade union leaders were possible if certain conditions 
were met first. The conditions, however, were unlikely to 
materialize. The KPD had to ensure that its efforts to mobilize the
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industrial workers had made sufficient progress so that any united 
front move on the Communist side would command decisive grass roots 
support, and thus force the hand of the Social Democratic 
leadership. At the same time, the "concrete" conditions under which 
the KPD could launch such an initiative had to be such that the 
spontaneous united front from below movement among the workers would 
not be compromised.^
Those who hoped for more from the Communists misunderstood the 
nature of the doubts which were being reflected in the KPD's tactics 
and policy pronouncements. There was no soul searching rooted in a 
growing awareness that National Socialism did, after all, threaten the 
existence of the party or that the presence of a powerful Nazi 
movement effectively ruled out all hope for the proletarian revolution. 
What was more to the point was that Nazi successes had forced a 
closer examination of basic Nazi foreign policy positions. Although 
there were some uncertainties, the Communists had on the whole been 
persuaded that the Nazis were a force in Weimar politics which 
worked against closer German-French relations.^ There was considerable 
scope for such optimism. Judging from the Nazi press and from 
commentary by leading Nazis on foreign policy questions, it was easy 
enough to conclude that opposition to France was central to the Nazi 
outlook.^ Moreover, the view that hostility to France would 
necessarily involve the maintenance of good relations with the Soviet 
Union was also represented by such leading figures as Reventlow and
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Goebbels. Writing in Per Natlonale Sozialist in 1930, Goebbels 
underscored this dimension of Nazi thinking,
"...today the European constellation of power 
is so structured that for the foreseeable future 
an Eastern oriented foreign policy is the only 
one which can be considered. We have to choose 
between our sick neighbours in the West, and the 
creative, exuberant health in the East...Russia’s 
need is our need and vice versa. Therefore we 
feel bound to Russia as the bearer of the same 
fate. Russia's freedom will be our freedom and 
vice versa. Therefore we stand at Russia's side 
as equal partners in the struggle for this 
freedom."18
Against such evidence that the optimism in their analysis was
justified, the Communists had to set other, disturbing, indications
of hostility towards the Soviet Union. For example, after the
successes of September 1930, Hitler could be seen as working for
19closer relations with the West, or at least with England.
After the Nazi electoral gains in the spring of 1932, the
Communists had to face the possibility of a Hitler government or at
least of powerful new Nazi influence on the course of German policy
and it became more important to discover the likely direction of
Nazi foreign policy. In the spring of 1932 these concerns were
reflected in the Communist analysis of the German situation. In
one article by the KPD's foreign policy expert, Theodor Neubauer,
Hitler's Mein Kampf and Rosenberg's Per Mythus des 20. Jahrunderts
were analyzed in the hope of discovering a basis for Nazi foreign 
20policy. Neubauer was especially concerned to establish the Nazi 
attitudes towards France,
"What policy do the National Socialists follow 
with respect to French imperialism? The answer
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to this question is at the same time the 
touchstone for National Socialist foreign policy 
generally."21
Neubauer reached the conclusion that opposition to French hegemony 
in Europe was central to the Nazi conception and to Hitler’s plans 
for a greater German Reich in the East. So much was clear from 
Hitler's and Rosenberg's writings. Yet according to Neubauer, that 
central conception was being lost as the Nazis came closer to power 
and attempted to make themselves acceptable for inclusion in a 
coalition government. Following an analysis of Nazi diplomatic 
efforts which appeared in the Manchester Guardian, Neubauer noted a 
changed attitude towards France and the attempt to reassure the West 
and France in particular that a Hitler government would not 
necessarily lead to additional complications in French-German 
relations. For Neubauer this was a "grotesque contradiction" which re­
presented betrayal,
"those betrayed and deceived will thus be the 
masses of the German people who actually hope 
for national liberation from Hitler and can 
expect only a more humiliating enslavement."22
The foreign policy of the German bourgeoisie was thus fated to follow
the same path whether it was directed by Stresemann, Bruning or
Hitler.^
The opinion that Hitler had become an important enemy of the 
Soviet Union was taken up elsewhere in the Communist press. Thalamnn, 
for example, drew attention to the "anti-Soviet hate" of the Nazis 
and to the increased risk of a war of intervention which they
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represented. It is important to notice that it was the anti-Soviet
as distinct from the anti-Communist aspects of the Nazi position
which were the cause for worry and there were disturbing new signs
of this. On the 23rd of June the Nazi delegation in the Prussian
Landtag brought forward a motion that the central government be
requested to demand that the Soviet embassy recall all Soviet citizens
from the district of Düsseldorf, and if after three days the request
were not met, the motion called for the arrest of all "Soviet agents"
25and their deportation as undesirable aliens. This and similar
26Nazi initiatives were noted with concern in the Soviet Union.
The new perception that the Nazis represented an uncertain, and 
potentially dangerous, anti-Soviet force came at a particularly 
difficult time for Soviet policy in Germany. The new Papen government 
offered much reduced opportunities for Soviet diplomacy. Unlike 
Brilning, Papen seemed determined to regard closer relations with 
France as a clear alternative to good relations with the Soviet 
Union and the established balance in German foreign policy was 
rapidly being lost. This was an especially threatening development 
given the growing evidence of more clearly anti-Soviet attitudes among 
the Nazis. Communist commentary pointed to the possibility that the 
Nazis, even if they did not enter a coalition, could provide the 
Papen government with a base of mass support and the way would then 
be open for a re-alignment in German foreign policy of indefinite 
duration. Thus by the summer of 1932 the Communists were faced with 
a completely different situation from that of the previous year.
24
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Then the SPD, from its position of strength in Prussia, had provided
the necessary (if passive) support for Brlining and had at the same
time been in a strong position to exert pressure against the
Ostorientierung. Under those circumstances, the KPD's opposition to
the Prussian government and its decision to support the referendum
could be seen to make sense. After the Prussian Landtag elections it
was the NSBAP which had emerged as the dominant party. The Communists
and the Nazis together controlled a majority in the Landtag. One
obstacle to the Soviet design in Germany had been removed but
28perhaps only to be replaced by another.
In view of the reduced influence of the SPD in Prussian and 
consequently also in national affairs, it was understandable that 
the Communists would turn more of their attention to the potential 
new threats. It was also true that in 1932 the Soviets could be 
expected to be especially sensitive to the indications of new 
difficulties in Germany. There was a growing sense of isolation and 
of danger. While more and more of Soviet energy was being absorbed 
in the difficulties of the First Five Year Plan, outside pressure 
also mounted. Not only was there the problem of the Soviet Union’s 
increasing isolation in Europe, there was also a new problem in the 
East and Stalin nervously watched the rising and aggressive power of
T 29Japan.
In the changing situation the Soviets sought increased diplomatic 
flexibility. In 1931 there were important indications of a shift in 
the Soviet attitude towards France. In Hay negotiations were
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undertaken for a trade agreement and a non-aggression treaty. At
the end of the year and in the early months of 1932 parallel
negotiations were begun with Poland, Finland, Estonia, Latvia and 
30Rumania. These moves reflected a re-examination of Soviet strategy 
in Europe and especially Stalin's determination to reduce the Soviet 
Union's diplomatic dependence on good relations with the Germans. 
According to reports in the German Foreign Ministry archives, Stalin 
had concluded that it was no longer possible to hope to oppose 
French influence on the basis of an alliance between the Soviet Union, 
Germany and Italy. The fact of French dominance on the continent had 
to be accepted and while good relations with Germany was the main 
Soviet trump, an effort had to be made to achieve better relations 
with France and French credits for Soviet economic development would 
be sought.^
The shifts in the KPD's tactical emphasis could be traced to
these foreign policy considerations. One report in the Russian
Menshevik press claimed that Moscow forced a modification in KPD
32tactics after the Presidential elections. According to this,
Stalin had decided that the Japanese threat in the East had made it 
imperative that everything be done to reduce the dangers to the Soviet 
position in Germany. Specifically, the KPD was to eliminate everything 
from its tactics which might make a Hitler victory easier. Stalin 
sought, in other words, to reduce the possibility of new upheavals in 
the West while his attention was for the moment turned towards Japan
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and towards the problem of improving relations with France. In 
connection with the tactical changes the Soviets apparently also 
demanded a purge of the KPD Central Committee.
This report was based on information obtained through the 
Menshevik underground and its accuracy cannot be checked. It is 
nonetheless consistent with what actually happened in the KPD. The 
changes in the KPD's tactics did become apparent after the alleged 
intervention. Moreover, there was a purge of party leaders.
3 3Although the purge was not completed until later in the year, 
the report provided further support for the argument that it was 
the Soviet attempt to de-emphasize earlier policies towards Hitler 
which best account for the decline of Neumann. The report gains 
further credence from the fact that Neumann surrendered his functions 
in the KPD early in April and was recalled to the Soviet Union;
that is, at the time when the Menshevik report claimed that both he
ii 3and Thalmann were present in Moscow to receive the new instructions.
Anyway, the foreign policy concerns which accounted for the
fluctuations in the KPD's tactics can be inferred from the party's
public statements. Thälmann, for example, emphasized that it was
important for the party's campaign against the Nazis to stress the
connections between Hitler and Papen's pro-French and anti-Soviet
foreign policy,
"The Hitler party openly carries the responsibility 
for the Papen government, which is firmly 
committed to the French orientation and to a policy 
of constructing an anti-Soviet block. Against the
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foreign policy of this cabinet...and against 
its National Socialist satellite, we shall 
stress our opposition to Versailles, according to 
the line of our programme of national and social 
liberation, more aggressively...than ever before."35
The tide of doubt proved to be shallow and of brief duration.
By the end of July it had receded and the original tactical emphasis
had largely returned. As late as the 20th of July there still
seemed to be hope for a new line. At the end of June the Communist
delegation in the Prussian Landtag declared its willingness to
support Zentrum and SPD candidates in the elections to the Landtag
36Presidium providing that certain conditions were first met. Early
in July the Communists showed some willingness at least to discuss
the possibility of united front co-operation with the SPD against 
37Fascism. There was also a stronger emphasis than in 1931 or
in the first months of 1932, on'united.front appeals which stressed
38the importance of the struggle against Fascism. Finally on the
20th of July, in a move which was seemingly calculated to keep united
front hopes alive, the KPD called a general strike in protest against
39the Papen government's decision to dissolve the Prussian Landtag.
On the SPD side there was little positive response to any of 
these initiatives and perhaps there should have been. It was unwise 
or so it must seem with hindsight, to make so little effort to 
exploit the doubts of the Communists. Yet, the SPD attitude was 
understandable. Goodwill and good sense could perhaps have overcome 
the obstacle of "Social Fascism" and the long history of viscious
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anti-Social Democratic propaganda. There was, however, another
obstacle and that was the lack of clarity in the Communist position.
What, after all, could be made of invitations to join under
Communist guidance in the campaign against "Fascism"? In 1932, just
as earlier, Fascism meant only one thing to the Social Democrats—
Hitler. Even if one could discount the absurdity of "Social
Fascism", and it was by no means clear in the spring and early
summer of 1932 that it was possible to do so, the Communist
understanding of Fascism was still much broader than that of the SPD.
In fact, "anti-Fascism" as a subject in Communist propaganda had been
carefully selected; for Fascism was meant to include both the Nazis
40and the Papen government.
Beyond this there was a deeper consideration. As in the past, 
the Social Democrats understood the struggle against Hitler to be an 
essential part of their effort to defend the Republic. For the 
Communists the Republic meant the Weimar coalition and a strong 
influence for the SPD on both domestic and foreign policies. In 
June, Thälmann made this very clear,
"In the struggle against Fascism, against Papen- 
Schleicher and against Hitler, we cannot allow 
the illusion to emerge that we are interested in 
fighting for the Weimar constitution; that it is 
our goal to maintain conditions which are 
compatible with the constitution. Naturally we 
fight against Fascism but one cannot devote a 
minute of his energy to that fight just in order 
to make it possible for Brüning and Groener to 
return to power. If Papen and Hitler were beaten 
and Brüning, Severing, Braun etc. took their places 
again, then the German proletariat would be robbed 
of the fruits of its victory."41
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On the Communist side, therefore, the choices were very different
from the ones which, faced the SPD. In the summer of 1932 there was
an inherent instability in the KPD's tactics. A war on two fronts
conception was better suited for the pages of the theoretical
journals than it was for Communist tactics. Since the resources of
the KPD were limited, the emphasis of practical effort had to fall
on one side or the other, and a decision had to be made whether it
was Nazism or Social Democracy which was the more serious enemy.
The choice was not in doubt for long. By the end of July all
the indications were that the old tactical emphasis was to remain.
The hesitant overtures to the SPD were now condemned as "opportunistic"
and Th'almann called upon the party to redouble its defenses against
the "right opportunistic tendencies towards block building with the
Social Democrats". According to Thälmann this tendency had been
rooted in the false view that the Communists should direct their main
42attentions against the Nazis. The Social Fascist argument was
reasserted and, as if to emphasize the end of doubt, it was stressed
43with particular vehemence. The more militant resistance to Nazi
strong-arm tactics was also questioned. Anti-Fascist struggle had
been too much confined to the streets and too restricted in its
targets. Ideological struggle and the united front from below
approach was what was required, as well as an understanding of
Fascism which went beyond the Nazis to include Social Fascism and
44the Papen-Schleicher government. By the end of the year the return
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to the earlier approach to the Nazis was complete. United front
appeals were stressed and were once more carried into Nazi meetings.
Functionaries were instructed to clarify the distinction between
the Fascist leadership of the NSDAP and its honest but misled anti-
45capitalist following. The way was again open for tactical
collaboration and in November that fact was dramatically confirmed
in the strike of Berlin transport workers.
As Weingartner observes, what was at work here was a kind of
Comintern, foreign policy, version of the SPD's "lesser evil"
46formula. For several reasons the SPD was judged to be the greater
threat to Soviet interests especially over the longer run. The
Communists once more succeeded in convincing themselves, that of
their rwo rivals, it was the SPD which was the stronger. Just as in
1923, Nazi strength was the product of crisis. Economic collapse
had radicalized large masses of the German population and made them
susceptible to Nazi "demogogy". For the Communists, however, there
was a natural outer limit to this process of radicalization. The
July Reichstag elections, although they resulted in large gains for
the Nazis, marked the end of the possibility for further Nazi 
47expansion. The middle class parties, with the exception of the 
Zentrum had disappeared. Any additional Nazi gains would, then, 
only be at the expense of the working class parties.
It was precisely on this point that the Communists found grounds 
for optimism. When it came to the working class voter it was the 
KPD and not the NSDAP which was the principal beneficiary of the
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crisis. If further Nazi penetration into the ranks of the working
class could be checked, Hitler's hopes for power would be dashed.
The prospects for blocking Nazi access to the workers were seen as
all the more promising because of the tensions within the NSDAPj
for it was the working class elements, especially within the SA and
the NSBO, which provided the main source of discontent among the 
48Nazis. It was on the basis of these considerations that the
Communists saw their own role as decisive. According to the
resolutions of the Twelfth EKKI Plen, Germany had reached the end
of the period of "relative stabilization". This did not, however,
mean that the continuing crisis of capitalism worked to the
advantage of Fascism. The Papen government was declared to be "one
of the forms of Fascist dictatorship", but the further development
of Fascism, (and under the circumstances this could only involve a
larger government role for the Nazis), could be stopped by the KPD.
If the KPD was successful in mobilizing the immense power of the
German working class, Fascism would collapse and the Nazi following 
49would melt away.
As in the past, the task of mobilizing the workers underscored 
the continuing importance of the KPD's united front work with the 
SPD rank and file and with the proletarian elements among the Nazis 
It is important to notice, however, that Communist tactics were 
only in part designed to meet the perceived requirements of the 
struggle against "Fascism". The KPD was equally determined to work
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against the other possible "way out" for the German bourgeoisie.
That way out was a democratic resolution of the crisis and a return 
to parliamentary rule. Thälmann warned the party that it was wrong 
to argue that there could be no return to democracy from the Papen 
dictatorship.^ Moreover, the insistance that it was the Social 
Democrats and not the Nazis who were the central problem indicated 
that the democratic outcome would be even less welcome than the 
consolidation of Fascism.
The Communist forecasts seemed in part vindicated by the results
of the November Reichstag elections. The KPD, alone of the four
major parties, increased its share of the vote; the Zentrum, NSDAP
and the SPD all suffered significant losses. This was interpreted
as a great triumph for the KPD, and several aspects of the results
were particularly gratifying. Not only had the party gained against
the SPD, but the Nazis had once more failed to expand their support
among the workers. In fact, with the exception of Berlin, the Nazi
losses were particularly heavy in the major industrial centres. It
was equally reassuring that the DNVP and the Deutsche Volkspartei both
made gains at the expense of the Nazis.^ Taken together with the
continuing evidence for discontent in the ranks of the SA, the results
were encouraging enough so that the one Communist observer was
52prompted to announce the end of the "Hitler psychosis".
Optimism, however, was not grounded simply on the KPD's 
electoral fortunes. Despite the setbacks, both the NSDAP and the SPD
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still commanded much more of the German electorate than did the 
KPD. Had they wished, the Communists might have applied to their 
own fortunes the prognosis which they had developed for the Nazis 
after the July elections. Barring a complete collapse of the 
economy, there were likely to be few new reserves of the unemployed 
for the KPD to attract to its list, and without the unemployed and 
the general atmosphere of crisis the KPD's electioneering efforts 
were bound to go down before the SPD's towering strength in the 
trade unions. In other words, it could easily be argued that 
Communist no less than Nazi strength was a product of the crisis. 
There should, therefore, have been few illusions that the KPD could 
play a decisive part in stopping Hitler. What probably coloured 
the Communist attitude in a much more serious way were certain other 
reassuring conclusions of their analysis.
The concerns, expressed earlier in the year, that some permanent 
arrangement might be found whereby Papen would be able to rely on 
the Nazis for popular support had proved to be groundless. The 
Nazis were behaving much more as an independent factor in German 
politics than the Communists had anticipated. The Communists now 
saw serious divisions in the ranks of the German bourgeoisie and 
especially between the radical petit bourgeois following of Hitler 
and the dominant industrial and financial interests. The potential 
base of support for German capitalism had thus shrunk, and according 
to the new analysis it was still the SPD which indirectly offered
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whatever backing was available for Papen. The SPD therefore 
retained its influence on German foreign policy.
It was against the background of these conclusions that the
earlier attitudes towards Hitler again became dominant. That is not
to say that there was a complete return to the optimism of 1930;
nevertheless after the July elections Hitler was a less worrisome
consideration in the Communist analysis than he had been between
April and July. There were formidable obstacles of distrust and
conflict of interest which stood in the way of coalition arrangements
with the Nazis. There was also the power of the Wehrmacht to be
taken into account and an accommodation between the army and Hitler
seemed unlikely to emerge. If despite all these difficulties,
Hitler did manage to enter a government, the Soviets were confident
that Nazi influence could be controlled by the army and industrial 
34interests. Anyway, a Nazi foreign policy need not be unduly 
feared. Contemporary accounts of Soviet attitudes towards a possible 
Nazi government stressed that there was no expectation of disaster 
but only a widely shared opinion that there would be a difficult 
transition period before Nazi policy yielded to the logic of the 
need for good relations with the Soviet Union. According to Gustav 
Hilger, the Soviets would have liked to establish contacts with 
Hitler in order to lessen the impact and shorten the duration of 
such difficulties.
Optimism seemed more than justified in December when Schleicher
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was named Chancellor. The continuing parliamentary crisis and the
strength of the nationalist opposition had led to a situation which
suited the Soviets well. The prospects for the Ostorientierung had
never been better. Radical nationalist and anti-Versailles
sentiment had badly compromised Papen's plans for better relations
with France and there was every reason to believe that Schleicher's
foreign policy would have to operate within the same constraints.
On the positive side, Schleicher could be seen to represent those
political forces in Germany which were most open to the policy of
close co-operation with the Soviet Union while Schleicher's own
foreign policy preferences were clearly in favour of the 
56Ostorientierung. The Soviets were also hopeful that Schleicher's 
plans to consolidate the authority of his government would meet with 
success. In particular, they exaggerated the importance of the 
tensions within the NSDAP and of Schleicher's ability to find a 
formula for government which depended on gaining the support of 
Gregor Strasser.^
For the KPD, the result of these foreign policy calculations 
was to confirm the existing tactical balance. As long as Stalin held 
out any hope for good relations with Germany there would be no 
significant break in the continuity of KPD tactics. Thus it was, 
that the equation did not collapse when Hitler was named Chancellor 
but only when his determined anti-Soviet orientation was clear for
C Oall to see. Long after there was very little of the KPD left to 
direct, it was directed to the same targets according to the same
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priorities and according to the same "revolutionary" logic.
Throughout 1933 the "Social Fascism" thesis remained intact. So
all pervasive was it, that it survived, as a dark ironic poison in
the outlook even of Communist inmates in Hitler's concentration
camps. When, for example, Social Democrats arrived at Oranienburg
they were reported to have been jeered and insulted as "Social
59Fascist swine" (etc.) by their Communist fellow prisoners.
As for the Nazis, the same united front from below approach
continued to take precedence over anti-Fascist united front efforts
to join with the other victims of National Socialism. Any evidence
of discontent especially among the proletarian elements within the
SA and the NSBO were carefully reported as evidence for the
sharpening of the contradictions of Hitler's regime and as evidence
for new revolutionary opportunities. A whole literature was devoted
to this t h e m e . A t  the same time the dwindling remnants of the
party were instructed to penetrate the Nazi organizations, to
construct "Trojan Horse" cells within them and to direct their
agitational efforts towards winning recruits for the KPD among the
6Xdisgruntled Nazi membership. The belief in the essential fragility 
of the Nazi proletarian organizations was remarkably tenacious.
The truth was, of course, very different. The working class 
organizations and parties were destroyed utterly. Following the 
Reichstag fire, thousands of Communist functionaries were rounded 
up and arrested. There had been little effective preparation for
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illegality and the intensity of Nazi oppression had caught the party
62completely off guard. At the top there was complete confusion
concerning the meaning of events and the likley future course of
63Hitler's policies. Some functionaries stayed behind and struggled 
to find ways of remaining useful which did not expose them to 
immediate arrest. Of those who escaped Hitler's camps some, like 
Neumann, were to disappear in Stalin's. There was little justice. 
Seldom has the truth of the German aphorism concerning the fate of 
swine and men been better borne out —  "Es regnete so stark, dass 
alle Sweine rein und alle Menschen dreckig wurden.". And among the 
survivors there was indeed some swinish behaviour. At the darkest 
moment in the campaign of Nazi arrests, some comrades could not 
resist siezing the opportunity to settle old feuds and to 
consolidate personal positions within the emigration. Margarete 
Buber-Neumann mentions this and her charges are supported in reports 
in the Foreign Ministry Archives, According to these sources, some 
in the KPD Paris emigration betrayed to the Gestapo the hiding 
places and cover identities of Communists who had remained in 
Germny . 64
In other words, a full price in pain and humiliation was 
extracted from the KPD for its past policies. Not that the party 
was ever in a position to be the decisive obstacle in Hitler's path. 
Few, however, could disagree that it might have done more both to 
stop Hitler and to save itself. There was tragic irony in the party's 
failure. When all was said, the KPD had sacrificed everything in
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the service of Soviet interests only to discover that in the end it
had served those interests badly. No outcome either for the KPD or
for Soviet foreign policy objectives could have been worse than
January 1933. Indeed, there was some recognition of this. There
was soul searching, but those inside and outside the party who
might have expected an honest admission of error were disappointed.
65The villain of the piece was found —  Social Democracy. It had 
been Social Democracy which had systematically prepared the ground 
for Hitler and had in fact allied itself with Hitler, while turning 
its back on the Communist anti-Fascist campaign. The Social 
Democratic leaders had divided the workers and had led them away 
both from decisive confrontation with the Nazis and from the 
revolution.
Beyond this excuse, there was another. The heresies of Neumann
were once more relied upon to account for failure. At no time did
the KPD need Neumann or some surrogate Neumann more than it did
after 1933. Policies had been correct, analysis sound, only Neumann
had prevented the party from finding success in its attempts to
66mobilize the workers. There never was an admission, nor could 
there ever be, that the real source of error lay elsewhere. It lay 
in the very structure of the KPD —  in its purposes as defined by 
Soviet interests and by an ideology which had been manipulated to 
serve those interests. Under the circumstances, Marxist-Leninist 
doctrine obscured rather than illuminated the realities of the Nazi
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threat and failed altogether as a guide to meaningful action. It 
might also have been true that under any circumstances the results 
of a Marxist analysis would have been inadequate. The Marxist 
outlook, especially in its Marxist-Leninist forms, simply asked for 
too much. Its categories demanded definitive and final solutions 
for problems which eluded solutions. More tragically, it placed 
the KPD at the centre stage of German history and politics, a position 
which it had no strong claim to occupy. The Communists could never, 
therefore, free themselves from their own expectations sufficiently 
to recognize their own limitations.
On these basic points of understanding the judgments must be 
harsh but they must also be placed in their appropriate historical 
setting. When the distorting influence of the Soviet connection is 
subtracted from consideration, the conclusions of the Communist 
analysis, at least on the specific points of the nature of the Nazi 
threat, did not stray so very far from the conclusions of others who 
worked within the same tradition. Even such a detached and elegant 
Marxist scholar as Kirchheimer could argue at the time from class 
conflict assumptions which obscured important realities of the 
problems which faced Weimar. How was it possible to conclude in 
1932 that "...state and government forms are in themselves never 
good or bad" or, while Hitler was present, to argue that no 
representative of the people could ever hope to transcend the class 
interests which he represented?^ On the more immediate tactical
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questions too, the Communists were not the only ones to make
mistakes. The Social Democrats had the precedent of their successful
strike action against the Kapp conspirators in 1920, yet they did
not respond to the Communist general strike calls in July 1932 and 
68January 1933. The SPD editor, Stampfer, offered an explanation
for this which was poignantly revealing of the SPD’s limitations,
"The Social Democratic Party was for decades 
a party of peaceful evolution, of reasonable 
and balanced consideration, of understanding 
without force. If it had given the signal 
for violent action, it would have attempted 
to appear what it indeed was not."69
Even with the admission of helplessness, this was a much more
satisfactory epitaph for a great party than any which a Communist
could provide for the KPD.
The persistent, wrong-headed analysis of Fascism and National 
Socialism need not have led the Communists to disaster had not the 
KPD isolated itself from the more clear sighted perceptions of 
danger which could be found among its own rank and file. It was 
Bolshevization which had served that end. Discipline was never 
complete but it was complete enough to ensure that the concerns of 
the membership were overridden and that Communists were directed to 
illusory and self-defeating ends.
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CONCLUSIONS
Inevitably, a study of this kind is susceptible to telling 
criticism. In its attempt to break new ground and to highlight a 
hitherto under-regarded and in many ways novel perspective, it almost 
unavoidably underemphasizes the significance of established research, 
inspired by alternative points of view. It is at once —  or so it 
might be thought —  both too narrow in concentration and too broad in 
focus: for example, in its concern with the hitherto little-examined 
agitprop relations between the KPD and the Nazis (see especially 
Chapters III, IV and V) it scants the significance of more violent 
forms of competition.^ Whilst, in attempting to provide an overview 
of KPD policies for a tumultuous ten-year span of national and 
international upheaval, it covers a very broad canvas indeed. Much 
remains to be done, of course; the need for further book-length 
research is obvious. Nor should this study’s heuristic emphasis on 
continuity be seen as springing from a disregard for the very real 
changes in the contours of German politics and KPD policies over the 
period of a decade. This last point receives further notice in what 
follows.
Still, the facts are as they appear set out in the preceding 
chapters, and the arguments that underly and inform their discussion 
are valid. Hence, to concede the legitimacy of alternative 
perspectives is, clearly, in no way to compromise the soundness of the 
reasoning presented throughout this essay. What then of the differing 
points of view just alluded to and how may the themes of the present 
study be made integral with them?
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Where others have emphasized Communist hostility to the Nazis, 
or have argued that this hostility was limited only by a parallel 
antipathy to Social Democracy, the present study seeks to contribute 
a useful shift in interpretive orientation, a complement to earlier 
and contemporary treatments. It contends that the Communists' on-going 
campaign against the SPD had as one of its important consequences the 
attempt to keep all questions of the KPD's relations with the Nazis 
secondary to its main goals and efforts. Official tactical doctrine 
as it found expression in the Communist press, theoretical journals and 
policy statements makes this point very clear. In the years between 
1923 and 1933 there was not a single instance where the anti-Nazi 
dimension of the party's stance was assigned a clear and unqualified 
precedence over the central issues of the struggle against Social 
Democracy. It was argued throughout the preceding chapters that these 
priorities did not find their importance only at the level of 
theoretical abstraction but influenced both the content and the 
direction of the party's anti-Nazi efforts.
It was also argued that the party to a large extent failed to find 
the ways to implement its priorities. An important obstacle was the 
simple one that the struggle against the Nazis became, in practice, if 
not in tactical doctrine, all important for the party's survival.
After 1928, especially daily conflict with the Nazis was the central 
preoccupation of the party's membership. It is one of the most 
interesting aspects of the party's overall tactical stance that this 
basic element of conflict did not resonate more than it did in the 
authoritative commentary on tactical questions. Instead there was,
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throughout, ambiguity in the overall Communist position. The increasing Nazi
threat did not lead to a more determined search for an understanding
with other anti-Fascist forces nor did it lead to a greater emphasis,
at the top, on the combative and confrontational tactics which had
2become dominant in the party's day to day life. In addition to the 
tactics of confrontation, the party at all times argued for agitational 
and propaganda work as the more appropriate mode of struggle against 
the Nazis. There were, of course, reasons for this which had nothing 
to do with the party's priorities. There was the danger of illegality 
and state repression and there was the question of the combative 
limitations of the KPD. Nevertheless it was clear from the 
authoritative commentary on tactics that the emphasis on "ideological 
struggle" better reflected the priorities of the party hierarchy.
This is not, of course, the same thing as saying that the 
agitational and propaganda work actually occupied most of the attention 
of the Communist membership. Pitched battles and desperate self 
defence measures came to eclipse the party's efforts in the other 
direction and made the ambiguities and tensions in the overall 
Communist position obvious. Even during the years 1924 to 1928, when 
the Nazis posed much less of a threat to. the KPD's organization and 
membership, the scope for persuasion, as reflected in the party's 
"united-front" efforts with Nazi supporters, was strictly limited.
3This fact was frequently noted in the pages above. A crucial 
limitation on the tactics of persuasion was the attitude of most Nazis 
and the emphasis of the argument in Chapters III and V above was in no 
sense meant to obscure that fact. The suspicions and indeed the
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murderous anti-Marxist/Communist hostility of the Nazis left little 
scope for these tactics.
An equally important constraint on this approach was present in the 
shape of the attitudes of most workers —  Communist and non-Communist, 
alike. The tension between the needs and perceptions of the rank and 
file and the priorities of the centre was a fact of life of the KPD which 
was frequently mentioned in this study. The stress placed in tactical 
doctrine on agitational and propaganda work among the Nazi following 
often revealed that tension. However much tactical doctrine might stress 
the "contradictions" in the Nazi ranks, most workers apparently possessed 
a much less subtle perception. They were, in the first place, clearly 
suspicious of the Nazis. The best evidence for this conclusion is 
provided by the great difficulty which the Nazis always experienced in 
gaining access to the workers even at times when they placed stress on 
the need to recruit workers and on the "socialist" element of their 
appeal. Especially in the major industrial areas where both the SPD and 
the KPD possessed a long and well-established tradition, Nazi "socialist"
4appeals could make little headway. For these workers a "Schlagt die 
Faschisten..." position contained most of the truth. Even in 1923, when 
there may have been less certainty concerning the socialist and working 
class dimension of Nazism, there is evidence that many among the 
Communists were suspicious of "Schlageter" style tactics.^
These considerations, of course, point to a larger observation: 
in fact, to what is by now the obvious given the relationship between 
the two parties. As has been shown, conflict between Communists and 
Nazis was constrained and qualified by considerations which had little
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to do with the basic clash of interests and perceptions which were 
represented by the two parties. There was some overlap of the two 
constituencies but not enough seriously to qualify the basic 
observation that the NSDAP and the KPD represented different and on 
balance opposed interests. No study of the relationship between these 
parties, no matter how concerned to emphasize other and less obvious 
dimensions of their relations could ever lose sight of that fact. The 
Nazis did not represent the interests of labour and most workers 
showed that they knew that. The stress which the Nazis placed on 
terror and on demonstrations in working class districts not only attests 
to their doctrinal anti-Marxism but also to their failure to make 
headway among the workers.
In this connection Bohnke, for example, notes, in apparent contrast 
to the emphasis of Chapter III, that political meetings where Nazis, 
Communists and Socialists were in attendance frequently ended in chaos 
and fighting. Still, the "dialectal" tensions in the party's approach 
to the Nazis which was apparent in 1923 continued, if in a subdued 
form. In the cases mentioned above, the united front intentions of 
Communist speakers was apparent.^ The same intention is also 
apparent from the KPD circulars which stress the importance of 
agitational work among the Nazis. The agitational, as distinct from / 
the confrontational motive was one of the reasons for the decision to 
attend Nazi meetings in the first place, regardless of the actual Nazi 
response and regardless too of the actual importance attached to such 
tactics by most workers, who were on balance much more interested in 
heckling Nazi speakers and disrupting their meetings.
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The different emphasis in Bohnke and in other of the studies of 
the NSDAP at the regional level follows from a very different 
perspective (but not of basic interpretation) from the one presented 
here, and probably stems from the concentration on the Nazis rather 
than on the KPD. Whatever positive response there was from the Nazi 
following to this dimension of KPD tactics does not disturb the 
prevailing view of the importance of the links between Nazism and 
conservative/reactionary interests. The manifest anti-Marxism of most 
Nazis underscored that observation. The Nazis were, however, at times 
prepared to exploit the differences on the left and it was also true 
that some were open to Communist overtures and were susceptible to 
socialist propaganda. These aspects of Nazism were, however, not 
decisive and not important enough to ensure the success of Communist 
agitational efforts; still less could they be all that important for 
any overall interpretation of Nazism. To the extent that this study 
draws attention to any wider questions of the sociology and ideology 
of the NSDAP, it conforms readily enough with the established consensus 
in that it recognizes the anti-Communism of the NSDAP, its connections 
with middle class interests and the characteristic opportunism and 
cynicism of Nazi tactics.
The same difference of perspective is important for other aspects 
of the argument, especially with respect to the events which were or 
were not stressed in the analysis. For example, the Munich putsch and 
especially the 1926 referendum on the expropriation of the princely 
estates are of crucial importance for an understanding of Nazism but 
are not necessarily central to an understanding of the Communist
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approach to the Nazis. Thus Noakes, for example, appropriately 
emphasizes that the internal Nazi debates on the question of the 
expropriation were important for an interpretation of Nazi "socialist" 
pretensions and for the party's efforts to gain a working class
g
following between 1925 and 1928. Kele, in his anxiety to stress the
"working class" dimension of the NSDAP would have done well to reflect
9more on the meaning of these events. The Communists, on the other 
hand, did not so much require additional evidence for their 
understanding of the NSDAP as a reactionary and Fascist movement.
Their analysis had established that much from the very first moment 
they noticed the Nazis. Nor did those events prevent them from 
continuing to stress the contradictions within the NSDAP; that is, 
the contradiction between the interests and orientation of the Nazi 
leaders and the "misled" proletarian and lower middle class elements 
among their followers. Any evidence for the reactionary outlook of 
the Nazi leaders was exploited in Communist agitational material 
designed to explode Nazi "social demogogy" and it must be said that 
most of the Nazi leaders most of the time provided them with numerous 
opportunities to follow that line.
Since the whole weight of the Communist commentary on the 1926 
referendum is concerned with the KPD's relations with the SPD it is 
difficult to judge if Hitler's decision had much of a bearing on the 
agitational dimension of KPD tactics. The KPD did not, in any case, 
drop these tactics after 1926. The Communist reaction to the Munich 
putsch, which is dealt with in Chapter III above, seemed to confirm 
the value of agitational and propaganda methods. The banning of the
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NSDAP and the imprisonment of Hitler was interpreted as a defeat for 
"petit bourgeois" Fascism by other forms of Fascism which were more 
closely linked to established capitalist interests. The NSDAP 
constituency was now available for the Communists.^ Thus, even 
though the Communists recognized that the Nazis and the Völkische 
were much less important in German politics between 1923 and 1928, they 
nevertheless continued to see the petit bourgeois following of the 
Fascist groups as a suitable target for the KPD's "united front" 
efforts. That much is clear from the resolutions of the Fifth 
Comintern World Congress which called for the continuation of such 
agitational efforts.
The contradictions which the Communists identified in the NSDAP 
were real enough. The Nazis did in fact have a lower class constituency 
which the Communists could appeal to. The Communists pointed to 
defections and discontent, especially within the SA, as evidence for 
this and the cases where Nazis did defect to the Communists were 
adduced as evidence also for the potency and relevance of the 
Communist appeal. Fluctuation and defection, however, cut both ways 
and what was more important, the Nazis showed a greater ability to live 
with their contradictions than the Communists allowed. Perhaps at some 
point in the future the contradictions would have proved more important 
but, despite the results of the November 1932 Reichstag elections, 
there was no way of being sure of this. In the meantime the Communists 
exaggerated the potential of their appeal especially among the 
Mittelstand supporters of Hitler. Their insistence on an underlying 
community of interest between their own supporters and the lower class
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elements among the Nazis was overstated, and too much overlooked the 
power of the more irrational dimensions in the Nazi appeal —  its 
racism, its nationalism and its hero worship. The account of Nazism 
provided in Chapter I, while brief, makes clear the inevitable harm 
which would follow from the Communist error in granting NSDAP ideology 
more rational coherence than it possessed. In particular, it makes 
clear the error of an over-insistance on the links between Nazism and 
established economic and class interests. The Communists largely 
overlooked, in other words, the ability of Nazism to act as an 
independent political force in German politics.'*'* In short, even 
though the Communists tried to exploit and to re-interpret the Nazi 
positions, their basic rationalist stance, their ties to the Soviet 
Union and their internationalist outlook generally, were serious 
handicaps with respect to much of the Nazi following. Ironically, the 
Communist efforts in this direction conceded too much to the Nazi 
outlook.
This is not to say that everything in the KPD's orientation led 
them inevitably to failure. If they were not so well placed to counter 
Nazi demogogy, they had a larger chance, at least electorally, when it 
came to the working class. Although in this respect it is exceedingly 
difficult to isolate the KPD's exploitation of nationalist issues or 
the militant anti-Fascism of most Communists as factors which 
contributed to the party's electoral successes after 1930, these aspects 
of the KPD's position might well have been important. Given the 
internationalist traditions of the German working class movement, it 
is easy enough to assume that for most workers the KPD's insistence
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on the intimate links between nationalist issues and more general
considerations of capitalist and imperialist exploitation would be
more intelligible and acceptable than the corresponding Nazi positions.
Eva Cornelia Schock argues convincingly that it was the general
militancy of the KPD on a range of issues which when taken together
with the SPD's failure to secure the interests of its supporters led
12to an increasing audience for the KPD among workers. As it turned 
out, this was not a decisive factor in breaking the SPD's hold on the 
factories but there can be little doubt that the continuing crisis and 
the growing disillusionment with the SPD were important electorally and 
provided encouragement for the KPD's electoral and overall strategic 
stance. Even in the factories there were grounds for optimism. As 
was noted above in Chapter V the Communists found it easier after 1930 
to circumvent the SPD dominated union structure when it came to the 
question of unauthorized strikes. This must have been some indication 
of a growing acceptance, if not of rival KPD organizations and 
leadership, then at least of the Communist point of view on many basic 
economic questions.
It remains, however, a central contention of this study that the 
KPD chose its strategic policies and saw this choice vindicated less 
on the basis of the successes or failures of particular tactics than 
out of regard for Soviet and Comintern evaluations of Communist 
interests in Weimar politics. Thus, although there were some doubts 
at the top, notably in the early months of 1932, the SPD was judged 
to be the more important strategic enemy of Soviet interests and this 
fact was reflected in the KPD's policies and tactics.
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In the existing literature Weingartner, especially, stresses the 
importance of the Soviet and Comintern constraints on the KPD. Yet 
even after Weingartner's useful contribution much remained to be said 
and there was a clear need to extend the analysis. Weingartner, for 
example, claims that it was only after 1928 that Soviet strategic 
calculations made themselves felt as an important influence on the KPD.
The chapters above clearly demonstrate that such a conclusion is 
misleading and that the basic hostility to Social Democracy, on 
strategic grounds, was present all along as an important consideration 
for an understanding of the KPD's orientation in Weimar. The 
importance of this point is obscured by the fact that it only became of 
crucial importance for the KPD during the crisis of 1930-1933. The 
roots of the KPD's priorities during those years, however, extend back 
in time at least as far as 1923. At every stage the Social Democrats 
were identified as a serious obstacle to good relations between 
Germany and the Soviet Union and KPD opposition to the SPD was 
consistently linked to this theme. This was true during 1923 and during 
every year thereafter. Nor can it be said that this consideration was 
present at the periphery of the party’s concerns. There is not a 
single assessment of the SPD on the Communist side which did not stress 
the dangerous anti-Soviet orientation of the SPD and the need for the 
party to combat the Social Democrats for this reason(and of coursefor other 
reason^). The theme was present in every KPD and every Comintern 
conference, in the theoretical journals, in the press and in the 
party’s internal circulars. The influence on the KPD's propaganda 
efforts is equally clear. The defence of the Soviet Union theme is
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always present and Is especially and very firmly linked to the
propaganda campaign against Versailles and the various other treaties
and accords which were concluded between Germany and the Western 
13powers.
As noted at the start of this chapter, the preceding remarks do
not constitute a comprehensive claim for continuity in KPD policies
and certainly not in German politics. Indeed, the KPD’s policies
changed on a variety of problems over time; though they did not
change on the question of whether the SPD was or was not an
enemy of Soviet interests. The principal change was in the mode of
struggle itself; the emphasis shifted between a united front from
below and a united front from above approach according to whether a
"left" or a "right" general line was dominant. These themes have been
14well explored in earlier research on the KPD. The KPD’s response to 
the Nazis also changed over time and reflected especially the KPD 
perception of the changing importance of the NSDAP for Weimar politics. 
Hence the otherwise surprising discovery that for a time, after 1923, 
the NSDAP scarcely impinged in any way on the KPD’s tactical and 
strategic calculations.^
Nor is it clear that Weingartner adequately stresses the actual 
impact of these considerations on KPD tactics. The direct influence 
of Soviet interests on the decision to support the Stahlhelm and Nazi 
sponsored referendum in 1931 is now beyond dispute, as is Soviet 
influence on the programme of National and Social Liberation in the 
sximmer of 1930. These aspects of KPD policy are emphasized here, in 
Weingartner, and elsewhere.^ There were, however, less clear but
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still interesting cases where Weingartner is much less satisfactory.
In light of Communist accounts of the BVG strike for example, 
Weingartner's merely passing reference to this strike is unfortunate.^ 
It is highly significant that a strike which the Communists themselves 
pointed to as the most valuable and instructive example of their 
"united front" line involved them, in their own view, in close 
co-operation with the Nazis and in opposition to the SPD. Here too was 
a good example of what the party's priorities could mean at the most 
practical level of the KPD's work. It is moreover an example which 
has hitherto received little attention in the literature.
On the other hand Weingartner gives less weight than this study 
to the limitations of the KPD as a "bolshevized" instrument of Soviet 
purposes. He provides, for example, only one brief reference to the 
KgdF and he largely neglects the whole question of the difficulties 
which the party experienced in its attempt to counter Nazi terror and 
more generally the influence which the party's priorities had on this 
struggle. As was shown in Chapter IV above, the party had in practice 
to pay more attention to the Nazis than its official, theoretical, 
statements of priorities suggested. On the other hand, those same 
priorities had the effect, in practice, of stretching the resources 
of the KPD and of confusing its purposes: the confusion of purpose 
was even evident in the case of the Communist organizations which 
were explicitly directed to counter Nazi terror.
The emphasis in Weingartner and even to some extent the emphasis 
in the present study, points to a difficult problem of interpretation, 
namely the problem of arriving at an overall balanced view and
320
balanced judgement of the KPD's role under Weimar. In one way or 
another the difficulties of striking such a balance are evident in 
any interpretation of the KPD. Even the careful and thorough work of 
Hermann Weber misses something of the essence of the KPD. Weber 
places an analytically useful stress on factional strife in the KPD 
and he traces the course of debate and factional division on a range 
of issues which faced the party. He shows convincingly how his invoc­
ation of the categories of factional division are useful for an 
analysis of the KPD's relations with the Soviet Union and its relations 
with the SPD. The same categories are considerably less helpful, 
however, for a discussion of the KPD's response to the Nazis. In an 
important sense the Nazi question broke through all the KPD's 
established factional divisions. Left and right oppositionists found 
common ground here and at some level, which must remain difficult to 
establish, so too did the working class movement as a whole.
It is this fact which is at the heart of all difficulties in 
judging where the stress ought to be placed in any assessment of the 
KPD's response to the Nazis. For when all is said, when full weight 
is attached to the complicating factor of the tie with Soviet purposes 
and interests, the KPD remained a bitter enemy of the NSDAP and was 
recognized as such by the Nazis.
Horst Schumacher is correct to observe that the theoretical and
tactical pronouncements of the KPD and the Comintern did not provide
18a complete guide to the party's approach to the Nazis. To the 
extent that his argument transcends apology for past mistakes, it 
points to an important truth. The militant anti-Nazism of the party
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is much more obvious when one turns from a consideration of the
theoretical pronouncements on strategy made by the hierarchy and
looks instead at the actual experience of the party in the streets.
Anti-Nazi militancy was evident from the emphasis which local party
organizations placed on anti-Fascist defence measures, and it was
more obvious still in the frequent and bloody pitched battles between
Communists and Nazis. From the moment of first contact, violent
confrontation was present and violent confrontation forms the
inescapable background against which other aspects of the relationship
can be explored. Between 1930 and 1933 especially the police files
19were replete with accounts of these events. But the police files
are hardly needed to make this point. For the citizen of Weimar violent
confrontation was the most visible and important dimension of the
relationship between the parties. Full scale pitched battles such as
took place in Altona in July 1932 provided a lasting testimony to the
20depth of the enmity which separated the parties.
Yet, if the search for balance is to continue one must attempt to 
go beyond the consensus established in the East German sources, and 
even beyond its more convincing representatives such as Horst 
Schumacher. An element of apology does after all remain in the East 
German work. One cannot erase the past influence of the party's 
theoretical and official priorities by drawing attention to the 
obvious anti-Nazi militancy of the rank and file. Nor will it do to 
try to disguise other aspects of the party's work by re-writing such 
materials as Ulbricht's report on the BVG strike. Alliances were 
made, and broken, at the centre; priorities no matter how difficult 
and uncertain in execution, were established at the centre; critics
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were purged from the ranks J support was given or withheld from 
subordinates; the relationship with the Comintern and the Soviet 
Union was given substance —  all this was done at the centre of the 
party.
The official priorities were important in a more general sense.
As the Nazi threat increased the morale and effectiveness of the 
party's organizations required clearer guidance from above than was 
in fact given. The party did not succeed in balancing the factors 
which were shaping its policies and as a result it did not succeed in 
concentrating its attentions, not even its anti-Fascist attentions, 
on the Nazis. Given the seriousness of the Nazi threat, too much 
energy was absorbed in competition with the KPD's working class rivals. 
Certainly the other working class parties thought so. The Social 
Democratic and Communist Opposition press is full of accusations that 
the Communists were more interested in attacking them than the Nazis.
It was not just a question of abuse received in the columns of the 
Communist press. They complained too about much more practical 
matters —  the KPD's parliamentary stance, Communist sabotage work 
among their followings, attacks by Communists on their members and 
the failure of the KPD to co-operate in pursuit of common enterprises. 
Moreover, the cases of co-operation between the KPD and the NSDAP 
remained a source of outrage for the other working class parties even 
when they were viewed against the background of Communist sacrifice 
in combat with the Nazis.
Schumacher's observation that the overall direction of the 
party's efforts differed from its stated priorities, points, at least
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in part, to the breakdown of discipline and consensus on the Nazi
question. In this connection, the oft repeated strictures against
"isolated acts of terror" testify to the concern at the top that an
undue emphasis on violent opposition to the Nazis would too much
21distract the party from its central concerns. The ideological mode 
of conflict was less threatening to priorities. It more clearly 
expressed the secondary status of the anti-Nazi campaign; it more 
clearly linked anti-Nazi with anti-SPD tactics; and it offered 
whatever hope there was of controlling the radical nationalist sentiments 
which were feeding the Nazis. The last point is an important one since 
there is ample evidence to suggest that from the Soviet point of view 
Nazi nationalism was a useful influence on the orientation of German 
foreign policy. That assessment was apparent in 1923 and notwithstanding 
the doubts which were explored in Chapter VI above, it was apparent 
again between 1930 and 1932. To the extent that the NSDAP figured at 
all in Communist strategic calculations between 1924 and 1930 this 
same assessment can be seen to have held also during those years.
To speak of "controlling the radical, nationalist sentiments", 
in this context, does not represent a concession to the Nazis; i.e. 
it does not mean that the Communists sought to reach a working 
understanding with the Nazis, to enlist them as allies, or to 
encourage them in their efforts to achieve power. The Communists 
frequently employed the term "neutralize" in connection with the 
agitprop aspects of their anti-Nazi tactics and this term provides a 
valuable clue concerning their intentions. The forces of German 
nationalism needed to be directed at the appropriate targets of
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Western imperialism. In other words, the Soviet Union sought common 
cause with German nationalism as distinct from Nazism. The KPD could 
be directed to oppose such forces, most notably those of the SPD, 
which were obstacles to such a common cause. At the same time it 
could try to capture the nationalist sentiment directly, in competition 
with right wing nationalist forces, for a version of nationalism which 
stressed the common Soviet and German opposition to Western imperialism. 
Hence in the Communist press, in the Reichstag, in election campaigns 
and in other propaganda campaigns the party always championed the 
cause of opposition to Versailles and pursued other nationalist issues. 
Through its agitational work among the followers of the Nazis, among 
other nationalist groups and within the Wehrmacht it could also try to 
encourage a pro-Soviet and anti-Western version of German nationalism.
In addition to its connections with Soviet interests, such 
"neutralization" of right-wing strengths was part of the KPD's - 
programme of self-defence against Nazi thuggery. Hence the stress, 
referred to above in Chapter IV, on the use of agitational literature 
to deflect Nazi hostility and to undermine Nazi power by winning 
away Nazi supporters. In view of the too-often weak defensive 
capabilities of the KPD's combat organizations as they were revealed 
in actual battle with the Nazis it could be easily argued (and was 
indeed argued by the Communists at the time) that agitational methods 
offered the best chance of preserving the party from Nazi violence.
In this regard Communist vocabulary is perhaps an obstacle to an 
interpretation of the direction of Communist efforts. Only rarely 
did "united front" indicate a concern to reach a broad understanding
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with another party. It far more often implied the attempt by the 
Communist side to assert their leadership over common enterprises and 
to use their influence and leadership to undermine and re-direct rival 
organizations. In other words the "united front" idea was a weapon in 
the Communist arsenal, both with respect to the SPD and to the NSDAP. 
Moreover, in practice, it was always difficult for the party and for 
the outside observer to establish a clear line between the two 
formulations C'from above", "from below") of united front tactics. In 
practice both formulations required that a balance be struck between 
co-operation and competition with the members of the target group. In 
any case, the examples of "united front from above" work with the Nazis, 
which were set out in Chapter V, represented just one among the 
several practical devices which were at the disposal of the KPD in its 
two front war against the SPD and the Nazis. Given the ferocity of 
Nazi provocation these finer points in the discussion of the party’s 
united front tactics might be seen as rather beside the point and 
indeed they were seen in just that light by many in the party. The 
realities of the Nazi terror cast into doubt the more subtle dimension 
of the anti-Nazi campaign and more generally it raised a serious 
question concerning the underlying wisdom of the KPD’s official 
priorities.
At the same time, it would be wrong to conclude that the growing 
seriousness of the Nazi threat was in itself sufficient to cause the 
KPD membership to alter the intensity of their opposition to the SPD. 
That this hostility was vigorous, and far from merely theoretical, is 
demonstrated by such phenomena as the Communist-SPD clashes which
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occurred even in Hitler's concentration camps. Nor should hindsight 
make the SPD's "lesser evil" formula seem more progressive than it 
then appeared to Communist leadership and rank and file alike: time 
and again the SPD allied themselves with reactionary economic and 
social policies, and implemented emergency administrative and 
legislative measured to the detriment of the SPD's own working class 
supporters. From top to bottom the KPD was only too well aware of 
this dimension of German Social Democracy; Communist hostility towards 
the SPD had deep roots.
"To Communists with personal, family or neighbourhood 
memories of the activities of the Freikorps in 1919-1920, 
directed as they were by Social Democratic Ministers, 
the 'social fascist' line of 1928-1933 will not have 
seemed a pure rationalization of ulterior interests on 
the part of the KPD leaders."22
In other ways, too, the SPD shared the responsibility with the 
Communists for sustaining the split in the working class movement.
They did little, for example, to exploit the doubts which arose on 
the Communist side during 1932. More generally, given their own 
recognition of the overriding importance of the struggle against 
Hitler, their "lesser evil" approach could have taken another direction. 
They might, in the first place, have given more consideration than 
they did to softening the anti-Communism of the SPD press. In view 
of the importance of Soviet interests to the KPD, they could also have 
dropped or modified their persistent criticism of Soviet foreign and 
domestic policies.
Even more to the point the SPD was for very long periods in a strong 
position to give practical effect to its hostility towards the 
Communists. The KPD was, in particular, a frequent target for the 
attentions of SPD-dominated police forces. The spectacle of the
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brutal suppression of unarmed Communists during the May Day
demonstrations in Berlin in 1929 left a lasting legacy of hate and
provided the KPD with a powerful symbol for its anti-Social Fascist 
23propaganda. In other words, the bitter emnity between the two 
parties doubtlessly played its part in sustaining the credibility of 
the struggle against Social Democracy even after the Nazi break­
through in 1929-1930; as did the continuing argument that the SPD, with 
its hold on the factories and unions, was the main obstacle to the 
KPD's revolutionary hopes.
The Social Fascist argument and the degree of resonance which it 
undoubtedly found among the Communist rank and file raises a more general 
problem of interpretation. The degree to which the concerns of the 
rank and file both made themselves felt at the centre and worked also 
to constrain the choices of the leadership is an intriguing point for 
future enquiry. This problem deserves more attention than it has 
hitherto received and there is a clear need for more research at the 
level of the KPD's local organizations. Such research must, however, 
come up against formidable problems of sources and interpretation and 
it is here, especially, that fuller access to the SED archives would 
be helpful.
As the present study bears directly on such problems it has 
noted the evidence for uncertainty and low morale among the rank and 
file as an indication of the tensions which were generated in the 
party by the priorities of the leaders. In addition, the concerns of 
the local organizations of the KPD, and the realities of their day to 
day struggle with the Nazis was interpreted as the principal obstacle 
in practice to a fuller implementation of the party's line with its
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stress on the campaign against social Democracy and its insistence on
more and more effective agitational efforts among the Nazi following.
These conclusions are based on the warnings, guidelines and
disciplinary strictures which can be found in the party's internal
circulars and in the internal information sheets and papers of the
KPD and KPD affiliated organizations. To the extent that the concerns
of the membership can be seen as exerting pressure for a fundamental
reversal of official priorities they did not make much impact. That
is not, however, to say that they did not find confirmation in the
attitudes of individual Communist leaders.
Despite the "Bolshevization" process there were still some at the
top who, though they stayed in the party, remained critical of official
»» 25priorities. Clara Zetkin was one of these, as was Willi Munzenberg. 
Munzenberg's case is particularly revealing of the conflicting 
pressures which operated on the party. The emphasis of his work in 
the IAH and also the emphasis in the publications which he directed 
was often substantially different from that of the prevailing line.
More than most in leading positions he was impressed by the Nazi threat. 
In the face of official reassurances he remained pessimistic about 
the likelihood of a Hitler government and about the direction of party 
policy. Babette Gross in her biography of Munzenberg has convincingly 
traced his efforts to work within a party line which left less and 
less room for his version of a "united front" policy which was both
26more flexible and assigned a higher priority to the anti-Nazi struggle.
The dilemma which faced people like Munzenberg is well illustrated 
by his reaction to the KPD's decision to support the Stahlhelm and
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Nazi sponsored referendum in 1931. He was one of those who opposed the 
decision and he did so in the strongest terms. Nevertheless in the end 
he yielded to Bolshevik discipline and supported the decision. In 
Gross's words for Munzenberg, too, "Parteibefehl war Parteibefehl".
Although Munzenberg was not at the centre of party decision-making and 
factional dispute, his predicament gains a more general significance 
from the fact that he was in the forefront of those in the KPD who 
retained independence of mind and who at the same time managed to 
attract a wide and sympathetic audience for the Communist point of view.
The line of enquiry pursued in the pages above has been directed at 
just the problem which faced people like Munzenberg. What in the end 
accounted for the ambiguous situation that the party found itself in?
What were the roots of the party's priorities and its judgments on the Nazi 
question? What impact did those priorities have on the direction of 
Communist policy? No one at the moment can claim the final word on these 
large questions. If, however, the attempt to answer them is not to be 
abandoned altogether, the approach must be as comprehensive as it is here. 
That is, it must recognize that the Communist positions and priorities of 
the last years of the Republic had their roots in an earlier experience 
and an earlier evaluation of Nazism. It must recognize too that the KPD's 
ability to form its own strategic and tactical evaluations —  its ability, 
in other words, to respond in its own way to its own perceptions of its 
needs —  was throughout significantly constrained by its connections with 
the Comintern and the Soviet Union. From the perspective of its political 
tradition and the social and economic interests which it represented the 
KPD's opposition to Nazism was fundamental. The KPD's failure and its 
tragedy lay in the fact that this reality never found its full expression.
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12 See, Eva Cornelia Schock, Arbeitslosigkeit und Rationalisierung 
Die Lage der Arbeiter und die kommunistische Gewerkschaftspolitik 
1920-1928, Frankfurt, New York, 1977. Cf: Babette Gross, Willi 
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Nazism for its elector success during 1932.
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See, for example, Herman Jurgen, "Zur Tätigkeit der KPD im 
Reichstag von 1924 bis 1929", Arbeiterbewegung und Parlamentarismus, 
1977, No. 1, pp. 53-59. Jurgen argues that the defence of Soviet 
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relations between Germany and the Soviet Union11 (p. 58) were 
central to the KPD's parliamentary work.
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2 Vols., Frankfurt am Main, 1969.
15 See above, Chapter III, esp. pp. 127-130.
16 See, Babette Gross, ibid., pp. 228-230.
17 In general, the discussion of these aspects of KPD tactics as 
set out in the chapters above, rests on fuller sources and on a 
more comprehensive use of the Communist press than is true in the 
case of Weingartner's book; hence, Weingartner's neglect of 
important detail.
18 Horst Schumacher, "Der VII. Kongress der Kommunistischen 
Internationale zu den Aufgaben und Möglichkeiten der sozial­
demokratischen Bewegung im Kampf gegen Faschismus und Krieg",
BZG, No. 1, (1979), pp. 42-54.
19 The police files contain monthly and yearly summaries of clashes 
between Communists and Nazis and clashes involving other parties. 
See, for example, "Übersicht liber die in Bayern in der Zeit vom 
1. Jan. bis 31. Dez. 1931 verübten politischen Gewaltaten",
BHSA Abt. II, MA 100 426. This report lists one hundred and 
eighty-nine incidents involving the NSDAP; sixty-three involving 
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NSSA (Hannover), Han Des. 122a XI, Massnahme zum Schutz der 
Republik, Vol. 82, "Zusammenstossen politischer Gegner, (18 Dec. 
1930). This report lists clashes in Hannover for 1930.
According to this, there were ten clashes between the NSDAP and 
the KPD; twenty-six between the NSDAP and the SPD/Reichsbanner; 
one between the KPD and the SPD/Reichsbanner. The KPD circulars 
also carry summaries of these events. See, for example, KPD 
Rundschreiben, (April 1931), HSA (Duss.), Duss. 30642(b),
Pp. Duisberg, (17 April 1931). This last notes that between 
January and March 1931 one hundred and one "revolutionary workers" 
were murdered by the Nazis.
20 Cf: Babette Gross, op clt., p. 242; Ossip K. Flechtheim, Die 
KPD in der Weimarer Republik, Frankfurt am Main, 1969, p. 284;
Alan Bullock, Hitler: A Study in Tyranny. New York, 1961, p. 177.
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KPD Rundschreiben, Bl. Ruhrgebiet. (24 Oct. 1931), HSA (Duss.),
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RDP, 30657(f), Pp. Essen, (3 Nov. 1931). This is a strong 
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against the Nazis. The circular insists on the need to link self 
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and to recognize that complete reliance on physical force was 
wrong. See also, KPD Rundschreiben, Bl. Ruhrgebiet. HSA (Duss.), 
RDP, 30657(f), Pp. Bochum, (Dec. 1931). Numerous articles in 
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antifaschistische Aktion", RF, No. 117, (31 May 1932). Cf:
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Professor Timothy Mason of St. Peter's Oxford to whom I am 
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elements in the Communist reaction to the SPD's betrayal of working 
class hopes.
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24 See, Eve Rosenhaft, "The KPD in Berlin", unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, 
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APPENDIX I
APPENDIX I
VOTING ALIGNMENTS IN THE REICHSTAG 1924-1932*
YEAR
NUMBER 
OF VOTES
PERCENTAGE 
OF TOTAL KPD-NSDAP
1924 19 9.6 +0.94
(18)
1925 2 1 1 0 . 6 +0.57
(ID
1926 26 13.2 -0.58
(15)
1927 24 1 2 . 2 +0 . 6 6
(16)
1928 17 8 . 6 +0 . 8 8
(15)
1929 17 8 . 6 +0.52
(9)
1930 26 13.2 +0.80
(2 1)
1931 32 16.2 +0.96
(31)
1932 15 7.6 + 1 . 0 0(15)
TOTALS 197 99.8 +0.73 
(145)
KPD-SPD SPD-Z NSDAP-DNVP KPD-DNVP
-0.84 +0.9 +0.73 +0.57
(16) (17) (14) (ID
-0.71 +0.52 +0 . 6 8 +0 . 6 8
(15) (ID (13) (13)
+0.58 +0.69 +0.65 +0.65
(15) (18) (17) (17)
+0.62 -0 . 6 6 -0.58 -0.79
(15) (16) (14) (19)
-0 . 8 8 +0 . 8 8 -0.58 +0.52
(15) (15) (1 0 ) (9)
-0.58 +0.70 +0.82 -0.64
(1 0 ) (1 2 ) (14) (ID
-0.65 +0.53 +0.65 +0.57
(17) (14) (17) (15)
-0.96 + 1 . 0 0 +0.96 +0.96
(31) (32) (31) (31)
-0.73 +0.80 +0 . 6 6 +0.53
(ID (1 2 ) (1 0 ) (8)
-0 . 6 8 +0.70 +0.67 +0.58
(135) (139) (133) (115)
SUBTOTALS
1924-
1928
1924-
1928
107 54.3 +0 . 6 6
(71)
-0.61
(6 6)
+0.64
(6 8)
+0.57
(61)
+0.51
(55)
without
1926
81 41.1 +0.74
(60)
-0.67
(55)
+0.63
(51)
+0.51
(42)
-0.53
(43)
*The numbers are simple percentage ratios. Given the high degree of voting discipline for 
all five parties, percentage ratios are adequate to establish the simple relationships 
required for this discussion. The plus indicates a positive correlation; the minus 
indicates a negative correlation. The numbers in brackets are the number of votes for 
each calculation. The basis for the selection of votes was random within the following 
framework: , 1 ) votes were selected from several non-consecutive months in each of the 
years; 2) votes were discarded when either the KPD or the NSDAP delegations were not 
present in the Reichstag; 3) an attempt was made to balance the period of highest positive 
correlation between the KPD and the NSDAP (1931-1932) with the period of the lowest 
positive correlation, (1926-1927). The votes from 1931-1932 represent 23.8% of the total 
and those from 1926-1927 represent 25.4%. The votes were taken from Verhandlungen des 
Reichstags, Stenographische Berichte, for 1924-1932, Vols. 381, 383, 388, 391, 394, 428, 
433, 444 and 446.
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